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Making Humanitarian Spaces Global: Coordinating Crisis Response 





This dissertation asks how global humanitarian spaces are being made through the 
socio-material practices associated with the Cluster Approach for the coordination 
of humanitarian action. Drawing on in-depth interviews with humanitarian 
professionals from the UN, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and various 
humanitarian NGOs, participant observation in cluster training courses, and an 
extensive documentary review, this dissertation traces the various practices, 
material arrangements, and knowledge practices through which the Cluster 
Approach is enacting global humanitarian spaces and achieving a global scale of 
humanitarian action. Starting with an exploration of the places and 
territorializations of global spaces, this dissertation moves into an account of the 
ways crises are made knowable and sites are connected through the circulation of 
information within the clusters. The dissertation also looks at the temporal 
orientations of humanitarian action are implicated in the designation of spaces as 
specifically humanitarian by different cluster actors, before finally considering how 
the deployment of different material response items enact different spatial 
relations and timelines of crisis. Rather than finding that practices are unified or 
that they enact global humanitarian spaces in a singular way,  the dissertation finds 
that socio-material practices associated with the Cluster Approach are multiple, 
making different global humanitarian spaces.  
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This dissertation traces the making of global humanitarian spaces through 
the socio-material practices associated with the mechanism for coordinating 
transnational humanitarian action known as the Cluster Approach. Since the end 
of the Cold War, there has been an extraordinary rise in transnational 
humanitarian responses and a significant increase in the number and diversity of 
humanitarian actors (especially in the form of new NGOs). During this period the 
UN has led a series of attempts to coordinate action among this growing number 
of humanitarian actors, the most recent of which was launched in 2005 in the 
shape of the Cluster Approach. The Cluster Approach is a system for 
coordinating humanitarian actors by sector (e.g. health, shelter, water and 
sanitation and so on) at both “global” and “country-levels” in order to ensure 
greater predictability, accountability and partnership in humanitarian responses 
around the world. 
This dissertation argues that, through its various practices and material 
arrangements, the Cluster Approach is enacting a global version of humanitarian 
spaces and achieving an associated global scale of humanitarian action. In tracing 
the practices and material arrangements through which the Cluster Approach is 
enacting and achieving the global, I draw on in-depth interviews with 





observation in trainings for cluster coordinators and cluster information managers, 
and on an extensive review of documents  associated with the Cluster Approach 
and its implementation in humanitarian responses.  
 In this introduction to the dissertation, I lay the groundwork for the 
research at hand, outlining key definitional points, situating my research subject – 
the Cluster Approach – in its immediate historical context and beginning the task 
of situating the research itself within the growing body of social scientific literature 
on humanitarianism (a task continued in Chapter Two especially and throughout 
the empirical chapters as relevant). More specifically, this chapter proceeds as 
follows: I first provide a brief account of what the Cluster Approach is, followed 
by a discussion of the meaning of the designation “humanitarian.” In the next two 
sections I explore first the question of why there has been an increase in 
humanitarian responses in the post-Cold War period and then the rise of a 
technical managerial approach to humanitarian responses. I then provide a short 
history, which situates the Cluster Approach in relation to both the rise of a 
technical managerial approach to action and the UN’s previous attempts at 
coordination. In a final section I provide an outline of the dissertation.  
The Cluster Approach in Brief 
The Cluster Approach is a system for coordinating humanitarian actors by 
sector of humanitarian activity aimed at improving the effectiveness, predictability 





Agency Standing Committee (IASC),1 the Cluster Approach initially established 
global clusters in nine areas of humanitarian response where there were “clearly 
identified gaps in capacity”  (IASC 2006: 3), with two additional global clusters 
established in the following year (see Table 1.1). Country-level clusters were 
established immediately in selected roll-out countries and were to be established 
for all “major new emergencies” (IASC 2006).2 Country-level clusters generally 
mirror the global clusters, however, in some countries certain sectors are 
combined (for example, nutrition and health) or omitted as appropriate to the 
particular situation.  
For each cluster, the IASC has designated a lead agency: an agency 
responsible for providing leadership in the cluster (that is, within the designated 
sector of humanitarian action) and which would be accountable to the UN 
Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) for this leadership.3 As the Cluster 
Evaluation Phase I report notes, by providing a “locus of responsibility,” the 
designation of a lead agency “most crucially differentiates the cluster approach 
from earlier modes of coordination” (Stoddard et al. 2007: 9). Previously, if 
humanitarian coordination proved ineffective, there was no mechanism to hold 
one agency or organization responsible. However, in the Cluster Approach, a 
                                              
1 IASC is a Geneva-based forum for policy development and coordinated decision-making between the 
UN’s humanitarian agencies and key non-UN humanitarian actors from the Red Cross/Red Crescent 
Movement and humanitarian NGO communities. 
2 Notably, although the IASC Guidance Note states that clusters are to be implemented for all major new 
emergencies, in practice, country-level clusters have only been implemented in countries where the UN has 
a Resident Coordinator or Humanitarian Coordinator in place. This discrepancy is discussed in Chapter 
Four. 
3 The exception to this is the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), 
which co-leads the Shelter Cluster. The IFRC holds a Memo of Understanding with the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in which it was agreed that IFRC does not accept 
accountability obligations beyond those defined in its Constitutions and own policies and it is therefore not 





single lead agency assumes responsibility for humanitarian outcomes in their 
sector or areas of activity, including pursuing effective inter-agency coordination 
(IASC 2006). To narrow this responsibility further, the lead agency is tasked with 
appointing a Global Cluster Coordinator who is “responsible for the day-to-day 
coordination and facilitation of the work of [the] global cluster” (IASC 2010). 
Country-level Cluster Coordinators are similarly appointed by the lead agency at 
country-level (which is usually, but not necessarily the same as the global lead 
agency).  
In brief, the Cluster Approach is intended to bring together many 
humanitarian agencies and organizations in cooperation to effect more efficient, 
predictable humanitarian responses. Described in the Cluster Evaluation Phase II 
Synthesis Report as “coordination(+) platforms the clusters are not merely forums 
for general coordination (like IASC), but also platforms for “elements that go 
beyond mere coordination, such as peer review, learning, or the organization of a 
common response” (Streets et al. 2010: 25). Table 1.2 lists the specific 
responsibilities assigned to the global clusters by the IASC, which are ordered 
around three broad areas: standards and policy-setting, capacity building and 
operational support. The country-level clusters, meanwhile, are tasked with 
coordinating sectoral actors in specific crisis responses and with ensuring that 
standards for practice set by the global clusters are met during these responses 






Table 1.1: Global Clusters and their IASC Designated Lead Agencies, 2011 
 
Cluster area, by type Cluster Lead Agency 
Clusters in Emergency Response Areas* 
 Food Security
4
 FAO and WFP (co-leads) 
 Camp Coordination & Camp 
Management (CCCM) 
UNHCR (conflict), 
IOM (natural disaster) 
 Early Recovery UNDP  
 Education UNICEF and Save the 
Children (co-leads) 
 Emergency Shelter UNHCR (conflict), 
IFRC
5
 (natural disaster) 
 Health  WHO  
 Nutrition UNICEF  
 Protection UNHCR  




 Emergency telecommunications OCHA (process owner),    
WFP (service provider) 
 Logistics WFP  
* Emergency Response Area clusters are those which work directly with beneficiaries (victims of 
crises); Service clusters are those which do not interact directly with beneficiaries, but instead support 
and facilitate the work of other agencies/organizations. 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
It should be noted that, while the Cluster Approach aims to achieve 
effective coordination and collaboration between all humanitarian agencies and 
organizations working in particular humanitarian responses, not all humanitarian 
actors participate in the Cluster Approach and not all who do participate do so in 
the same way or with the same level of commitment. Some groups – most notably 
ICRC and MSF – remain “observers,” rather than members, of the clusters in 
                                              
4 The Global Food Security Cluster, co-lead by FAO and WFP, was established in 2011; the new Food 
Security Cluster absorbed the previously established FAO-led Global Agriculture Cluster. 





order to maintain their neutrality. Others, particularly smaller national or local 
NGOs, are left out of the clusters through oversight or inaccessibility. Still others 
choose not to participate in the Cluster Approach for other reasons, be they 
ideological, practical or budgetary in nature. Moreover, even among fully 
participating members of the clusters, a diversity of goals, opinions, and practices 
is the norm rather than the exception.  
Table 1.2: Responsibilities of Global Clusters as Assigned by the IASC 
 
Standards and policy-setting:  
 - Consolidation and dissemination of standards 
 - Where necessary, development of standards and policies 
 - Identification of ‘best practice’ 
Building response capacity: 
 - Training and system development at the local, national, regional and 
international levels 
 - Establishing and maintaining surge capacity and standby rosters 
 - Establishing and maintaining material stockpiles 
Operational Support: 
 - Assessment of needs for human, financial and institutional capacity 
 - Emergency preparedness and long term planning 
 - Securing access to appropriate technical expertise 
 - Advocacy and resource mobilization 
 - Pooling resources and ensuring complementarity of efforts through 
enhanced partnerships 
Source: IASC 2006: 4  
 
The empirical chapters examine many of the challenges, debates and 
exclusions found within the clusters in their attempts to achieve coordination and 
collaboration between a multiplicity of humanitarian actors. However, for readers 
unfamiliar with the field of humanitarian action,  I first situate the Cluster 





humanitarian relief; second, recent debates around what the aim and scope of 
humanitarian action should be; third, the question of how to understand  the  
increase in humanitarian responses in the post-Cold War period; and, fourth, the  
rise in a managerial, technical approach to humanitarian practice, of which the 
Cluster Approach may be seen as the most recent manifestation.  
A Brief History of Humanitarian Action in the 20th Century  
Modern humanitarianism is often traced back to the abolitionist movement 
of the 18th and 19th centuries followed by the rise of various humane movements 
in Victorian England (e.g. Wilkinson 2005). Already in this earlier period, Calhoun 
identifies an emergent rational orientation to humanitarian action, evidenced in 
the humanitarian reform and philanthropic movements of the 19th century, 
through which “action in response to [suffering] was made orderly and goal 
directed” (2008: 77). This rationalization was carried forward more fully in the 
founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and its 
associated inter-state legal agreements establishing International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL). After the First World War the League of Nations furthered the 
internationalization of humanitarian action, with its aims of providing 
international relief and maintaining peace through diplomatic channels.  
After the World War II, Calhoun notes (2008: 83), there were renewed 
efforts, especially through the UN system, at delineating international 
humanitarian norms and building new institutions for overseeing their 





eye not only to simple charity, but to a rising politics of human rights. 6 Perhaps 
most significantly in this respect, the scope and scale of the Holocaust gave rise to 
the idea of crimes against humanitarian and the legal formulation of genocide. In 
1948 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Further, in 1949, the Geneva Convention was signed, updating 
and expanding earlier treaties on IHL. Thus, the renewed focus on humanitarian 
concerns in the aftermath of World War II was entangled with a new focus on 
human rights and the protection of civilians.  
In the years immediately following World War II, massive refugee crises in 
Europe also gave rise to a further component of the United Nations’ humanitarian 
response: first, in 1945, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA), later replaced by the International Refugee 
Organization in 1947 and, finally, by the permanent agency of the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950. In addition to UNHCR, in the 
five years following the Second World War, three other UN agencies that would 
come to play significant roles in the transnational humanitarian system were 
founded – FAO (1945), UNICEF (1946) and WHO (1948).  
However, this florescence of new institutions and legal agreements 
associated with humanitarianism and human rights after World War II, was 
quickly brought to a standstill by the very different challenge posed by the onset 
                                              
6 These values are notably expressed in preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, which begins, “We 
the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, 
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of 





of the Cold War. As Tsui and Myint-U argue, this effectively “paralysed UN 
action for more than four decades” (Tsui and Myint-U 2004: 3).  
Closing off Humanitarian Spaces: the Cold War 
Accordingly, during the Cold War the UN assumed only minimal 
involvement in humanitarian operations, instead focusing aid primarily on social 
and economic development projects. In the early 1960s the UN founded the WFP 
(1961) and the UNDP (1965),7 while UNICEF, FAO and WHO moved away 
from earlier humanitarian aims in favor of a heightened focus on development. 
International humanitarian NGOs like Save the Children, Care and Oxfam 
followed suit, reorienting their missions towards development work. In this 
period, doctrines of national security originating both in the tension between 
superpowers and the (understandable) sensitivities of newly decolonized states 
placed concerns for state sovereignty ahead of humanitarian issues. In the biggest 
humanitarian crises of the 1950s and 1960s – Partition, China’s “Great Leap 
Forward,” Algeria and Vietnam – the UN and the largest international 
humanitarian NGOs abstained from humanitarian involvement.  
In 1971, following a limited – and largely unsuccessful – humanitarian 
involvement in the Third Indo-Pakistani War (through which Bangladesh was 
established)8, a report to the UN Secretariat went as far as to recommend that the 
                                              
7 The UNDP merged the UN Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, established in 1949, and the 
UN Special Fund, established in 1958.  
8 India’s invasion of East Pakistan (what is now Bangladesh), following the influx of an estimated 10 
million refugees fleeing religious persecution by Pakistani army, is considered one of the first 
“humanitarian interventions” (Sinha 2002). After failing to garner support for action by the UN Security 
council for its actions, the Indian government broke with international norms of state sovereignty, invading 
East Pakistan in a military engagement that resulted in its secession as the independent state of Bangladesh. 
Justifying this military engagement in the name of humanitarian concern for the people of East Pakistan, 





UN withdraw altogether from humanitarian endeavors, leaving this work to the 
Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. Although this recommendation was 
officially rejected, for the next twenty years the UN engaged only minimally with 
the provision of humanitarian relief. What humanitarian relief the UN did partake 
in over this time, was primarily in the form of relief after natural disasters, 
provided at the specific request of national governments and organized by the UN 
Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) set up in 1971 for that purpose. (The 
exception to this was the distribution of food aid during the large-scale famines in 
sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s). 
Outside of the UN system, however, the 1970s marked a resurgence for 
humanitarian action, sparked by the founding of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
in 1971 by a group of French doctors and journalists. The former had broken with 
the French Red Cross and the ICRC over their adherence to the principle of strict 
neutrality – and, critically, its associated stance on public silence – in the provision 
of humanitarian assistance during the Nigerian civil war in with the state of Biafra 
attempted to secede.9  The newly formed MSF based its work on principles nearly 
identical to those of the ICRC, with one critical difference: the commitment to 
témoignage (roughly translated as “witnessing”), which has served as the justification 
for MSF’s tradition of speaking out publicly against the human rights violations it 
witnesses (Barnett 2011: 145; see also Redfield 2006). As Chapter Two revisits in 
greater detail, perhaps the most significant aspect of MSF’s founding for 
transnational humanitarian action, at least in symbolic terms, was the new 
                                              
9 The accusation was that the Red Cross had stood silent to genocide in their refusal to speak publicly on 





organization’s public declaration – marked in its very choice of name – that the 
authority of national borders was subordinate to the right of populations within 
those borders to receive humanitarian assistance.  
Opening Spaces: Resolution 46/182 and Beyond 
The situation changed dramatically with the withdrawal of the superpowers 
from proxy conflicts at the end of the Cold War. The dissolution of the bipolar 
standoff between the US and the Soviet Union opened up unprecedented 
humanitarian access to populations put at risk by violent conflicts and allowed the 
UN to play a new role in conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and humanitarian 
relief. In December of 1991 – just months after the fall of the Soviet Union – the 
UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 46/182 on the “Strengthening of the 
coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations,” 
commencing a series of efforts to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian 
responses to natural disasters and complex emergencies through increased 
coordination and leadership. Among these efforts were the systematic pooling of 
crisis early warning information between UN agencies, the provision of assistance 
to disaster prone countries for strengthening national disaster response capacities, 
and the establishment of stand-by arrangements for seconding personnel and 
materials between UN, NGOs, governments. Resolution 46/182 also established 
the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF, later recreated as the Central 
Emergency Relief Fund), a pooled emergency fund designed to streamline the 






Perhaps most significantly, Resolution 46/182 gave rise to three of the 
most important humanitarian structures in the contemporary UN system: the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC); the Department of Humanitarian 
Affairs (DHA, later reorganized as the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA); and the Under-Secretary General position of 
Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). Critical to the approach to humanitarian 
action that Resolution 46/182 engendered was the fact that it was framed in the 
context of the UN’s International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. The 
result was that an orientation of prevention, preparedness, mitigation and 
response followed by recovery rehabilitation and development “were simply 
transported from the context of the ‘natural’ disaster to that of the ‘complex 
emergency’” (Tsui and Myint-U 2004: 10). In transporting the lessons learned 
from dealing with natural disasters into responses to humanitarian crises caused by 
violent conflict, Resolution 46/182 called for an essentially technical approach to 
both, aiming to effect better efficiency in humanitarian responses through 
establishing standardized structures and procedures for crisis response aimed at 
effecting “an automatic response that would draw the system together in times of 
emergency” (ibid., emphasis original). 
This moment can be seen as marking a major step towards the kind of 
“managerial, technical” approach to humanitarian action that the Cluster 
Approach later came to stand for (to be discussed further below). At the same 
time, just months after the passage of Resolution 46/182,  then Secretary General 





together the UN’s peacekeeping agenda with its humanitarian one, ushering in the 
era of “integrated missions” (see 2004).  
As Stockton points out, 
although Resolution 46/182 had stated that ‘humanitarian assistance must be provided in 
accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality’, within a few 
months the Agenda for Peace had indicated that humanitarian assistance could, and indeed 
should be, used for political purposes also, so long as these served the cause of peace. 
(2004: 27) 
Born of the optimism that characterized UN actions at end of the Cold War (a 
phenomenon discussed in more detail in Chapter Two), the Agenda for Peace was 
soon put to the test by the messy, protracted humanitarian crises the 1990s, 
including genocide in Rwanda and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. In the aftermath of 
the Rwandan genocide (in which the UN system failed to intervene), humanitarian 
actors found themselves feeding and giving healthcare to the genocidaires alongside 
other Hutu refugees in the Goma refugee camps in Zaire (now the Democratic 
Republic of Congo). Threatening both aid workers and other residents with 
violence, the genocidaires  quickly gained the upper hand, using the camps as bases 
for operation. Finding this situation untenable, MSF France withdrew from the 
camps, but many humanitarian actors, including UNHCR, stayed in place, not 
wanted to abandon “legitimate” refugees. A year later in Bosnia, over 8,000 
Muslim men and boys were massacred by Bosnian Serb forces in the UN-declared 
“safe zone” of Srebenica under the watching eyes of the UN peacekeepers 
stationed there.  
By the latter half of the 1990s it was clear that the “automatic response” 
envisioned by 46/182 has not materialized. Not only were the responses to crises 
caused by violent conflicts more complicated than imagined in the natural disaster 





new coordination mechanisms in place. Rather than throwing in the towel on the 
Agenda for Peace’s vision for the coordination of humanitarian action, human rights 
and peacekeeping, however, in 1997 Secretary General Kofi Annan launched his 
UN reform process, through which human rights were named as a central and 
cross-cutting field for all UN programs and missions. In service of this, the 1997 
reform also placed a renewed emphasis on coordination between humanitarian 
assistance and the UN’s political and development arms, giving rise to the idea of 
the “integrated mission.”  
In 2001, a decade after the UN adopted Resolution 46/182, the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)10 
released its report, The Responsibility to Protect. The report centered on two basic 
principles: first, “State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary 
responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself”; and second, 
“Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, 
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or 
unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect” (ICISS 2001: 13). Following on the heels of 
a decade that saw the rise of integrated missions, humanitarian interventions, and 
a progressive elevation of the language of rights (including to humanitarian 
assistance and protection), The Responsibility to Protect report articulated an 
important shift in the understanding of state sovereignty in the international 
                                              
10 ICISS was an independent international organization established in 2000 with a one year mandate to 
examine the relationship between sovereignty and humanitarian violations and “to build a broader 
understanding of these issues and to foster a global political consensus on how to move towards action 





system: whereas previously states were the bearers of rights in this political system, 
now the basic rights of individuals were given precedence.  
In 2004, in response to the recurrence of humanitarian failures during the 
crisis in Darfur, Jan Egeland, the ERC at the time, commissioned a review of the 
transnational humanitarian response systems. The resulting report, the 
Humanitarian Response Review (Adinolfi et al. 2005), highlighted the persistence of 
“well-known long-standing gaps” in the transnational humanitarian response 
system and made a series of recommendations for improving humanitarian action. 
In reaction to these findings, IASC launched the Humanitarian Reform Initiative 
in 2005 with the purpose of increasing the predictability, effectiveness and 
accountability of humanitarian responses. Initially the Humanitarian Reform was 
structured around three “pillars”: improved humanitarian leadership, better 
coordination of humanitarian action, and faster, more predictable funding. A 
fourth pillar, “effective partnerships” was added in 2007, following the 
recommendations of the recently convened Global Humanitarian Platform. Part 
of this Humanitarian Reform Initiative, the Cluster Approach was launched to 
address the pillar of coordination, later also taking on the task of effective 
partnerships between humanitarian actors.  
The following section examines some of the major the debates within the 
humanitarian community around what humanitarian action can and should 
achieve. Outlining these debates and what is at stake in them both helps to explain 
the great diversity of goals and practices within the humanitarian community and 





What Should Humanitarian Action Do? 
The term “humanitarian” is almost always ascribed to situations, and to 
types of action in response to them, by (self-designated) humanitarian actors 
themselves. Writing on this reflexive nature of the designation “humanitarian,” 
Nicholas Stockton notes that  
it is a conceptual product of the relief agencies ... as it is the international aid system 
which effectively decides what is a “humanitarian” emergency and what is not, and as it 
is largely the international aid system which designs, manages and evaluates the response, 
and which pays for the production of humanitarian “history” (2004: 16) 
While a number of scholars have taken up the cause of exploring what the 
designation “humanitarian” might connote as well as the task producing 
humanitarian histories (with regards to the latter, see Barnett and Weiss 2008b; 
Barnett 2011; Bornstein and Redfield 2007, 2011), it remains the case that both 
humanitarian crises and humanitarian responses are almost exclusively designated 
as such by humanitarian relief agencies and NGOs themselves. As such, in this 
dissertation I largely follow the Cluster Approach’s own – shifting and ever fuzzy 
at the edges – definitions of what humanitarian action is (see Chapter Three for a 
longer discussion on this point). At the same time, it is worth taking a moment to 
outline what is at stake in the definition of situations and actions in response to 
them as specifically humanitarian. 
Craig Calhoun has suggested that a key feature distinguishing humanitarian 
action from other fields, such as human rights and development work, is the 
former’s focus on “humane responses to immediate suffering” (2008: 90). This 
definition allows for an analytic separation between activities which can be 
thought of as “agendas for improving the human condition” in general, and those 





crisis or catastrophe (ibid.). While Calhoun’s description distills what is perhaps at 
the heart of the designation “humanitarian,” beyond this basic quality – humane 
responses to immediate suffering – there are a range of other issues that arise. 
To start, the idea of responding to immediate suffering also suggests a 
particular temporal orientation of humanitarian action, which, in contrast to other 
forms of action aimed at alleviating human suffering, is particularly focused on 
action in the immediate present of suffering. That is, as Peter Redfield points out,  
[w]hile the project of human rights is concerned with redressing past wrongs and 
development projects focus on building future capacities, humanitarian action is focused 
only on the present with its immediate imperative to reduce suffering and save lives 
(Redfield 2005: 338; see also Bornstein and Redfield 2007). 
This temporal orientation towards acting in the urgent present is, for many 
observers and humanitarian actors, a critical feature separating specifically 
humanitarian action from other forms of action aimed at alleviating suffering. At 
the same time, as Chapters Six and Seven of this dissertation demonstrate, the 
question of the appropriate temporal orientation for humanitarian action has been 
a growing source of contention in the field.  
The ambiguity in the meaning of humanitarian is most apparent in the 
increasing array of activities calling themselves “humanitarian,” including those 
which might otherwise fall under the domains of economic and social 
development, of politics (particularly the politics of human rights), and – at the 
extreme – of warfare in the case of so-called “humanitarian interventions.” With 
regards to the latter, Ed Tsui and Thant Myint-U suggest that the term 
“humanitarian intervention” effects “a semantic confusion between the external 
provision of life-saving aid, in order to ameliorate the consequences of conflict, 





itself” (2004: 5). Most humanitarian agencies and organizations would be quick to 
draw a line between their aims and actions and those of military actors who take 
the name “humanitarian” for armed interventions. However, the lines separating 
the aims and actions of humanitarian from those of either  development or human 
rights actors are much less clear. Reflecting this, Barnett and Snyder observe that 
almost all of the major transnational humanitarian agencies and organizations 
(with the notable exception of the ICRC) embrace some form of human rights 
and/or development principles as part of their mission (2008: 158).  
Inevitably, the application of the term “humanitarian” to an increasing 
array of activities in the world has led to contentious debates within and outside 
the field of humanitarian action over the appropriate meaning of the term. More 
often than not, this debate splits along lines of those who subscribe to the Red 
Cross’s strict definition of humanitarianism, which emphasized neutrality and 
impartiality in the relief of immediate suffering, and those who would align 
humanitarian action with a wider politics of human rights or development. 
Calhoun characterizes these two sides as reflecting an ongoing “tension between 
‘consequentialist’ efforts to link assistance to projects of social transformation and 
the ‘minimalist’ approach that would limit humanitarian assistance to simple care 
and protection” (2008: 75).  
Capturing the broad lines of this wider debate is the particular 
disagreement between public scholars David Rieff and Michael Ignatieff. On the 
one side, Rieff argues for restricting the aims of humanitarian action in line with 
basic charity – free from pretensions to anything grander than the straightforward 





emergency medical care or a simple “bed for the night” (Rieff 2002). This is an 
argument for humanitarian relief in the tradition of the ICRC, (ideally) separate 
from any form of politics and deliberately limited in scope. It is also an argument 
that stands in contrast to many contemporary notions of what humanitarian relief 
should aim to do (Calhoun 2008).  
On the other side of this debate, Ignatieff (e.g. 1997, 2004) argues for a 
humanitarian action aimed at not only relieving immediate suffering but also at 
improving the human condition more broadly. This is a view that draws a 
connection between the immediate suffering of humanitarian crises and the causes 
of this suffering and concludes that this suffering could be best addressed and 
possibly even prevented through the enforcement of positive human rights 
and/or the inclusion of development principles. This approach to humanitarian 
action is also highly concerned with the outcomes of humanitarian action, 
particularly to the extent that these should ensure human rights, aid in (or at least 
not hinder) the progress of development and, in some versions (e.g. M. B. 
Anderson 1999), even support “peace-building” (involving, among other things, 
the insertion of armed peacekeeping troops into a situation). In seeking to alleviate 
suffering through the elimination of its causes, subscribers to this 
“consequentialist” version of humanitarian action move humanitarian action 
beyond mere relief, blurring the lines between humanitarian action and action 
associated with human rights and development (Barnett 2008: 241; Barnett and 
Snyder 2008: 150).  
In addition to these two competing approaches to humanitarian action – a 





orientation: the managerial approach to humanitarian crises. This technical, 
procedural approach aims to “solve” humanitarian crises by restoring the 
“normal” order of things as quickly as possible. This involves the 
conceptualization of humanitarian crises – reframed as “emergencies” – as 
sudden, unpredictable ruptures in the normal functioning of things and, 
accordingly, concerns itself with restoring the “normal” global order (Calhoun 
2004, 2008). This approach, and the associated use of the term “complex 
emergency” for designating humanitarian crises, makes no distinction between the 
causes of crises (i.e. natural disasters versus conflict), instead defining crises only 
in terms of the required multifaceted response (Terry 2002).  
The technical managerial approach to humanitarian action is most clearly 
associated with the work of the UN humanitarian agencies, although it is 
increasingly central throughout the transnational humanitarian community. The 
launch of the Cluster Approach, aimed at improving the efficacy and predictability 
of humanitarian responses through enhancing technical and organizational 
capacities and managerial capabilities for crisis response, epitomizes the rise of this 
approach. Standing outside of the minimalist versus consequentialist debates, this 
managerial approach to humanitarian action is much more concerned with the 
development of technical expertise, operational capacities, and procedural 
accountabilities for maximizing the effectiveness of humanitarian responses than 
it is with any moral or philosophical questions about the meaning and purpose of 
humanitarian action. I revisit this approach to humanitarian action below in a 





following section considers the question of why there has been such a dramatic 
rise in humanitarian responses since the end of the Cold War. .  
New Crises or New Spaces?  
As noted above, there has been a significant rise in transnational 
humanitarian action since the end of the Cold War. Whether this rise corresponds 
to an increase in the number of humanitarian crises occurring around the world or 
simply to an increase in humanitarian responses has been a subject of much debate. 
On the one hand are those who suggest there has been a change in the nature of 
violent conflicts and/or a rise in the number and severity of natural disasters 
resulting in more civilians being put at risk than ever before. On the other hand 
are those who hold that what we are seeing is not a rise in human suffering, but 
rather an opening up of humanitarian space, such that humanitarian actors now 
have more opportunities to stage humanitarian responses to this suffering than 
ever before.  
Prominent among the proponents of the former argument (that 
humanitarian crises are on the rise, or at least have changed in some way for the 
worse), are a group of scholars working on so-called “new wars” (e.g. Kaldor 
1999; Duffield 2001; Münkler 2005; Hoffman and Weiss 2006). With varying 
levels of nuance, this scholarship explores the changing nature of warfare in the 
late 20th and early 21st centuries, sharing a general argument that “traditional” 
warfare (as a contest between two or more state militaries) has given way to a 
more complex reality in which the line between civilians and combatants has 
blurred and where civilians have become the direct and deliberate targets of war 





is that this form of warfare puts more civilians at risk, leading to more 
humanitarian crises than ever before. For example, it is suggested that, because 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) was written to apply to states, it is rarely 
observed by non-state parties to violence, who are often either unaware of these 
international laws and protocols, or believe that – as non-state actors – they will 
not be held accountable to them (Münkler 2005; Hoffman and Weiss 2006). 
Others have argued that the flaunting of IHL is exacerbated by the corrupting 
effects of a rise in the monetary incentives for non-state parties to warfare – 
including those with informal monetary incentives like warlords and certain militia 
groups, as well as those with formal monetary incentives such as private military 
and security companies hired by governments, individuals and corporations 
(Leander 2006, 2010; Kjellman 2010).  
While it seems apparent that some aspects of contemporary warfare are, if 
not entirely “new,” then at least becoming more common, it is less clear whether 
this has contributed to a greater number of humanitarian crises than in previous 
periods. As Fiona Terry (2002, 2004) points out, IHL has been flouted in war 
since its inception, offering notable examples of this in atrocities committed by 
state forces against civilians during the Vietnam war and the Cold War conflicts of 
Central America, in the aerial bombings in World War Two that failed to 
distinguish between civilian and military targets, and in the targeting of the Red 
Cross in Ethiopia by the Italian army in the 1930s. In addition to Terry’s 
examples, I would suggest that one would be hard pressed to argue that today’s 





humanitarian crisis of the mid-20th century: the Holocaust, Partition, and China’s 
“Great Leap Forward.”  
Even with regards to the undisputed rise in attacks on humanitarian aid 
workers in the past decade, Laura Hammond (2008) notes that this is most 
apparent in contexts where the neutrality of humanitarian aid is in doubt, such as 
when humanitarian aid was used to convey the supposed goodwill of invading 
armies to local populations in the “hearts and minds” campaigns of the recent 
U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (see also Barnett and Weiss 2008a). 
Terry would also add that there are more humanitarian workers, closer to the 
heart of crises than ever before, therefore almost guaranteeing that more will be 
attacked than in the past. In short, Terry argues that the idea that civilians were 
shielded from the worst effects of war when it was carried out by formal state 
militaries, or that IHL is less respected now than in the past, is nothing more than 
a “tenacious myth,” reflecting what could only be described as a “collective 
historical amnesia” (Terry 2002: 10, 12). If humanitarian crises appear to be on the 
rise, Terry concludes, it is simply because more humanitarian actors are witnessing 
more crises as “the main field of [humanitarian] intervention has shifted from 
refugee camps on the periphery of conflicts to the very heart of contested 
territories” (Terry 2004: 42; see also Barnett and Weiss 2008a). 
But if humanitarian crises are no worse than in the past, it is still possible 
that there are a greater number. On this point it is useful to consider Craig 
Calhoun’s (2004) work on the seeming rise in humanitarian emergencies. 
Specifically, Calhoun suggests that what is most apparently new in the relationship 





frequency of humanitarian crises, but rather “an apparent compulsion to 
intervene” (2004: 374). That is, whether or not we are seeing an increase in 
humanitarian crises, there is an undoubted increase in the number of humanitarian 
crises being responded to, as well as in the number of humanitarian responders in the 
form of new (or newly humanitarian-focused) NGOs as well as various UN 
agencies liberated from the political constraints against humanitarian action they 
had experienced during the Cold War (Tsui and Myint-U 2004). This corresponds 
in large part to the opening up of sovereign territories in the wake of the Cold 
War. Access to affected populations is, after all, a crucial precondition for the 
carrying out of transnational humanitarian responses.  
A final point that should also considered, is that the opening up of 
sovereign spaces has not only brought more humanitarian actors to the scene of 
humanitarian crises, it has also brought more international media coverage. 
Alongside increased access to affected population, advances in media technology 
and the advent of the 24 hour news cycle have led to real time media coverage of 
humanitarian crises, bringing images from crises live to television and computer 
screens around the world. In an important philosophical text on this subject, Luc 
Boltanski (1999) explores the moral and political dilemmas presented to the 
viewer, or “moral spectator,” by the televising of the suffering of distant others. 
Others have explored the more concrete aspects of increased media coverage of 
humanitarian crises, with the so-called “CNN effect” indicated in both journalistic 
(e.g. Ignatieff 1997; Rieff 2002; Soderlund and Briggs 2008) and scholarly (e.g. 
Jakobsen 1996; Robinson 2000; Balabanova 2010) accounts. This “effect” is held 





which brings a corresponding increase in funding and support for humanitarian 
responses to these crises. At the same time, the downside of being subject to the 
demands of the 24 hour news cycle is that this attention is fleeting. Crises that are 
slow-moving are often overlooked, those that become protracted are forgotten, 
and those with complicated explanations often simplified to fit into news-slots of 
a few minutes of less (Calhoun 2004; Rieff 2002).  
The Rationalization of Humanitarian Practice 
At the same time as changes in access to populations and media coverage 
of humanitarian crises were underway, advances in transportation and 
communications technologies have opened up new possibilities for ever more 
rapid and efficient humanitarian responses. As Tsui and Myint-U point out, 
however, whether or not the potential for increased speed and efficiency was 
realized in particular crises “depended more and more upon how they were 
managed and coordinated” (2004: 4). In particular this speaks to the increasing 
professionalization of humanitarian action and accompanying debates about the 
need for increased efficiency in humanitarian responses.  
After decades of being loosely organized on a primarily volunteer, ad hoc 
basis, by 1990s a generation of humanitarian workers had spent their entire careers 
working in humanitarian responses, from working in Biafra and Bangladesh in the 
late 1960s and ‘70s, to the famine in the Horn of Africa in the ‘80s and to Kurdish 
Iraqi crisis in 1991 (Tsui and Myint-U 2004). Barnett (2008) argues that what had 
emerged as a humanitarian “community of practice” in the early 1990s by the mid-
2000s had become a “field” in the sense described by Dimaggio & Powell (1983, 





In short, [the members of the humanitarian community of practice] are undergoing 
rationalization—developing standardized codes of conduct, accountability mechanisms, 
methodologies for calculating the consequences of their actions, abstract rules to guide 
standardized responses, and procedures to improve efficiency and identify the best 
means to achieve specified ends; bureaucratization—developing specialized knowledge, 
spheres of competence, divisions of labor and areas of specialization, and rules for 
determining the optimal means for given situations, fixed doctrine, and vocational 
qualifications that derive from advanced training. (2008: 253-54). 
These trends towards rationalization, specialization and bureaucratization are 
evident, for example, in the proliferation of humanitarian forums and consortia, 
the development of industry-wide standards, such as the Sphere minimum 
standards for humanitarian response and enhanced mechanisms for coordination 
and management between humanitarian actors, of which the Cluster Approach is 
the latest realization. The professionalization of humanitarian actors can also been 
seen in the Bourdieusian sense of these actors sharing a logic of practice (Krause 
2009). 
 An additional expression of the rationalization of humanitarian work has 
been that, as noted above, within the UN system crises resulting from violent 
conflict have been treated with more or less the same managerial technical 
approach originally developed in responses to crises resulting from natural 
disasters. As a result, Tsui and Myint-U (2004: 6) argue that matters of principle 
and long term strategies were set aside in favor of achieving better immediate 
management of humanitarian “emergencies” (a term which had come to replace 
“crisis” in describing the humanitarian situations resulting both from violent 
conflict and natural disaster). 
The rationalization of humanitarian action is also reflected in the 
rationalization – in the form of quantification – of human suffering. On this 





idea of saving lives is dependent on counting lives, yet  “it is a minimal sense of 
life that is counted in statistics of those lost (or lives saved).” There is thus an 
ethical tension inherent in the value ascribed to lives saved through humanitarian 
action. Yet, the counting of lives, while reflecting the instrumental rationality of a 
managerial orientation to action, however, is done in service of a value rationality 
which remains oriented towards the humanitarian imperative of saving lives and 
reducing suffering. The tension between what is saved – lives – and what is lost – 
lives elaborated beyond mere physical existence – is central to the question of how 
global humanitarian spaces are made and what those spaces look like. It is a 
tension that surfaces throughout the empirical chapters of this dissertation and on 
which Chapter Two theoretically elaborates. 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 In the following chapter, I outline this dissertation’s approach for thinking 
about (humanitarian) space. I first examine and then reject the assumptions that 
often (if implicitly) inform conceptualizations of space as static, pre-given and 
outside of time. I then lay out the elements for a reconceptualization of space as 
entangled with time, dynamic and social. In addition to laying out my thinking on 
space in general, including exploring the spatial processes involved in the 
production of relational scales, this chapter also looks at the more specific spatial 
processes associated with the nationalization and globalization of social spaces (in 
general) and of humanitarian spaces (in particular).  
Chapter Three turns to the methodological concerns of this dissertation, 
discussing both approaches that orient the research at hand and the specific 





which sets Saskia Sassen’s concept of “analytic borderlands” in conversation with 
Sarah Whatmore’s “hybrid geographies,” this chapter provides a rationale for my 
specific focus on socio-material practices, including discussions on following 
practices, the implication of the material in the social and on crafting accounts. It 
also gives an account of how I approached and carried out research in the form 
on in-depth interviews, participant observation and an extensive documentary 
review.  
 In Chapter Four I begin my empirical investigation with a focus on the 
places of the Cluster Approach. Locating the places where the global and country-
level clusters are at work, it draws attention to the situated practices through 
which global humanitarian spaces are made. It also unsettles the spatial 
imagination of place and placelessness and nested hierarchical scaled implicit in 
the architecture of the Cluster Approach. This chapter also looks at two emergent 
territorializations of global humanitarian spaces, using the case of the 2008 
cyclone Nargis response in Myanmar to illustrate the translocal territoriality 
effected through articulations between global and local places, followed by the 
case of the Kenya clusters to illustrate a denationalized national territoriality of the 
global.  
 Having located the places where the clusters are at work, Chapter Five 
turns to the practices and decision-making processes of cluster information 
managers as they work to make humanitarian crises knowable at a distance and 
over time. This chapter also considers how the process of making crises knowable 
through the circulation of standardized information connects sites and stabilizes 





calculations and professional judgments that shape how (and when) information 
managers gather, interpret, present and circulate information about ongoing crises 
are also considered. This chapter ends with a counter-example in the case of 
Somalia, which illustrates the conditions under which information about 
humanitarian crises resists conversion into knowledge about those crises and 
therefore resists enrolment into the global scale. 
 Chapter Six compares two different temporal orientations to humanitarian 
action. The first is a temporal orientation toward acting in the urgent present, 
what I call and orientation towards “saving lives today.” The second is an 
emergent temporal (re)orientation, which remains focused on urgent action in the 
immediate present, but with an eye toward minimizing harm in the future, what I 
call “saving lives today, with the future in mind.” In this chapter I trace two cases 
in which humanitarian space is defined through, and reinforces, the different 
temporal orientations of humanitarian action. The first case looks at how the 
Food Security Cluster, oriented by a temporality of saving lives today, defines 
food security crises using a standardized classification system that enacts 
humanitarian spaces in terms of emergency and rupture. The second case looks at 
how the Education Cluster, oriented to saving lives today with tomorrow in mind, 
is seeking to (re)define humanitarian spaces as requiring not only urgent action to 
save lives, but also urgent action to sustain those lives, enacting humanitarian 
spaces in terms of “comprehensive” responses.   
Finally, Chapter Seven explores how the mobilization of different material 
objects for effecting humanitarian responses is implicated in the enactment of 





humanitarian action. This is illustrated through the case of two different 
emergency shelter items deployed for effecting emergency shelter responses: the 
family tent and the shelter kit. Building on concepts drawn from Bruno Latour, as 
well as John Law and Annmarie Mol, the family tent is found to move as an 
immutable mobile, stabilizing spatial relationships and material arrangements 
across sites of humanitarian crisis through its ability to remain the same from 
place to place; shelter kits, conversely are found to act as mutable mobiles, 
connecting sites not through the stabilization of relationships but through its 
ability to adapt to local contexts as it moves from place to place. In addition, while 
the family tent is found to enact a sequential timeline of crisis in which 
humanitarian space is temporally bounded as the first step in a sequence of action 
that will be followed by recovery and development action, the shelter kit enacts a 
simultaneous timeline of crisis in which humanitarian space unfolds together with 











In the opening of The Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre observes that “[w]e 
are forever hearing about the space of this and/or the space of that” from literary 
or artistic spaces to economic or political spaces, from spaces of madness or 
illness to spaces of leisure or work and so on (1991 [1974]: 3). Yet, as Lefebvre 
goes on to argue, the concept of space is not explored in these usages, but rather 
tends to be taken as self-evident and, in any case, secondary to its modifier (see 
also Massey 2005; Harvey 2006). The problem, Doreen Massey suggests, is that 
the spatial imagination informing so many uses of the term “space” relies on 
unrecognized assumptions, which lend this implied imagination the “implacable 
force of the patently obvious” (2005: 17). Yet, once one tries to actually unpack 
what exactly is meant by “space” in phrases like “political space” or “space of 
illness,” the meaning is less than obvious. The phrase “humanitarian space” – 
frequently used in humanitarian policy, practice, and advocacy circles – is 
illustrative on this point: the authors of a recent policy review of “humanitarian 
space” found the phrase’s meaning to be so varied and unspecific in practice that 
they concluded it was effectively meaningless and should therefore be abandoned 
altogether (Hubert and Brassard-Boudreau 2010).  
Rather than discarding the phrase “humanitarian space” (a 





integration into both popular use and policy jargon), I argue for recovering a 
meaningful understanding of the “space” in humanitarian space. To this end, this 
chapter lays out the theoretical elements I use for thinking about space in 
meaningful relation to humanitarian action. More specifically, this chapter has two 
aims: the first is to develop the theoretical approach to (social) space that guides 
this research; the second is to set this dissertation in conversation with other 
relevant social scientific research on humanitarian action.  
With regards to the first aim, I begin by reviewing the static, closed 
assumptions that inform many implied understandings of space in the social 
sciences. Following this, I begin to build up an argument for a more dynamic, 
open spatial imagination informed both by Lefebvre’s classic work on the 
production of (social) space (1991[1974]) and by Massey’s more recent 
contribution to spatial thinking (e.g., 2005). In addition to laying out this 
dissertation’s general approach for thinking about space, I explore the more 
specific spatial processes associated with the nationalization and globalization of 
social spaces in general and of humanitarian spaces in particular. In the course of 
considering national(izing) and global(izing) spatial processes, I also consider 
some of the relevant literature on scale and scaling processes. By choosing to pay 
particular attention to scale, the intention is not to privilege this dimension of 
space over others (see Jessop et al. 2008), but rather to highlight the centrality of 
(re)scaling processes to the dynamic production of newly global humanitarian 
spaces.  
As well as seeking to outline my theoretical approach to space, this chapter 





dissertation within the relatively small, but growing body of social scientific work 
on humanitarianism. It should be noted that neither this chapter, nor the 
dissertation overall, attempts to provide a comprehensive review of all of the 
social scientific literature on humanitarianism and humanitarian action (for 
broader overviews of this literature, see Barnett and Weiss 2008b; Bornstein and 
Redfield 2007, 2011). Rather, I focus in this chapter on work directly relevant to 
my theoretical concern with the production, making and/or doing of transnational 
humanitarian spaces. (Additional literature on humanitarian action with specific 
relevance to the themes of my empirical chapters is discussed therein.) At the 
same time that it does not give a comprehensive review, however, this chapter 
does engage with several recurrent themes appearing in the social scientific 
literature on humanitarianism, including the ways in which humanitarian versions 
of sans frontièrisme (roughly translated as “without borderism”) confront the 
territorial ordering of nation-states, as well as the implications of the pervasive 
“emergency temporality” of humanitarian action for how humanitarian spaces are 
enacted.  
Unpacking (Humanitarian) Space 
Despite wide discrepancies in its intended meaning and the confusion this 
can cause, the phrase humanitarian space continues to circulate widely. Though it 
was almost certainly used earlier,11 common usage of the phrase is generally traced 
to the former president of MSF, Rony Brauman, who coined the term “espace 
humanitaire” in the mid-1990s to describe “a space of freedom in which we are free 
                                              
11 Hubert and Brassard-Boudreau (2010), for example, identify use of “humanitarian space” to denote a 





to evaluate needs, free to monitor the distribution and use of relief goods, and free 
to have a dialogue with the people” (quoted in Wagner 2005). In Brauman’s 
formulation, humanitarian space indicates, at a basic level, an operational 
environment for humanitarian work that is devoid of (or “free from”) agendas 
other than a humanitarian one. This meaning by itself is not particularly 
contentious, however, the question of which agendas count as “external” to 
humanitarian aims is a matter of intense debate within the field (Hubert and 
Brassard-Boudreau 2010). Brauman’s original plea for humanitarian space, 
delivered in the context of the increasing coordination of humanitarian action 
with international peacekeeping missions in the 1990s (see Chapter One), was 
largely one for maintaining a strict separation of humanitarian operations from 
armed interventions. Taking up a similar call, the ICRC has become a major 
advocate for the preservation of humanitarian space, which they take to be an 
operating environment defined according to their central principles of impartiality, 
neutrality and independence. For the ICRC, humanitarian space must not only be 
kept strictly separate from armed interventions, but from politics of any sort. 
Many (though certainly not all) humanitarian NGOs, meanwhile, reject the 
necessity of strict neutrality in humanitarian space, advocating instead for their 
own various versions of humanitarian politics – most commonly inflected with 
either human rights or development principles, and not always concerned with the 
separation of humanitarian action from state or even military agendas. While the 
ICRC’s strict commitment to neutrality prevents it from publically expressing 
opinions on conflicts in which it works, for many humanitarian NGOs giving a 





persecution are central to their missions. The UN system, for its part, employs the 
phrase humanitarian space primarily in a technical, operational sense, equating it 
simply to the operating environment for humanitarian action without further 
attachments. 
 For the clusters, it is this technical and operational understanding of 
humanitarian space that dominates, partly because the clusters are often led by 
UN agencies, but more importantly because this minimum definition allows the 
greatest flexibility for each cluster member to maintain their own commitments to 
the meaning of humanitarian space. Both politics in many forms and their absence 
can be easily fitted into the minimum definition of humanitarian space as the 
space in which humanitarian actors operate, allowing different cluster members to 
work together while maintaining their diverse commitments to different 
definitions of humanitarian space. Thus, for the clusters it is this broad 
inclusiveness that matters most for achieving their technical and managerial goals 
of effecting a high level of coordination among humanitarian actors, improving 
technical capacities, and ensuring minimum standards are followed in crisis 
responses.   
Yet, as is critical to Lefebvre’s observation that opened this chapter, 
contention (and confusion) over the meaning of humanitarian space is primarily 
an effect of contention (and confusion) over the meaning of “humanitarian,” 
rather than over the meaning of “space.” While the former is subject to ongoing 
debate (see Chapter One), the latter is assumed as more or less given, deferring to 
its modifier “humanitarian.” While the “humanitarian” in humanitarian space is 





overlook the potential significance of the “space” in humanitarian space. In order 
to uncover the possibilities contained within humanitarian space, the first task in to 
uncover the inherited, un-thought assumptions that often inform the concept of 
space. In so doing, I hope to clear away some of what David Harvey has called 
“the fog of mis-communication that seems to bedevil use of the word” (2006: 
120), making way for a (re)conceptualization of (humanitarian) space as a useful 
dimension for social analysis. Accordingly, the following lays out two common 
strands of thought that frequently underlie implied assumptions about space.  
Assumptions about Space, 1: Descartes’ Space as Absolute 
Perhaps the most common source of implied assumptions about space 
derives from the philosophical work of René Descartes. In tracing this association, 
Lefebvre argues that the thinking of Descartes was no less than a defining 
moment in the conceptualization of space in the Western Logos, one in which it 
came to be understood as absolute, as Object opposed to Subject, as pre-existing, 
fixed and containing all other things (1991 [1974]: 1). Space conceptualized in the 
Cartesian tradition, then, is space understood as a static, neutral and pre-given 
container or surface. As with the space of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian 
physics, the absolute space of Cartesian logic is divisible into standardized units 
and open to standard measurement and calculation within a set frame (Harvey 
2006: 121). With regards to social relations, then, a Cartesian spatial imagination is 
one in which space is taken as an area, surface, or container in which things are 






Applied to the question of humanitarian space, this imagination suggests a 
neutral, unchanging area or surface where humanitarian action, however defined, 
takes place. That is, within a Cartesian understanding, humanitarian space is 
reduced to space as a container of humanitarian action. If this is all that the space in 
humanitarian space implies – a container or area in which (contentiously defined) 
humanitarian action takes place –then understanding the role of spatiality in 
humanitarian action becomes largely insignificant, given the unlikelihood of a 
resolution any time soon to the debates over what should and should not count as 
a specifically humanitarian act.  
That this understanding of space does not make for a very useful concept 
in “humanitarian space,” of course, is not by itself reason to abandon it. Rather, 
the problem with the Cartesian conceptualization of space is that, in treating space 
as absolute, and therefore fixed, it fails to account for the ways in which space 
itself can be subject to change. To unpack this limitation, I turn to a second 
commonly, and often implicitly, assumed characteristic of space: its separation 
from, and even opposition to, time.  
Assumptions about Space, 2: Bergson’s Space without Time 
In an interview with the editors’ of the geographic journal Hérodote, 
Foucault remarked that  
A critique could be carried out of this devaluation of space that has prevailed for 
generations. Did it start with Bergson, or before? Space was treated as the dead, the 
fixed, the undialectical, the immobile. Time, on the contrary, was richness, fecundity, life, 
dialectic. (1980: 70)  
The comment is partly self-aware, a recognition of Foucault’s own treatment of 





1989).12 But it also carries a broader admonition, for it is not only Foucault, but 
“generations” of thinkers in the social sciences and humanities for whom space 
has been understood as static and fixed in explicit opposition to time’s liveliness 
and movement. Foucault is not alone in identifying the philosophical thinking of 
Henri Bergson (for example, 1911, 1913) as a foundational moment in the 
conceptual division of space from time, wherein the former was devalued in 
relation to the latter (see, for example, Soja 1989; Grosz 2004; Thrift 2006).  
Writing years before Foucault’s comments on the subject, Lefebvre (1991 
[1974]: 21) situates Bergson’s valorization of time over space as a reaction to 
Hegel’s “fetishization of space in the service of the state” at the expense of time.13 
Indeed, Massey (2005) also situates Bergson’s conceptualization of time and space 
as rooted in what she characterizes as an argument for the genuine openness of 
the future (in contrast with Hegel’s teleological time). For Bergson, Massey writes, 
“change (which he equated with temporality) implies real novelty, the production 
of the really new, of things not already totally determined by the current 
arrangement of forces” (2005: 21; see also Deleuze 1988). Massey has no 
argument with this desire to restore openness to the process of becoming – a 
theoretical cause which aligns with her own. Her concern is, rather, with Bergson’s 
ascribing of the possibility of unfolding or becoming only to time, in contrast with 
                                              
12 In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1989: 201), Foucault writes that “knowledge is also the space in which the 
subject may take up a position and speak of the objects with which he deals in his discourse,” a statement 
that led to Lefebvre’s (1991 [1974]: 4) accusation that Foucault is setting space up in discursive opposition 
to the thinking subject, thus rejoining a Cartesian philosophical tradition of objective, pre-existing space 
outside of time.  
13 Notably, Lefebvre points here not only to Bergson’s meditation on duration and the immediacy of 
consciousness, but also to Marx’s recovery of historical time as revolutionary time, as well as Husserl’s 





space, which is defined negatively as the absence of duration (time) (2005: 24). 
That is, in his conceptual separation of space and time, Bergson relegates the 
former to a residual category, a discreet instant where time is held still.14 
To reiterate, by separating and opposing space and time, the former is 
relieved of any possibility of dynamism. Time, expressed by Bergson as duration, 
is capable of accounting for change through temporal unfolding, while space is 
left as a static cross-section of this unfolding. As such, the Bergsonian legacy for 
space has been to position it as, in the words of Nigel Thrift, “a static backdrop to 
time’s activity” (2006: 142). And, as Deleuze points out, “by dividing the 
composite according to two tendencies, with only one showing the way in which a 
thing varies qualitatively over time, Bergson effectively gives himself the means of 
choosing the ‘right side’ in each case” (1988: 32).  
If within a Cartesian spatial imagination, space was conceptualized as a 
static container for the unfolding of processes and social relations, then within the 
Bergsonian spatial imagination, space might be conceptualized as the static 
representation of these unfolding processes and social relations. That is, since time 
can never actually be held still, and space is held to be the absence of time, the 
latter can only ever give a representation of unfolding reality. The critical point for 
my concerns is that, in both conceptualizations, space does not (cannot) itself 
                                              
14 Within some schools of thought – most notably in the structural anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss 
and Clifford Geertz – the conceptual act of holding time still, synchrony, has been actively sought as a 
means for seeing the structure of the whole and separating analysis from the vagaries of diachrony as seen 
in the temporal narratives of stage theories such as those positing a move from savage to civilized (in 
anthropology) or from pre-modern to modern (in political-economy). The problem with the synchronic 
view is that it presents a closed system, unable to account for change. For a longer discussion of synchrony 





unfold. In the following section, I outline the limits of such a conceptualization 
through a discussion of state-centrism, globalization, and humanitarian action. 
Inherited Assumptions about Space in Action: State Centrism and Global 
Territorialism 
The Cartesian spatial imagination has long been prevalent (if generally not 
explicitly recognized) in sociology. Cartesian assumptions about space are often 
pointed to, for example, in the sociological tendency toward state-centric analyses, 
wherein the space of the nation-state is (usually implicitly) taken as a more or less 
fixed, self-enclosed container of social processes (Agnew 1994; Taylor 1994; 
Ferguson and Jones 2002; Brenner et al. 2003; Sassen 2007a). Similar tendencies 
exist at ostensibly ‘lower’ levels of analysis, such as in work that sees subnational 
regions, cities or neighborhoods as no more than static, easily demarcated areas 
containing social processes and/or social relations. 
With regards to state-centric analyses in particular, their prominence in 
sociological research may in part be attributable to the apparent spatial ordering of 
many of the diverse elements of social relations along the lines of nation-state 
territoriality for most of the discipline’s (relatively short) existence. Speaking to 
this spatial ordering of the social, a critical part of Lefebvre’s (1991 [1974]) 
argument on the production of social space holds that states’ historically specific 
drive to homogenize and unify space within their national boundaries has led to 
the alignment of most modern social relations with national territorial spaces. 
More recently, Sassen (2008a) argues that nation-states have historically been able 
to bring much (though never all) of what constitutes social, political, and 





in which each of these elements was primarily organized around the 
bureaucratized spatial order of nation-states.15 On the other hand, the 
understanding that the national spatial ordering of social relations is a historically 
specific condition is absolutely critical to both Lefebvre’s and Sassen’s analyses. The 
defining feature of state-centric analyses, conversely, is a naturalization or 
reification of national spatial orderings such that the historical tendency towards 
the national territorialization of social relations is conflated with a total, de-
historicized realization of that tendency (Brenner 2004: 43).  
In the current era of globalization, however, social processes and relations 
are increasingly “overflowing” their state-containers, such that the 
interconnectedness of social (including economic and political) relations across 
national boundaries is increasingly apparent. This, in turn, has made the 
assumption that nation states are the exclusive containers of social relations and 
processes increasingly untenable. For many observers, the extension of social 
relations across national boundaries was made apparent first and foremost by the 
emergent patterns of economic restructuring that took off in the 1970s. If 
transnational corporations and post-Fordist supply chains were the highly visible 
economic harbingers of a less state-centric era of social relations, then the 
founding of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in 1971 might be taken as the 
humanitarian signal of the same.  
                                              
15 The conceptualization of state space as bureaucratic space, of course, owes much to Max Weber’s (1978) 
insight that the emergent self-reinforcing bureaucratization of the authority of nation-states was a central, 
and historically specific, feature of modern life. As Brenner (2004: 76) points out, however, while Weber was 
sensitive to the historical specificity of the territoriality of modern nation-states as compared to earlier 
forms, he did not account for the possibility that this territoriality could evolve within the modern 
interstate system itself, nor that it might differ between states – it is simply assumed as a fixed characteristic 





Founded by a group of French journalists and doctors disillusioned by 
their experience working for the Red Cross in Biafra in the late 1960s (see Chapter 
One), the new organization’s symbolic rejection of the authority of state borders 
was broadcast in its very choice of a name. Though humanitarianism has long 
been concerned with the crossing of state borders (see Barnett 2011), under the 
international humanitarian system dominated by the ICRC and IFRC, the crossing 
of national borders was predicated on the sanction of the nation-states concerned. 
By contrast, among MSF’s founding principles is the right of interference (droit 
d’ingérance) for humanitarian actors. The right of interference is a counterpoint to 
the humanitarian action of the Red Cross movement, which, per the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions (later reaffirmed in the 1977 Additional Protocols), rule out 
humanitarian action without the consent of states or controlling authorities. In the 
decades that followed MSF’s founding, humanitarian NGOs would increasingly 
challenge the sovereignty of states and, especially, state borders, in pursuit of what 
would, by the 1990s, come to be called a “global civil society” (Dechaine 2002). 
However,  in 1971, MSF’s break with the Red Cross and its explicit subordination 
of the spatial authority of nation-states (codified in their borders) to the rights of 
populations within those borders to receive humanitarian assistance was a radical 
move.  
Yet, despite the plainly visible growth in cross-border processes and 
relationships as the 1970s moved into the 1980s and beyond, the Cartesian spatial 
assumptions underpinning state-centric modes of social analysis did not go away, 
but instead were carried forward into the growing field of globalization studies. 





research that Brenner (2004: 47) groups together under the title of “global 
territorialism.” As Brenner explains, global territorialist analyses simply transpose 
state-centric assumptions about space onto a global level, essentially stretching the 
Cartesian territorial grid to a global scale (2004: 44). Work in this vein 
conceptualizes globalization as movement towards a single “world society” – 
essentially replacing the national spatial container with a larger, global one (see, for 
example, Robertson 1992; Waters 1995; Meyer et al. 1997).  
As such, global territorialist analyses depend on a Cartesian 
conceptualization of space as absolute and, especially, of spatial scales understood 
as a nested hierarchy of set sizes or levels, akin to a set of Russian matryoshka 
dolls (Brenner et al. 2003; Latour 2005). Within this understanding of scales, the 
global scale exists above and encompasses the totality of the national scale. If social 
relations are moving to the larger, global scale, then from this understanding it 
follows that the national scale is being subsumed by the global. Moreover, both 
national and the global scale are assumed to be pre-existing – the global scale is 
assumed to have always been there; it is simply that social relations are only just 
now reaching it. As such, Brenner argues, the global territorialist view of a one-
world society “reproduces a state-centric conceptualization of global space as a 
timeless, territorial framework that contains historicity without itself evolving historically” 
(2004: 49, emphasis added).  
If the global scale is pre-existing and static, standing outside of time, then 
globalization itself ceases to be a spatial concept, turning instead into a new 
version of the old temporal stage theories. Specifically, as Massey argues, in 





world society over the passive surface of planetary space, the possibility of 
different spatial paths is obscured by the imagination of temporal sequence. 
Different localities around the world may be more or less inside the “one world 
society” – at the pre-given global scale – but it is assumed that their eventual 
inclusion is inevitable. That is to say, the narrative of global territorialist models of 
globalizations is, like modernization theory, not an analysis of spatial 
transformation (space as a static surface is not capable of transformation), but 
rather one of ‘catching up’ along a single, universal path (Massey 2005: 82).  
Global Territorialism in Action: Enforcing the End of History 
Typical in the 1990s, global territorialist conceptualizations of globalization 
are in many ways indicative of the historical moment in which they were 
conceived. If state-centric analyses are reflective of the historical era when nation-
states were able to draw most of the diverse elements of social life into a national 
spatial ordering, then global territorialist analyses reflect a more fleeting historical 
moment at the end of the Cold War. This moment may be characterized (at least 
in the West) by a sense that a new, post-national era was on the horizon, bolstered 
by an emergent political multilateralism and the softening of state sovereignty after 
decades of bipolar standoff. Cheerleading for this new era to come, Francis 
Fukuyama’s widely read – and criticized (see, for example, Derrida 1994) – treatise 
on the “end of history” (1989, 1992) argues that the end of the Cold War would 
usher in a global universalization of Western liberal democracy as “the final form 
of human government.” As with other global territorialist models, Fukuyama’s 
idea that universal liberal democracy (along with an analogous neoliberal global 





imagination of globalization as spreading out from the West over the surface of 
the globe. Space, as noted above, is relegated to a passive, fixed surface, 
containing but not subject to history, while historical time – conceived as a 
unilinear progression – takes center stage.  
Although it seems somewhat incredible in hindsight (Barnett 2011: 161), 
the broad sentiment (and spatial imagination) behind Fukuyama’s hyperbolic 
thesis was shared by many leading Western policymakers of the day. The idea of a 
universal liberal democracy spreading out over the surface of the globe was not 
merely an academic (mis)interpretation of events, but was also reflective of the 
(Western, establishment) sentiments of its time. Moreover, as an ideology of sorts, 
the sentiment captured in Fukuyama’s “end of history” started directing action in 
the world, reforming spatial relationships in the process. This included the spatial 
relationships shaping humanitarian action. Among other areas (perhaps most 
notably in the growing neoliberalization of global economic relations, pushed 
forward by various institutional actors), the performativity16 of the global 
territorialist view of globalization is apparent in the rise of an international regime 
of armed “humanitarian” intervention, justified by the pursuit of a universal liberal 
peace (see Ignatieff 1997; cf. Rieff 2002) and supported by the major UN 
humanitarian treatises of the day: Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace, Annan’s reform 
process and ICISS report on “The Responsibility to Protect” (see Chapter One).  
Freed from the constraints of Cold War politics, it seemed to many within 
the UN system that the institution might finally fulfill its founding purpose to 
                                              
16 I use the terms “performativity” and “performative” here in the sense meant by Michel Callon (e.g. 
2007) when he suggests, in relation to economics, that economic theories and methods not only describe 





“save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (Stockton 2004). 
Characterizing the mood of the UN system at this precise historical moment, Tsui 
and Myint-U recall that “As tens of thousands of blue helmets fanned out across 
the globe, with permanent implications for UN humanitarian action, an 
exuberance was felt throughout the UN system” (2004: 4). Reflecting on the same 
historical moment, Stockton writes that humanitarian coordination in the 1990s  
included from the outset not just the relatively modest task of coordination amongst 
specialist humanitarian relief organizations, but also the integration of those 
organisations’ activities into the larger political project of the pursuit of global liberal 
peace. As it were, enforcing the ‘end of history’ (2004: 28 emphasis added).  
In this way, the spread of Western liberal democracy predicted by Fukuyama was 
becoming performative: “tens of thousands of blue helmets fanned out across the 
globe” in an attempt to realize the prediction that liberal democracy would 
become the universal form of human government.  
As such, by the mid-1990s, not only had MSF’s foundational position of 
subordinating the authority of state borders to the right of individuals to 
humanitarian assistance ceased to be radically anti-establishment, these positions 
had entered into the very heart of the establishment, carried forward by Western 
governments and the UN system and backed, in the case of the newly christened 
“integrated missions,” by military force. The movement of humanitarian actors 
across national boundaries more or less at will – the very idea of which had only a 
few decades prior been an act of radical defiance – was, by the 1990s, the default 
mode of spatial practice for humanitarian actors.  
And yet, as Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (1998, 2001) have shown, despite 
attempts to make it otherwise, the reality of the post-Cold War world was not one 





and social forms of democracy and capitalism were both multiple and open. That 
is to say, even if capitalism and democracy were becoming the dominant modes of 
ordering economic and political systems in the 1990s, their form and content from 
place to place around the world was anything but uniform. For example, instead 
of a singular capitalist system ruling the globe, the post-Cold War era saw the 
emergence of multiple capitalisms with different forms and contents (ibid.). 
Recalling the argument above, that the unfolding of space is not already 
determined in the current arrangement of things, the evolution of these multiple 
forms of capitalism and democracy were revealed as open and neither predictable 
nor teleological (Eyal et al. 2001).  
Similarly, almost as soon as the humanitarian “enforcers” of the end of 
history started to spread out into the world, they were met with messy spatial 
realities, belying the space-as-surface imagination on which the ideal of a 
spreading global liberal peace rested. In particular, the optimism of these would-be 
enforcers at the start of the 1990s was quickly dampened by high profile 
humanitarian failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda (see Chapter One). 
Meanwhile, low profile protracted conflicts in places like Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Guatemala rebuffed the attempts of peacekeeping forces to realize the rapid 
ceasefires and lasting peace Western policy makers had envisioned in deploying 
these forces. These humanitarian encounters demonstrated that, while “blue 
helmets” might have spread out from the West in the wake of the Cold War, their 
movement was not like that of water poured over a smooth surface, but instead 





conduits and carried forward and held back along the way through its encounters 
with different spatial orderings (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; cf. Cresswell 2010).  
It is clear that globalization conceived as a single world society has not 
successfully spread out over space-as-a-surface. In fact, with the passing of the 
optimism that informed Western policy-makers at the start of the 1990s (if not 
completely dampened by that decade’s humanitarian disasters, then certainly so by 
the events of 9/11), the spatial assumptions informing global territorialist versions 
of globalization seem increasingly simplistic. Fixed and standing outside of time, 
the spatial scales of the national and global cannot actively transform, but can only 
be filled by time’s action. As with other stage theories, this aspatial 
conceptualization of globalization (Massey 2005) becomes a temporal story of 
progression along a single universal path.  
Presenting an alternative to such approaches, in the following section I 
explore the possibilities contained in a (re)conceptualization of space not as closed 
and separate from time, but open and dynamic. In doing so, I pay particular 
attention to the question of scale as it relates to the reordering of (social) space in 
the current global era.  
The Sociability of Dynamic Space  
If, instead of separating and opposing time and space, the two are 
conceptualized as coexisting, then space may also become implicated in dynamic 
change. Indeed, at least since Lefebvre’s The Production of Space, the idea that social 
space is produced through multiple, ongoing, lively social practices has been 





example, Soja 1989; Hayden 1997; Harvey 2006; Brenner 2004).17 The opening up 
of space as a dynamic category of inquiry has led to what Jessop et. al. (2008) 
describe as a series of “spatial turns” in the social sciences over the past 30 years 
or so. These spatial turns have tended to focus on opening up particular 
dimensions of space, from the nature of place (e.g. Agnew 1987; Massey 1994; 
Cresswell 2004), to the role of territoriality (e.g.Agnew 1994; Taylor 1994; Brenner 
et al. 2003; Sassen 2008a), to the production of scale (e.g. Collinge 1999; Marston 
2000; Smith 2003), to the constitution of networks (e.g. Castells 1996; Amin 2002; 
Taylor et al. 2002). 
Space, for Lefebvre is the dimension of interaction, of the social. Lefebvre 
argues that social space “is the outcome of a sequence and set of operation and 
thus cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple object… Itself the outcome of past 
actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting 
yet others” (1991 [1974]: 73; emphasis added). Space, then, does not simply contain 
interactions or social relations, it creates the very possibility for interactions and 
social relations. At the same time, it is through social relations and interactions 
that space is ordered and reordered or, to use Lefebvre’s language, produced and 
reproduced. This co-implication of space with the social, then, necessarily involves 
conceptualizing space as itself always unfolding.  
Analogously, Massey (2005) argues that space and time are co-implicated in 
one another’s unfolding such that, although they remain separate conceptual 
                                              
17 As David Harvey (2005: 130) points out, it would be absurd to suggest that Lefebvre is the “originary 
moment from which all thinking about the production of space derives,” however his text has proved 
foundational in the field of human geography when it comes to thinking about space as produced through 





elements, they are in practice inseparable. Seen in this way, Massey suggests that 
space is not, as Bergson has it, a “static contemporeneity,” but rather a “dynamic 
simultaneity” (2005: 55). Rather than the closed system of synchrony, space, co-
constituted with time, is understood as an open, ongoing production and 
reproduction, a simultaneity of “stories so far” (ibid.) As in Lefebvre’s 
conceptualization, Massey’s understanding of space as entangled with time, and 
therefore capable of dynamism, gives it an active role in the social. As Massey 
explains:  
If time unfolds as change then space unfolds as interaction. In that sense space is the 
social dimension. Not in the sense of exclusively human sociability, but in the sense of 
engagement within a multiplicity. It is the sphere of the continuous production and 
reconfiguration of heterogeneity in all its forms – diversity, subordination, conflicting 
interests. (2005: 61) 
As the sphere of interactions and engagement, space is the dimension not only of 
the social, but of the political and of power. In this conceptualization of space and 
time, the outcome of social engagements and political struggles becomes truly 
open, rather than inevitable or predictable in the scientific sense.  
In such dynamic conceptualizations of space, the global scale (or any other 
scale, for that matter) is no longer a pre-given level, waiting to be filled by actions, 
but something that is being actively made and remade through social processes 
and relations in the world. Notwithstanding ongoing controversies about its 
precise nature (e.g. Marston et al. 2005; Leitner and Miller 2007), there is currently 
wide consensus in human geography that scales are not neutral, fixed, or given, but 
are a product of ongoing social processes and as such are both historically 
contingent and subject to recurrent reconfigurations (e.g. Smith 1984; Soja 1989; 





and scaling processes, geographical scale is also frequently presented in this 
literature as constituting a conceptual framing for actors involved in social, 
political, and economic relations (e.g. Delaney and Leitner 1997). It is also 
generally understood to be relational in that the size, configuration, and dynamics 
of a given scale are explainable only through their relation to those of other scales 
(e.g. Howitt 1998; Brenner 2004). Following from this relational quality, scalar 
categories – such as the local, national, or global – are understood to display 
qualitative differences depending on the particular social process or institution 
under consideration (e.g. Brenner 2004; Harvey 2006). In short, like other 
dimensions of space, scales are enacted (and re-enacted) through practices, 
material arrangements and discourses “that may be partly concrete, powerful and 
bounded, but also partly unbounded, vague and invisible” (Paasi 2004: 342). 
Along these lines, Chris Collinge argues for seeing scales as “composed as 
realities within the practices of everyday life” (2006: 248; see also Callon and 
Latour 1981; Law 2004a). Analogously, Bruno Latour (2005: 185) argues for 
seeing scale as something that is “achieved” by actors through ongoing relational 
processes of scaling, spacing and contextualizing one another. Using the example 
of a global train network, Latour writes: 
Is a railroad local or global? Neither. It is local at all points, since you always find sleepers 
and railroad workers, and you have stations and automatic ticket machines scattered 
along the way. Yet it is global, since it takes you from Madrid to Berlin or from Brest to 
Vladivostok. However, it is not universal enough to be able to take you just anywhere. It 
is impossible to reach the little Auvergnat village of Malpy by train, or the little 
Staffordshire village of Market Drayton. There are continuous paths that lead from the 
local to the global, from the circumstantial to the universal, from the contingent to the 
necessary, only so long as the branch lines are paid for. (1993: 117)  
Here Latour rejects the possibility that scaling processes are driven by forces 





composed and enacted (see also Law 1992). As with the work from critical 
geographers cited above, then, scale is conceived here as a relational product, 
produced by actors and constantly subject to reconfigurations. This relational 
approach to scale (and, in fact, to space more generally) assumes neither the 
relative size of, and relationship between, scales nor the locations or distributions 
of power between them in advance, but instead looks for traces of these 
relationships in the course of empirical study.  
The rejection of the inherited imagination of static, pre-given space outside 
of time, has contributed to an energizing of globalization research, adding 
complexity and nuance to thinking about the (re)production of space and spatial 
scales in the current era. In the conclusion to this chapter I return to the point 
that, to explain the global, one must focus on how scale (and space in general for 
that matter) is produced or enacted through actual situated practices. First, 
however, the discussion returns to the question of globalization, outlining an 
argument for a dynamic, multiscalar globalization, freed from the inherited spatial 
imagination of global territorialist views. This discussion first considers and rejects 
one popular imagination of globalization, namely the idea of deterritorialization 
and hypermobility, before moving onto a more nuanced idea of globalization as 
involving multiple relational scales.  
Globalization through Multiples Scales and Territorializations 
Whereas global territorialist accounts of globalization are stuck firmly 
within the Cartesian imagination of nested hierarchical scales, a second common 
conceptualization of globalization – what Brenner (2004) calls 





Cartesian imagination of space and scale. Instead of simply stretching the 
Cartesian grid or moving up one level on a scalar hierarchy, deterritorialized 
understandings of globalization draw on the idea of network space, which 
imagines horizontal connectivity wherein distances are not absolute, but 
determined by ties between nodes within a network of relations. At its extreme, 
this is the imagination of globalization as involving hypermobility and near 
instantaneous exchanges, invariably aided by new information and 
communications technologies (ICTs). This version of globalization is apparent in 
conceptualizations such as O’Brian’s (1992) “end of geography,” Ohmae’s (1995) 
“borderless world,” and Castell’s (1996) “space of flows.”  
 To the extent that the world is moving toward a deterritorialized “space of 
flows,” these versions of globalization assume it to be moving away from the 
national/territorial “space of places” (Castells 1996). However, while 
deterritorialized accounts of globalization overcome the state-as-container model, 
as Brenner argues, they do so only through “the conceptual negation of the 
national state and, more generally, of the territorial dimensions of social life” 
(2004: 30). Moreover, although deterritorialized conceptualizations of 
globalization escape the Cartesian imagination of space-as-container or space-as-
surface, they fail to escape two further assumptions inherent to state-centrism, 
identified by Sassen (2010b: 4) as an implied correspondence between national 
territorial space and the national itself and the implication that the national and 
non-national are mutually exclusive conditions. By contrast, Sassen (e.g. 2007a, 
2008a, 2010b) finds that processes happening within the space of national 





national, such as national corporations, capital, or cultural outputs, may occur 
outside of the space of national territories, either in other nation-states or in a 
(partially) disembedded digital space.  
Instead of seeing globalization as the stretching of social, economic, 
political and cultural processes to a pre-given and fixed planetary scale or as a total 
deterritorialization of those processes into a borderless, supraterritorial space of 
flows, Sassen perceives a multiscalar dynamic at work in many global processes, 
recognizing both the globally scaled institutions and processes typically assumed 
to constitute globalization, and the nationally and subnationally territorialized 
practices and conditions that also constitute globalization (e.g. 2001; 2007a, 2008a; 
see also Howitt 1993; Sheppard 2002). The latter include the insertion of localities 
into global processes, the multiplication of cross-border connections between 
local spaces and processes, and the subjectively recognized recurrence of certain 
conditions across an increasing number of local and national places (see Sassen 
2007b). These more nuanced spatial conditions suggest that globalization does not 
occur despite nation-states (or national territoriality), but occurs at least partly within 
national territorial formations and with the participation of national (and 
international) institutions.  
Thus, instead of the (pre-existing, static) global scale gaining dominance at 
the expense of the (pre-existing, static) national scale, a multiplication of spatial 
relationships across dynamically shifting scales is starting to decenter and in cases 
destabilize older scalar hierarchies organized around the territoriality of nation-
states. Yet, as Sassen notes (2007a), these new scalings are not necessarily 





Lefebvre (1991 [1974]), who suggests that scales are not unitarily sized or ordered 
across all institutions and processes, but should instead be understood in terms of 
a mosaic of different and overlapping sizes and orderings. Thus, instead of being 
either national or global, Sassen (2008) sees the possibility for emergent spatial 
formations to be both. Global formations may draw on capabilities developed by 
nation states; national processes and actors may be denationalized to the extent 
that they are oriented towards global aims. The centripetal force of nation states 
that was once strong enough to draw in most elements of social life now sits 
alongside an emergent centrifugal dynamic in which some of these elements 
escape from the spatial order of nation states (ibid.). 
Within the field of transnational humanitarian action, it is possible to 
identify a number of these multiscalar conditions. Localities get inserted into 
global processes, for example, when humanitarian actors in local settings alert 
global media circuits and civil society or activist networks to emergent crises or 
when they tap into global networks of donors to fund local relief efforts and 
national or global awareness campaigns. On a more basic level the articulation of 
the local and global scales is apparent in the interaction between highly mobile 
transnational humanitarian workers and the populations they serve, many of 
which may be profoundly localized by crises, as when confined to a refugee camp 
(Redfield 2005). Humanitarian NGOs, meanwhile, increasingly engage in both 
vertical partnerships with UN agencies as well as horizontal partnerships with 
other NGOs, thus taking part in global networks that rely on a variety of scalar 





them to participate in global humanitarian action even while their actions remain 
spatially localized.  
Global humanitarian space, then, involves articulations between various 
spatial orders (including scaling). It also, however, involves the co-implication of 
these spatial orders with the temporal orders that orient humanitarian action. In 
the final section of this chapter, I consider the co-implication of humanitarian 
space with the temporalities of contemporary humanitarian action.  
Humanitarian Space and the Emergency Temporality 
In his polemic critique of the state of humanitarian action in the post Cold 
War period, David Rieff reflects on the degree to which action in the face of 
humanitarian crisis has become, for many in the humanitarian field, the only 
response, writing: 
Reasonable people may differ in their evaluation of the way a particular humanitarian 
intervention, or human rights campaign, or relief effort is carried out, but not over the 
desirability or the moral imperative of such undertakings. To say anything else is to lay 
oneself open to the charge of being against humanitarianism and human rights. It is like 
saying one is against a better world. (2002: 270) 
The seeming self-evidence of the moral imperative to respond to humanitarian 
crises identified here is echoed in a very similar imperative identified by 
Annemarie Mol (2002) in the field of modern medical practice. As Mol explains, 
in the medical profession the goal of saving lives and improving health has was 
long deemed to be given and any self-reflection within the profession was aimed 
not at this goal itself, but on whether or not particular interventions were serving 
this goal (2002: 172-3). In the medical profession, the goal of saving life has 
recently lost its self-evidence in light of discussions on quality of life concerns 





the cost of a painful treatment regime) (Mol 2002: 173). For some observers of 
humanitarian action (e.g. De Waal 1997; Terry 2002; Kennedy 2004), humanitarian 
failings in the 1990s – horrifically exemplified in Srebrenica and Goma – are taken 
as signals that the desirability of humanitarian action in all cases might too have 
lost its self-evidence. These authors point to the “paradox of humanitarian action” 
– the finding that it might, in fact, prolong the suffering it is intended to alleviate.  
Others have pointed to the dehumanizing effects of humanitarian aid as 
potentially indicative that the desirability of humanitarian action is not necessarily 
self-evident. Following from Arendt’s insight that “The paradox involved in the 
loss of human rights is that such loss coincided the instant a person becomes a 
human in general” (1973: 336; quoted in Barnett 2008: 252), Barnett points out 
that the very concept of a universal subject on which much humanitarianism rests, 
obfuscates the recognition of particular circumstances that shape individual 
subjectivities “thus removing the very humanity of individuals”(2008: 251). 
Following from Giorgio Agamben (1998), meanwhile, Redfield (2005) explores 
the distinction often (if implicitly) drawn through humanitarian action between 
zoë, or “bare life” as mere physical existence, and bios, or life as elaborated human 
existence. As Redfield (2005: 330) notes, humanitarian actors are often only 
preserving mere physical existence in the carrying out of humanitarian responses, 
deferring the possibility of more elaborated human life – including the possibility 
of human dignity – until the end of crisis.  
Redfield finds that his particular subject, MSF, fully recognizes the 
potential ethical tension in the work of preserving bare life at the (at least 





organizations, the bottom line is that inaction in crisis in an untenable 
organizational stance (2005: 337). Indeed, for most humanitarian organizations, 
the “bottom line” remains choosing action over inaction in the face of immediate 
human suffering. Self-reflection after the fact has led to efforts and initiatives – 
like the Cluster Approach – aimed at improving the effectiveness and 
accountability of humanitarian action. Yet, as noted above, for most humanitarian 
organizations the goal of saving as many lives as possible as quickly as possible 
remains a given.  This stance is linked to the peculiar temporality of humanitarian 
action: unlike development which is oriented towards making a better future, or 
human rights which combines a similar orientation towards the future with a 
focus on recognizing and redressing the injustices of the past, humanitarianism is 
oriented almost entirely to the urgent present. Operating on a logic of clearly 
bounded projects, aimed at relieving immediate suffering in the short-term, past 
contexts of place and the future well-being of beneficiaries are marked outside the 
domain of specifically humanitarian action (Krause 2009).  
Pandolfi (2003) has aptly named this temporal orientation the “emergency 
temporality.” As the name indicates, the emergency temporality of humanitarian 
action is at least partly an effect of the imaginary of humanitarian crises as 
emergencies, that is as states of exception. By being understood as an exception to, 
or rupture of, the “normal” functioning of society (Calhoun 2004), a humanitarian 
crisis is constructed as what Redfield calls a “historical deferment”(2005: 346), 
where both the past and future are deferred in favor of addressing a radical 
present of immediate human suffering. Critically, by inhabiting such an immediate 





authorizing status. The very term emergency – now standard for describing 
humanitarian crises – Calhoun explains, “is a way of grasping problematic events, 
a way of imagining them that emphasizes their apparent unpredictability, 
abnormality and brevity, and that carries the corollary that response—intervention—is 
necessary” (2004: 375, emphasis added). Seconding this conclusion, Redfield notes 
that in the advent of humanitarian crisis “action (especially technical, expert 
action) acquires self-authorizing status by virtue of circumstance” (2005: 337).  
Though it is, by definition, a temporal category, the emergency temporality 
has crucial implications for the enactment of humanitarian spaces. As Pandolfi 
writes: 
Determined as a temporal and temporary derogation in a precise context, the emergency 
category is “logically” opposed to the category of the ordinary. Paradoxically, emergency 
no longer constitutes an extraordinary or exceptional temporal category in humanitarian 
intervention. In the territories of humanitarian intervention, it has become the sole 
temporal modality of the new social contract, which includes the right of interference, 
temporality of emergency, and necessity of action. (2003: 376) 
Constructed on a logic of urgent action, humanitarian spaces are enacted through 
“[t]he occupation of space, the invasion of territory, and the crossing of borders” 
all justified by the need for mobility and speed (ibid.).  
François Debrix (1998) identifies the making of new spaces through the 
occupation of territories and crossing of borders as a conscious strategy at work 
among humanitarian actors the particularly as associated with MSF and other 
humanitarian actors adopting the spirit of sans frontièrisme. In his analysis, Debrix 
draws on Deleuze and Guttari’s (1987) very specific notion of de- and 
reterritorialization, in which the former is associated with “smooth” space – space 
that is unsettled, or open for negotiation, so to speak – and the latter with 





bureaucratic order of nation states. In the case of MSF, Debrix argues that sans 
frontièrisme is a movement engaged in simultaneous strategies of deterritorialization 
– escaping the territorial ordering of national-states – and reterritorialization – 
reordering space along new lines of their own design. The result of this process is 
that acting “without borders” becomes “its own territorial strategy, another 
geopolitical marking, a new spatial demarcation with its own regime of power and 
knowledge” (Debrix 1998: 830, emphasis added).  
Debrix’s argument resonates with Mariella Pandolfi’s (2003, 2008) work on 
the “mobile sovereignty” of humanitarian actors, who often take on roles 
traditionally associated with sovereign states such as the provision of social 
services (healthcare, sanitation, education and so on) and the monitoring of 
populations. In line with Sassen’s argument for seeing multiple spatial orders as 
existing side by side, however, I would point out that humanitarian space does not 
simply replace state space, even if humanitarian actors take on roles previously 
played by states. Debrix’s argument that “Borderlessness produces placelessness 
as reterritorialisation produces homogenisation and delocalisation” (1998: 842) 
misses Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) point that reterritorialization is never a 
matter of creating something totally new, but is rather a reassembling of parts, 
some of which may be new, but many of which are simply repurposed or 
rearranged from older territorializations. This is also Sassen’s (2008a) point about 
emergent global assemblages, that they do not simply arise from nothing, but 
involve the repositioning of older capabilities developed by nation-states in service 





Contrary to Debrix’s assessment, then, sans frontièrisme – and other versions 
of humanitarian action, for that matter – are not merely a replacement for state 
sovereignty. For, as Redfield points out, the mobility of global humanitarian 
workers, 
evokes general contradictions of postcolonial expatriate life. To work “without” borders 
confronts the basic territorial logic of the nationstate; however, it also recalls the legacy 
of imperial expansion. Relations of identity and place cut two ways, depending on 
position and history amid empire... Place and identity of origin are, therefore, not neutral 
characteristics; a borderless world retains the ruins of earlier frontiers, across which some 
people move far more easily than others (2005: 336-7).  
The act of deterritorializing and reterritorializing is not (cannot be) a matter of 
sweeping away older national spaces and instating the new humanitarian spaces 
from scratch. The “ruins of earlier frontiers” remain, even if their valence has 
changed. The global humanitarian spaces being made through the Cluster 
Approach (re)assemble elements from earlier spatial orderings, especially that of 
the (inter)national.  
Conclusion 
The primary aim of this chapter has been to outline the approach to 
thinking about (humanitarian) space on which this dissertation will build. In the 
course of opening up the conceptualization of (humanitarian) space, it has laid the 
groundwork for the empirical investigation to follow. More specifically, this 
chapter has outlined and rejected inherited assumptions about space as absolute – 
that is, as a static, pre-given Object in the Cartesian sense – and as being both 
separate and opposed to time – such that space becomes a mere residual category 
once the liveliness of time is removed. In place of these rejected assumptions, 
space was reconceived as entangled with time, dynamic and social. Following from 





such that it both allows and constricts actions depending on how it is ordered and, 
simultaneously, is reordered through these new actions and interactions. In other 
words, space shapes the social through enabling or restricting different practices 
and interactions, but it is also made through these practices and interactions. Following 
Massey, space has also been recovered from the imagination of a static 
contemporaneity to one of a dynamic simultaneity of different spatial trajectories. 
Freed from the association with a static cross-section through time, space can be 
seen as unfolding along various overlapping, interacting and juxtaposing 
trajectories. 
Building from these insights on space, this chapter, following from Sassen, 
also argued that the global is not necessarily coterminous with the global scale 
(and certainly not with any static, pre-given notion of that scale), but instead 
involves articulations and encounters between different spatial scales and 
territorial conditions. Scales, in turn, have also been (re)conceptualized as 
dynamic, relational and constantly in the process of being (re)produced and 
(re)ordered through situated practices and social relations. This last point is key, as 
it reinforces the positions that, first, the spaces of the global are open and 
dynamic, and, second, that spatial orders (including scalings) are made through 
particular practices, relationships and material and social arrangements. As this 
dissertation will show, this insight is key towards understanding the particular 












“Either the sociologist is rigid and the world becomes a mess or the 
sociologist is pliable enough and the world puts itself in order”  
- (Latour 2005: 184) 
 
 
 This chapter provides both a discussion of the more abstract concerns 
informing my methodological approach and a practical account of my research 
methods. With regards to the former, I build on themes introduced in Chapter 
Two, particularly that of seeing the unfolding of spaces as truly open rather than 
decided in advance. I also consider how materiality matters for humanitarian 
spaces. To reiterate what has already been stated in the first chapter, this research 
is not focused on describing what global humanitarian space is or comparing the 
global to the international as such, but rather on tracing the constitution of global 
humanitarian spaces through the heterogeneous (human and non-human) 
associations effected through the Cluster Approach.  
With regards to the latter, I detail my use of, and analytic approach to, the 
methods used in gathering data for the present research. Specifically, in tracing the 
making of global humanitarian spaces through the Cluster Approach, my research 
employs a range of methods: first, an analysis of documents relating to the Cluster 
Approach and to contemporary humanitarian action more broadly; second, in-





the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and humanitarian NGOs who are 
involved with the work of the clusters; third, participant observation in training 
courses for cluster coordinators and information managers . 
Researching the Global, 1: Analytic Borderlands and Hybrid Geographies 
 In order to uncover the making of global humanitarian spaces, I focus on 
the overlap between (inter)national and global humanitarian spatial orderings – 
what Sassen (2008a: Ch.8) calls the “analytic borderland.” More specifically, 
Sassen’s concept of the analytic borderland is one that captures the space of 
overlap and interaction between what are typically posed as analytic dualities – in 
this case the global and the (inter)national. When these two spatial orderings are 
looked at as two sides of a conceptual divide, the (inter)national is generally seen 
as being displaced by the global. By contrast, the analytic borderland provides a 
conceptual space for considering how these two orderings might overlap, interact 
and participate in each other’s constitution. Accordingly, instead of describing 
what the global is like in contrast to the (inter)national, this orientation to research 
focuses attention on the practices, relations, and arrangements involved in making 
and doing the global. In this mode of analysis, the international humanitarian 
system need not be opposed or wholly separate from the production of global 
humanitarian spaces, but rather can be seen to participate in the making and doing 
of these emergent spaces.  The analytic borderland, then, shows a space of 
complex interactions in the shift from the (inter)national to the global, in which 
the rise of the latter is not simply a product of unconscious expansion, nor simply 
a function of new global technological capabilities, but rather the product of 





 In orienting my research toward Sassen’s concept of the analytic 
borderland, I find it useful to also draw on Sarah Whatmore’s (1999) 
complimentary, through distinct, concept of hybrid geographies. As she describes: 
In place of the geometric habits that reiterate the world as a single grid-like surface open 
to the inscription of theoretical claims or uni-versal [sic] designs, hybrid mappings are 
necessarily topological, emphasizing the multiplicity of space-times generated in/by the 
movements and rhythms of heterogeneous association. The spatial vernacular of such 
geographies is fluid, not flat, unsetting the coordinates of distance and proximity; local 
and global; inside and outside. This is not to ignore the potent affects of 
territorializations of various kinds, just the reverse. It is a prerequisite for attending more 
closely to the labours of division that (re-) iterate their performance and the host of 
socio-material practices – such as property, sovereignty and identity – in which they 
inhere. (Whatmore 1999: 6) 
As with Sassen’s analytic borderlands, Whatmore’s hybrid geographies require 
attention to the messy in-between spaces in which the world is not already neatly 
ordered in one particular way or another, but in which different orderings of the 
social and spatial overlap, interact and multiply. Also in line with Sassen’s analytic 
borderlands, Whatmore calls for specific attention to the work of division itself; 
that is, for directing research to the socio-material practices through which 
divisions are made and remade, rather than simply comparing two sides of a 
divide.  
Whatmore’s hybrid geographies concept diverges from Sassen’s analytic 
borderlands in its emphasis on certain points associated most closely with actor-
network theory (ANT) and post-ANT approaches to social research. Most 
notably, hybrid geographies emphasize the consideration of both human and non-
human actors in the constitution of social relations (e.g. Callon 1986; Latour 1987) 
and, relatedly, rejects the society/nature dualism posed by much of modern social 
science (Latour 1993). My research shares this concern with the inclusion of non-





focus on how tools for assessing or categorizing humanitarian crises elicit some 
types of social relations, actions and knowing  while proscribing others. This is not 
to say that non-human actors have an agency equal to that of human actors, but 
that they are necessary components in the heterogeneous associations through 
which social relations – including scalar and spatial relations – are constituted 
(Latour 2005). Both Sassen’s concept of the analytic borderland and Whatmore’s 
of hybrid geographies are concerned with attending to the act of becoming (though 
this language is particular here to Whatmore; Sassen uses the similar term 
“emergence”). That is, they both suggest an orientation to research that focuses 
on the making or doing implicated in the emergence of new forms, rather than on 
describing an already settled state of affairs. Indeed, there is a suggestion in both 
that the order of things in never settled, but constantly in the process of being 
(re)composed . The global spatial ordering of things may, over time, become 
dominant and the national spatial ordering fade away, but this does not mean that 
the former will be settled. Both are historically specific processes and their future 
arrangement, as argued in Chapter Two, is neither decided in advance nor 
predictable in the teleological sense.  
Following from this, my research is focused on the work of (re)composing 
and enacting global humanitarian spaces rather than on comparing the 
international spatial ordering of humanitarian action with the emergent global 
spaces being made and done through the Cluster Approach. The aim is not to 
separate out the international from the global, but to show how capabilities, 





redirected, reshuffled or remade in the making and doing of emergent global 
spaces.  
Researching the Global, 2: Assembling and Subtracting 
Seeking to establish some clarity from the array of activities calling 
themselves humanitarian (see Chapter One), some scholars have found it useful to 
develop typologies of humanitarian action to differentiate between different types 
of, and/or motivations for, action (e.g., Hoffman and Weiss 2006; Barnett and 
Snyder 2008). By contrast (and although I dedicate some space to discussing the 
different meanings assigned to humanitarian action in Chapter One), I have tried 
to approach my research without a predetermination of what exactly humanitarian 
action is or should be. Instead, I have tried to follow the ways in which 
humanitarian action is actually understood and practiced by the actors within the 
Cluster Approach themselves. This does not (nor was it intended to) lead to the 
discovery of a “true” meaning of humanitarian action. In fact the understandings 
of humanitarian action that arose in the course of my research on the Cluster 
Approach were even more fuzzy and shifting than I expected, even to the point of 
being sometimes contradictory (see, especially, Chapters Six and Seven).  
Part of following the self-understandings and practices of my subject is 
taking these self-understandings seriously. For example, most of the actors I 
encountered in my research understood the Cluster Approach to be about 
effecting a global scale of humanitarian action. Taking this understanding seriously, 
my question has not been whether the humanitarian spaces of the Cluster 
Approach are globally scaled or not, but how differences in size, level and place 





5). This is in line with a recognition that, if scales are relationally constituted, as 
argued in Chapter Two, then their definitions are given by the practices through 
which they are achieved (Latour 2005: 184). Importantly, this approach does not 
preclude critique. Self-understandings are taken seriously, however they are also 
open to criticism. For example, asking where and how a global level is being 
produced by the Cluster Approach has led to the finding that the global clusters 
are situated, particular, and exclusionary (see, especially, Chapter Four).  
Remaining open to such possibilities is part of a research strategy in which 
“becoming able to add or assemble is more important than subtraction” (Thrift 
2006: 145). That is to say, rather that striving to “subtract” elements in order to 
distill ideal types or neat causal relationships, I have sought in my research to keep 
as many of the complexities of my subject in play as possible and to follow these 
complexities in their unfoldings. At the same time, I recognize that some 
substraction is inevitable. As John Law writes in his book After Method:  
method assemblage is a continuing process of crafting and enacting necessary boundaries between 
presence, manifest absence and Otherness… making anything present implies that other but 
related things are simultaneously being made absent, pushed from view, that presence is 
impossible without absence. (2004b: 144, emphasis in original) 
Since no account can include all of the world’s messy realities, any account 
necessarily depends on making choices on what to include and what to exclude. 
At the same time, choosing which complexities to follow, and which to leave 
aside, may be thought of as a method of crafting sociology. Here “craft” can be 
taken in the sense of skill as well as in the more colloquial sense of making 
handmade, idiosyncratic objects (Murphy 2009).  
In my research on global humanitarian spaces I have chosen to focus on 





humanitarian system, including other coordination mechanisms and, largely, the 
work of individual humanitarian agencies and organizations. Further, even within 
the narrowed lens of the Cluster Approach, I have inevitably omitted certain 
aspects in order to enable a fuller focus on others. I have, for example, focused 
much more on some clusters – Shelter, most notably, as well as Education, Food 
Security and Nutrition – to the exclusion of others. The same is the case with 
cluster responses to particular disasters: my analysis focuses on a deliberately 
limited selection of responses. These are primarily responses in Haiti, Kenya, 
Myanmar,18 Pakistan and Somalia, although others are briefly touched on.  
Perhaps the most conspicuous absence in this dissertation are the voices of 
the victims of humanitarian crises (or the “beneficiaries of humanitarian aid” to 
use the standard language of the humanitarian community). This has been, in part, 
a matter of following the lead of my subject – the Cluster Approach. As 
evaluations of the Cluster Approach have found time and again (e.g. Stoddard et 
al. 2007; Streets et al. 2010; NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project 2009), the 
voices and experiences of the beneficiaries of aid are consistently excluded from 
consideration in the planning, carrying out, and evaluation of humanitarian action. 
These exclusions, and their consequences for the content of global humanitarian 
spaces, are part of the way in which those spaces are constituted by the Cluster 
Approach. Accordingly, here the voices and experiences of the victims of 
humanitarian crises, if they appear at all, come filtered through the actors within 
the Cluster Approach (see Chapters Six and Seven). 
                                              
18 The usage of “Myanmar” rather than “Burma” in this dissertation follows the designation used by the 
UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and most NGOs, rather than reflecting any political stance on 





Part of this narrowing of the analysis has been for practical reasons: 
without the subtraction of parts of the global humanitarian system from the 
narrative, the scope would have been too broad. However, I also argue, following 
Law, that such subtractions are also productive. By pushing some elements from 
view, by making them absent, I am able to focus more intently on that which is 
present, allowing for a richer, more focused analysis of what remains. The clusters I 
do focus on – Shelter, Nutrition, Food Security, Education – and the crises that 
feature more prominently than others – the Haiti earthquake, Pakistan floods, 
cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, cyclical drought in Kenya and protracted crisis in 
Somalia – have all been chosen for the ways in which they illuminate the issues I 
have chosen to focus on particularly well. Their selection is part of the crafting of 
this account.  
Following Documents 
 In the course of my research, I reviewed an extensive number of 
documents relevant to the Cluster Approach, including (but not limited to) 
published and unpublished reports, assessments and evaluations, policy and 
position papers, UN Resolutions, technical specifications, training materials, 
meeting minutes, memos, PowerPoint presentations, advocacy materials 
(including print and video), photographs, guidance and best practices booklets, 
and numerous “tools” for measuring or classifying humanitarian crises or 
responses. Many of the documents I reviewed in my research are accessible 
online, posted to agency or organizational websites, individual cluster websites, 
and the general website for the Cluster Approach as a whole. Other documents, 





(such as General Assembly hearings) were reviewed at the United Nations Office 
at Geneva Library (formerly the League of Nations Library) at the Palais des 
Nations. Still other documents, including unpublished reports or memos, meeting 
minutes, and internal documents were shown or given to me by interviewees or 
their assistants. Finally, various training materials were obtained in the course of 
participating in trainings, as described below.  
Different documents are understood as conveying different types of 
information. Some documents – particularly meeting minutes and accounts of 
proceedings – are taken as relatively straightforward, if abbreviated, records of 
events. Other types of documents I reviewed, however, are taken as both products 
of, and potentially producers of, social relations. That is, following from Foucault’s 
(1989) classic statement, I consider many of the documents I’ve reviewed not as 
more or less reliable accounts of history, but rather as products of the historically 
specific social relations through which they were created.  
Moreover, in addition to seeing these documents as the products of 
specific social (and institutional) relations, many of them can also be seen as 
potentially productive of social relations. As Shona Hunter argues, for example, with 
regards to policy documents, these can act to “configure multiple social relations, 
facilitating co-operation without forcing a unified or singular perspective” (2008: 
522). That is, these sorts of documents can act as boundary objects (Star and 
Greisemer 1989), unifying diverse actors around a particular cause or set of 
actions by being loose enough for each actor to fit with each one’s particular 
interests or agenda. For example, many of the Guidance Notes and policy 





enough to usefully guide action and being just vague enough so as to not alienate 
any major cluster members. In outlining who should be included in the clusters, 
for example, the IASC Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach uses non-
specific descriptions such as “a wide range of international humanitarian actors” 
and “relevant international actors” rather than more specific descriptors of 
particular groups (IASC 2006). In this way the Guidance Note facilitates 
participation and cooperation in the clusters by avoiding specific mention of 
groups such as national government or military actors, which would alienate the 
Red Cross, MSF, and certain NGO cluster members from participation, yet leaves 
the door open for participation by these groups.  
Along similar lines, Sara Ahmed notes how documents can perform in a 
double sense of institutions using documents to “perform an image of 
themselves,” as well as a way in which institutions “perform in the sense of ‘doing 
well’” (2007: 594). Evaluation, assessments, and various other reports associated 
with the Cluster Approach might be thought of in this double sense of performing 
(or presenting) an image of the Cluster Approach, while also showing that the 
Cluster Approach is doing well in the sense of performing “best practices” of 
evaluating and accounting for its actions. Other documents, such as training 
documents, assessment and classification tools, and even advocacy materials, may 
be productive of action in the world in even more straightforward ways, providing 
explicit instructions for how to act in certain situations, dictating what to measure 
and how to measure it, or didactically calling for some type of action or sentiment 
over others. These types of documents, and the social relations they are 





Chapters Five and Six. Technical specifications and their role in the making of 
global humanitarian spaces, meanwhile, appear in Chapter Seven.  
Overall, the multitude of documents of various sorts reviewed for this 
research have provided a wealth of information in various forms. By combining 
this information – both with other documents and with data from interviews and 
participant observation – I have been able to accumulate a wealth of information 
on the socio-material practices and arrangements associated with the Cluster 
Approach through which global humanitarian spaces are made.  
Conducting and Interpreting Interviews  
 For this research I also conducted a series of in-depth interviews with 
humanitarian professionals working in or around the Cluster Approach. This 
included interviews with staff from UN agencies as follows: OCHA, UNDP, 
UNHCR, UNICEF and WHO; from the IFRC and various national Red 
Cross/Red Crescent Societies; and from various NGOs, including ActionAid (lead 
organization on the NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project), CARE, HelpAge 
International and Save the Children. The positions of people interviewed varied 
from global and country-level cluster coordinators, to cluster support staff 
(including staff working at the Global Cluster administrative offices as well as 
country-level information managers and one country-level technical manager), to 
professionals not directly employed to work on the clusters, but who were, in 
various capacities, working with the Cluster Approach, for example as point 
people on the Clusters for their organization. Interviews were conducted in 
Geneva, London and Nairobi between April 2010 and March 2011. While a 





(particularly those from UN agencies), others were more so. Accordingly, for 
consistency, I have withheld the names of all of my interviewees. Rather than refer 
to interviewees by pseudonym, I refer to them by their position (for example as 
“the Global Shelter Cluster Coordinator” or “the Save the Children point person 
on the Nutrition Cluster”), an arrangement all interviewees expressed comfort 
with.  
In interviews, in a similar way to different types of documents, different 
types of questions and their corresponding answers provided different sorts of 
data. On the one hand, some of the issues I was interested in discussing were 
fairly technical and ostensibly mundane; for example: “what are the main 
technologies used for communicating with the field?” or “how do you decide 
which assessment tool to use for which situation?”. For these sorts of questions, 
answers tended to be more or less straightforward accounts of actual practices and 
material arrangements. On the other hand, some of the issues I raised elicited 
more subjective answers, some of which may not have been actively thought 
about by interviewees before the event of the interview; for example, “how would 
you define humanitarianism?” or “what does it mean for humanitarian action to 
be global?”. In such cases, the interview situation became a space where 
interviewees could work through ideas together with the interviewer (me), where 
themes were both occasioned and co-constructed in the event of the interview 
itself (Talmy 2011).  
Further, these interviews can be seen as, if not exactly performances of the 
self (e.g. Atkinson and Silverman 1997; Talmy 2011), then performances of the 





interviewees, for example, spoke of the Cluster Approach in positive terms; NGO 
interviewees were more negative, with Red Cross interviewees tending to be 
somewhere in between the two. This is, no doubt, partly a reflection of these 
different groups’ experiences of working in and with the clusters, which have been 
repeatedly cited in evaluations as being too UN-centric (e.g. Stoddard et al. 2007; 
NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project 2009). It is also likely a reflection of 
organizational commitments: cluster lead agencies, most of which are UN 
agencies, have a professional interest in presenting the clusters in a good light; 
NGOs meanwhile have no such interest. And, further, it may reflect different 
professional cultures: overall, the UN officials I spoke with presented polished 
answers with relative ease, giving lengthy answers and rarely straying from the 
official line of their particular agency (with the notable exception of one UN 
OCHA Somalia official who’s unfiltered answers were an evident source of stress 
for his co-interviewee). By contrast NGO professionals I spoke with were often 
more open in their answers, while, at the same time, seeming less comfortable 
with the interview process, asking, for example, if they had answered my question 
or if what they said was what I was looking for. Again interviewees from the Red 
Cross tended to fall somewhere between these two poles.  
 Whenever possible, interviews were conducted in the offices of the 
interviewees. This provided both a comfortable space for the interviewees and a 
chance to visit and observe the offices where the work of the Cluster Approach 
was being conducted. As noted above, in many cases this led to obtaining 
additional documents – as issues arose in the course of an interview, interviewees 





internal document for me to peruse or take home. In addition, the ringing of 
phones (colleagues calling to report from Pakistan or Haiti, for example), the 
intrusions of assistants and superiors (e.g. reminding interviewees of an urgent 
meeting in ten minutes) and the checking of emails (“it’s another one from the 
global office asking for more information...” sighed a UN OCHA official in 
Nairobi) all added to the insights I was gaining into the expansive connectedness 
of the Cluster Approach, as well as into the sense of urgency, including the 
banality of urgency, which pervades the workspaces of humanitarian agencies and 
organizations (on the normalization of urgency in the humanitarian workspace, 
see Krause 2009).  
The experience of visiting the workspaces of my interviewees also brought 
some unexpected juxtapositions to the fore. Perhaps most relevant to my research 
was the juxtaposition between the expansive connectedness and mobility of the 
global professionals I was meeting with and the relatively localized workers – the 
drivers, guards, receptionists and janitors – on which their work depended (see 
Sassen 2001 for an analysis of this juxtaposition in global cities more generally). In 
Nairobi this contrast was coupled with the juxtaposition between the relatively 
darker skin of the mainly Kenyan drivers, guards, receptionists and janitors I 
encountered and the relatively lighter skin of the North American and European 
UN professionals I interviewed there. Such divisions between the high level 
professionals in the global humanitarian field and those on which their work 
depends – which contribute to particular asymmetries in the constitution of global 
humanitarian spaces – are generally not visible in documents or via interviews 





Placed in conversation with other sources of data – documentary review 
and participant observation – the interviews I conducted provided an invaluable 
source of professional and personal insights as well as technical and organizational 
details.  
Participating and Observing 
 Finally, my research involved participating in two cluster training events. 
The larger of which was a Shelter Cluster Coordinators’ training course consisting 
of an online course followed by a week-long intensive training retreat in 
November 2010. This training was sponsored by the IFRC, which co-led the 
training together with two independent consultants who had previously led a 
series of cluster trainings for other, UN agency-led clusters. The event was hosted 
by the British Red Cross in Guildford (a suburb of London). I also took part in a 
smaller, online-only training for cluster information managers, also sponsored by 
the IFRC in association with the Shelter Cluster, also in autumn 2010.  
Participation in these trainings gave me a view from the inside of the 
cluster training process. It also brought me in contact with a wide range of people, 
many of whom I was able to interview, who had worked in various capacities in 
country-level clusters – as coordinators, information managers, technical 
managers, or just as Red Cross or NGO cluster members – and in various cluster-
organized humanitarian responses – including (but not limited to) responses in 
Bangladesh, Haiti, Indonesia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines 
and Sri Lanka. Participation in these training courses also gave me access to a 
range of documents, such as training modules, presentations, case studies and 





Participant observation in these Shelter Cluster training courses gave me 
insight into the professional cultures of the Shelter Cluster through both formal 
and informal interactions with cluster members. Formal situations – modules, 
presentations, interactive teaching sessions and group activities – allowed me to 
experience some of the professional work culture of the clusters, as well as giving 
a feel for the priorities, substantive rationalities and decision-making strategies 
employed by or encouraged for professionals working in the Cluster Approach.  
At the same time, the informal responses of participants to these formal moments 
– expressed in questions, interruptions and even arguments with presenters – 
provided insight into the contestations that exist within the Cluster Approach over 
appropriate meanings, processes and practices. The experience of a particularly 
Red Cross centered training was particularly illuminating on this point, as constant 
controversies arose on the appropriate level of humanitarian coordination 
between agencies, at one point involving a member of the French Red Cross 
interrupting a presenter in mid-sentence by standing up and exclaiming “the Red 
Cross will never be accountable to the UN!”. 
In addition, informal situations outside of official training sessions – meals, 
drinks and shared train journeys at the end of the week – provided a space for 
more fluid and spontaneous conversations. At one lunch, for example, the topic at 
my table turned to Haiti and one attendee spontaneously shared his story of 
witnessing a vigilante murder on the streets of Port-au-Prince from the window of 
an armored Red Cross Land Cruiser and the shock and unexpected guilt he 
experienced as the vehicle kept driving. Two others at the table immediately 





an account he had read about severed feet being hung mockingly outside the 
Médecins Sans Frontières offices in Sudan. Others around the table nodded 
knowingly. And then, with barely a pause, a joke was made and the conversation 
turned light again. In a different way from the bustling offices where I conducted 
my interviews, moments like this conveyed the sense of urgency with which 
humanitarian actors carry out their work as well as the normalization of this 
urgency. 
Participant observation was an invaluable element of research, providing 
me with a view of the Cluster Approach from the perspective of the professionals 
who participate in it. Unlike the contrived space of the interview, or the 
formalized space of documents, the space of the cluster trainings allowed me to 
see some of the unedited controversies, confessions and sentiments of those who 
work within the Cluster Approach.  
A Final Note on Action and the Cluster Approach 
Finally, one point of clarification should be made: although I refer 
throughout this dissertation to activities being done by the cluster, it is the cluster 
member agencies and organizations that carry out the programming in 
humanitarian responses, not the clusters themselves. As one NGO cluster 
member was quick to point out 
There is a danger mixing the cluster with the response – you see more and more people 
pointing to outcomes from the cluster – ‘the cluster did this in x emergency’, ‘the cluster 
did y’ but in fact the cluster doesn’t do any programming. Programming is done by 
organizations and agencies. (Emphasis original) 
This cluster member’s concern, of course, was that humanitarian 
programming carried out by her organization was being subsumed under the 





programming is carried out by cluster members and not the cluster itself, however, 
I use “the cluster” and the “Cluster Approach” to refer to activities carried out by 
cluster members under the direction or facilitation of the cluster at large. This is 
both for ease of narrative flow and to follow the emerging language of the 
humanitarian community itself. As this NGO cluster member’s own comment 
makes clear, responses organized through the Cluster Approach are increasingly 
thought of and referred to by those in the humanitarian community as being done 
by the cluster. 
Conclusion: Researching Humanitarian Action 
This chapter has outlined both my general approach to the research 
presented here and described the practical details of the methods I used for 
collecting data. In terms of my research approach, my focus has been on the 
making and doing of global humanitarian spaces through the heterogeneous 
associations and socio-material practices of the Cluster Approach. My research 
methods, meanwhile, included in-depth interviewing, participant observation and 
an extensive documentary review as described above. In concluding, I want to 
make one final note on researching the humanitarian action, which follows from 
Michael Barnett’s observation:  
An ever-present danger in writing about humanitarianism, and nearly any aspect of 
international ethics, is the seductive pull of a Whiggish view of history. It is difficult to 
avoid writing a highly sympathetic, nearly sycophantic account of humanitarianism or 
interpreting its evolution and expansion as a sign of moral progress. (Barnett 2008: 235) 
Barnett’s suggestion is that the humanitarian subject holds a particular pull 
on the sympathies of its researchers (and, indeed, Barnett himself has, on 
occasion, been called out for just such fawning treatment of humanitarian actors 





actors have been common in the social sciences (e.g. Kennedy 2004; De Waal 
1997), suggesting that a pull to interpret the humanitarian subject in the opposite 
direction has been at least equally seductive to scholars. In my research I have 
tried to avoid either of these two extremes, focusing on the practices, relationships 
and material arrangements through which global humanitarian spaces are made 
rather than on the heroism or dastardliness of the humanitarian endeavor in 
general. At the same time, objectivity in research is neither possible (see, for 
example, Haraway 1997), nor necessarily desirable. As aptly expressed by Shamus 
Khan “To stand outside people, looking in at their lives as if they were in some 
laboratory or snow globe, is not to understand them” (2011: 201). While this 
dissertation is not, as Khan’s work is, an ethnography, I hope that I have, through 
the course of in-depth interviewing, participant observation and emersion in a 
multitude of documents, become close enough to my subject that my observations 
and arguments to follow come from a situated standpoint that is capable of both 







Locations and Encounters:  




This chapter begins my empirical investigation into the making of global 
humanitarian spaces by the Cluster Approach with a focus on places. I start with 
places, firstly, as a way of grounding my analysis. This is, in part, an answer to 
Latour’s (2005) provocation that, in order to explain the global, one must start by 
asking where it is that it is being achieved. This resonates with the argument, 
described in Chapter Two, that globalization is neither occurring in a virtual 
nowhere – as in a totally deterritorialized space of flows – nor is it occurring 
everywhere on the planet at once – as in a global one-world society. In other 
words, if the practices, productions, and relationships that constitute globalization 
are neither nowhere nor everywhere, then they must be somewhere. This also 
follows from Saskia Sassen’s (e.g. 2007a, 2001) analogous point that a focus on 
places directs attention to the actual, situated practices and processes through 
which globalization takes shape. Accordingly, this chapter locates the particular, 
situated places where the Cluster Approach is at work in its making of global 
humanitarian spaces. 
I start with places, secondly, as a way of introducing the variety of 
territorializations through which the Cluster Approach realizes global 
humanitarian spaces. Related to the argument that globalization cannot be 





Chapter Two) that globalization is not simply a homogenizing force spreading out 
from the West over the surface of the globe. Space, it was argued, is not simply a 
neutral surface. To the degree that new spatial orderings originating in the West 
(or in any particular place) are extended outwards into new places around the 
globe, they do not simply wash over these places, but rather encounter other 
spatial orders as they move. Moreover, it is the encounter between different spatial 
orders in particular places that is productive of the global humanitarian spaces 
made by the Cluster Approach. This chapter is also concerned, then, with 
introducing such encounters between different spatial orderings – between the 
ostensibly global spatial order of the clusters and the national or local spatial order 
of humanitarian crises – that happen in places. 
With these aims in mind, this chapter proceeds as follows: in the first 
section below, I outline a conceptualization of place that builds on the themes 
introduced in Chapter Two in relation to space. I then outline the specific spatial 
imagination expressed in the organizational architecture of the Cluster Approach, 
which I argue relies both on an imagination of “place versus placelessness” and on 
the related spatial imagination of nested hierarchical scales. This is followed by 
locating the specific places where both the global clusters and the country-level 
clusters are at work, a task which unsettles the spatial imagination of hierarchically 
scaled place and placelessness. Having located the places where the clusters are at 
work, I end this chapter by tracing two emergent territorialities of global 
humanitarian space: the first, illustrated through the case of the cluster response to 
Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, is a territoriality involving the translocal articulation 





and practices into the territorial locations of nation-states; the second, illustrated 
with the case of the Kenya Nutrition Cluster, involves a national territoriality 
wherein national capabilities have been redirected in the service of global aims. 
Conceptualizing Places 
In line with the conceptualization of space laid out in Chapter Two, there 
has been a growing move in the social sciences – particularly in the field of human 
geography – to understand places as dynamic, open and multivalent (e.g. Massey 
1994, 2005; Cresswell 2004; Amin 2004). As with the increasingly apparent cross-
border connections that have destabilized state-centric approaches to space, 
technological advances in recent decades – particularly in information and 
communications technologies (ICTs), as well as in transport – have increasingly 
suggested the openness and interconnectedness of places (Gieryn 2000). This, in 
turn, has destabilized older conceptual approaches to place that take it, often 
implicitly, as fixed, areal, self-contained, and in possession of a unique, unchanging 
identity (Brenner et al. 2003; Jessop et al. 2008).19 Increased interconnectivities 
enabled by new technologies, for example, distribute action over wider distances 
(Callon and Law 2004), allow interactions with “absent” others (Giddens 1990) 
and – as a consequence of both – foster new forms of “action and belonging at a 
distance” (Amin 2002: 395). With regards to humanitarian action, not only does 
the “CNN effect” (see Chapter One) allow the places of humanitarian crises to be 
                                              
19 Anssi Paasi (2008: 407-8) argues that arguments like Jessop et al.’s reflect (and contribute to) “the current 
amnesia” about older relational conceptualizations of place. This amnesia, Paasi suggests, stems from a 
tendency to assume a linear evolution of conceptual categories marked by radical changes and breaks. 
Following from Raymond Williams (1977) idea of layers of culture (residual, emerging and dominant), 
Paasi advocates for seeing the development of conceptual categories similarly as part of a “layered culture 





viewed in real time around the world, but contemporaneous advances in transport 
and logistical capacities allow transnational humanitarian actors to mobilize 
personnel and materials into the places of crises faster than ever before, effecting 
humanitarian responses in near real time (Barnett 2011).  
The increasingly apparent openness of places, along with their 
correspondingly visible interconnectedness with other places, has led some 
observers to suggest that, in the contemporary era of globalization, places are 
dissolving into an unbounded space of flows (Castells 1996), losing their unique 
identities (e.g. Ritzer 1996), or are otherwise suffering at the hands of an 
encroaching globalization. Along such lines in the case of global humanitarianism, 
Debrix (1998) argues that global humanitarian action is dissolving the specificity 
of the different places where crises occur into a larger humanitarian space defined 
by globally homogenous practices and relationships. The problem with such 
visions of the dissolution of places at the hands of globalization is that, firstly, they 
rely on a spatial imagination that sees globalization as a force spreading out over 
space-as-a-surface, dissolving places by homogenizing them as it moves – an 
imagination dispensed with already in Chapter Two. Secondly, they also rely on 
conceptualizing places as closed, areal, and of more or less fixed identity, such that 
evidence to the contrary is taken to spell the demise of place. As the following 
example suggests, however, recognizing the openness, dynamism and evolving 
identity of places need not equate with their dissolution into wider space.  
In the first weeks of August of 2010, when I was conducting a series of 
interviews in Geneva, flooding in Pakistan that had been building since the start of 





waters had moved from the north through to the south of the country, at their 
height submerging a fifth of the country’s landmass (United Nations 2010). This 
massive body of moving water entered a location already at the intersection of 
past and ongoing conflicts, the global war on terror, the international development 
complex, persistent socio-economic marginalization, and an existing transnational 
humanitarian presence in the area. Moreover, many, if not most, of the elements 
co-present in the physical space with the flood waters in Pakistan in August 2010 
extended outward into other places – Islamabad, Kabul, Washington, London, 
New York.  
In some provinces, the flood waters moved into places where millions of 
displaced people – both internally displaced persons (IDPs) from violent conflicts 
in the neighboring provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and 
refugees fleeing from the global “War on Terror” taking place in Afghanistan – 
had previously moved in. At the time the floods happened, some of these 
displaced people had started to move back to their previous homes, some were 
resettling into new locations and others remained in designated displacement 
camps or informal settlements. Global humanitarian actors, for their part, 
observed the crisis unfolding from their offices in Geneva and other distant 
(mostly Western) cities and directed the deployment of personnel and resources 
from other places around the world into the place of the floods. The earthquake 
in Haiti earlier that year became present in Pakistan’s flood plains via its depletion 
of available humanitarian funding, capacities and resources. In one stark example 
of this, although Pakistan produces some 85 percent of the world’s emergency 





tents shipped from Pakistani factories and warehouses to Haiti earlier that year 
had yet to be replenished (Polastro et al. 2011: 38).  
The 2010 Pakistan floods highlight the open, heterogeneous and 
overlapping character of the places of humanitarian crises. They demonstrate that 
the places of humanitarian crises have no internal coherence – no clear inside and 
outside. And yet, it does not make sense to say that Pakistan’s flood plains were 
dissolved into a larger space of homogenized global disaster and response. 
Instead, the places of the 2010 Pakistan flooding display a unique, place-specific 
bundling of elements with different extensions and durations. That is, they suggest 
an understanding of place in line with Doreen Massey’s (2005) understanding of 
places as “temporary constellations” of heterogeneous (human and non-human) 
elements; places as the coming together of diverse spatio-temporal trajectories of 
different actors, objects and natures in a specific here and now. As with the 
successive waves of displaced people in the Pakistan flood plains – and with the 
flood waters for that matter – the elements that make up places will eventually be 
dispersed and replaced by new elements, each at different times and speeds, such 
that places are continually evolving as some elements disperse and others replace 
them (Massey 2005: 141). 
In a related conceptualization, David Harvey (1996) argues for seeing 
place-making as a matter of carving out “temporary permanences” from wider 
spaces. Where Massey emphasizes the constant flux – or, the ongoing becoming – 
of places, however, Harvey focuses more on the durability of assembled elements 
(natural disasters notwithstanding). Reconciling this divergence, Pierce, Martin and 





character of places, writing that “places seem durable to the people who recognise 
and experience them, but they are nonetheless constantly being recreated and 
subtly changing” (2011: 58 emphasis original). Both conceptualizations, 
meanwhile, suggest that places are open, overlapping and evolving, while 
maintaining a (changing, relational) meaningfulness in these particular points in 
time and space. If places now appear to be changing or losing their unique 
identities, this is not because they were unchanging before, or that they have 
somehow lost their specific meaningfulness, but that the ongoing evolution of 
places and their internal multiplicities are simply becoming more apparent in the 
age of digital communications and increasingly global interconnectedness.   
The Spatial Imagination of the Cluster Approach  
As introduced in Chapter One, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC) Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach distinguishes between two 
distinct “levels” of the approach: the global level and the country level (IASC 
2006: 2). This division is fundamental to the intended structure of the Cluster 
Approach, with each level assigned a distinct set of activities aimed at improving 
transnational humanitarian responses. Specifically, the global clusters are 
designated to address universal humanitarian policies, capacities, and practices, 
while the country-level clusters are designated to adapt these universal policies and 
practices to the work of coordinating specific crisis responses in particular 
countries. This division represents an implicit attempt to resolve the tension 
identified by Michael Barnett (2008), between the desire of the transnational 
humanitarian community to, on the one hand, uphold ‘universal’ moral values 





global clusters are set up to establish and encourage universal humanitarian policy 
and practice, while the country-level clusters are aimed at addressing the 
particularities of the specific places where humanitarian crisis occur. 
This division of cluster activities – with global cluster activities oriented 
toward the universal and country-level cluster activities toward the particular – 
corresponds with a certain spatial imagination. Specifically, the global clusters are 
associated with a deterritorialized, universal “space of flows” while the country-
level clusters are associated with the particularly located “spaces of places.” 
Consider, for example, how the IASC’s design of the Cluster Approach reinforces 
the locational aspects of the “emergency imaginary” as specified by Craig Calhoun 
(2004, 2008, 2010). That is, it strengthens a social imaginary of humanitarian 
emergencies that “simultaneously locates in particular settings what are in fact 
crises produced, at least partially, by global forces, and dislocates the standpoint of 
observation from that of the wealthy global North to a view from nowhere” 
(Calhoun 2004: 376). The various Terms of Reference, Guidance Notes and other 
official written materials outlining the Cluster Approach never attach the global 
clusters to any particular places. Instead, they are always just referred to as 
“global” and their work is described as taking place at “the global level” and 
pertaining to that which is “sector-” or “system-wide,” exemplifying the 









Source: (OCHA 2010b)  
 
The country-level clusters, meanwhile, are officially attached to the 
particular national territories where each is implemented (the Pakistan Clusters to 
Pakistan, the Haiti Clusters to Haiti and so on). Figure 4.1 shows an 
implementation map designed and distributed by OCHA, showing the 38 
countries where country-level clusters had been implemented through March 
2010. The spatial imagination of the map in Figure 4.1 is one where the location 
of each country-level cluster is made coterminous with its eponymous country’s 
                                              
20 A Resident Coordinator (RC) is the senior-most UN official representing the UNDP in countries where 
that agency is operating. The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) is a senior UN official appointed by the UN 
Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) in countries experiencing a new or worsened humanitarian crises and 
where there is already an RC in place. The cluster approach is most likely to be implemented in countries where 
there is both an RC and HC in place, though some national governments have resisted the appointment of 
an HC for political reasons resulting in only an RC being in place when clusters are implemented. The 
IASC recommends that the RC and HC posts be held by separate individuals, however, in practice this role 
is often filled by the same person. The practice of so-called “double-hatting” – having one person acting as 
both RC and HC – has been repeatedly identified as problematic by the humanitarian community (e.g. 





national territory. This reflects the other half of the emergency imaginary, wherein 
humanitarian crises (or in this case, responses to them) are attached to seemingly 
self-contained, particular territorial locations (Calhoun 2004).  
In addition, the spatial imagination of the global clusters as deterritorialized 
and the country-level clusters as specifically located is attached to a particular 
scalar imagination of the global-national relationship, in which the global is seen as 
above and encompassing the national. For example, the Cluster Evaluation Phase 
II Synthesis Report explains the Cluster Approach through use of an illustration 
that shows the global level at the top of a hierarchy of descending boxes (see 
Figure 4.2). These move down in sequence, from global to regional, to national, to 
provincial and, finally at the bottom of the page, to local. Meanwhile a bracket at 
left shows the country-level as encompassing the national, the provincial and the 
local. Although the organizational chart presented in Figure 4.2 does not make any 
explicit claims about scale, visual depictions such as this present and reinforce a 
particular understanding of the relative positions of the different parts of the 
system (Callon and Law 2004). Here the organizational division of the clusters 
into levels carries forward a spatial imagination of the parts relating through a 
hierarchy of scales, with the global clusters sitting above the country-level clusters, 
which in turn are represented as encompassing hierarchically ordered sub-national 
territorial levels. 
The spatial imaginary of the Cluster Approach is thus one in which places 
are closed and internally coherent. More specifically, it attaches the work of the 
country-level clusters to the spatial order of the national. The global clusters, 





Figure 4.2: Illustration of “Levels of the Cluster Approach” from Cluster Evaluation 
Phase II 
 
Source: (Streets et al. 2010: 26) 
 
particular places, represented as inhabiting a deterritorialized global scale above 
the specifically located national scale of the country-level clusters. In the two 
sections to immediately follow, I unsettle this closed spatial imagination by 
locating first the global clusters in the particular, situated places where they are at 
work and, second, the country-level clusters in the multiple territorial locations 
and articulated scales where they are at work. The particular spatial imagination of 
the clusters as existing in a hierarchical scalar relationship is further unsettled in 





articulations and territorializations through which the global and country-level 
clusters together make global humanitarian spaces.  
Locating the Global Clusters 
Unlike global collaborative humanitarian networks like ALNAP, ICVA and 
InterAction, the global clusters are not incorporated organizations. Still, as one 
participant in the global clusters put it, “the clusters don’t exist in their own right, 
[but] they have to be hosted somewhere.” That somewhere, in general, is in the 
offices of the global cluster lead agencies (see Chapter One). As well as appointing 
a specifically designated Global Cluster Coordinator as mandated in the IASC 
guidelines on the Cluster Approach, most of the global cluster lead agencies have 
voluntarily designated additional office space and personnel to support the work 
of the Global Cluster Coordinator. Table 4.1 lists the locations and cluster-specific 
names of these sites of cluster administrative offices (hereafter referred to 
generically as global cluster administrative offices, or GCAOs, when referred to 
collectively).  
As Table 4.1 shows, six out of the eleven GCAOs are based solely in 
Geneva, two are based jointly in New York and Geneva, and three are based in 
Rome. While many of the GCAOs are hosted in the headquarters of their 
respective lead agency, this is not always the case. Notably, where the lead 
agency’s headquarters are outside of Geneva, there is a tendency to host the 
GCAO either solely or jointly in the lead agency’s Geneva offices. Both UNICEF 
and UNDP, which lead four clusters between them, are headquartered in New 
York but run their clusters either solely from, or jointly with, their Geneva offices. 





headquartered in London, but seconds staff to UNICEF’s Geneva office for its 
cluster administrative duties. The exceptions to the pattern of hosting GCAOs 
solely or partly in Geneva are the FAO and WFP led clusters, which host their 
GCAO in their respective agency headquarters in Rome. 
Table 4.1: Global Cluster Lead Agencies and Administrative Units, 2011 
Global Cluster 
Global Cluster  
Lead Agencies 




 Global Cluster 
Administrative Offices 
Food Security* WFP and FAO (co-
leads) 
Global Food Security 
Support Cell 
WFP Rome (HQ) 





UNHCR Geneva (HQ) 
Early Recovery UNDP Global Early Recovery 
Team 
UNDP Geneva 











UNHCR Geneva (HQ);         
IFRC Geneva (HQ) 
Health WHO Global Health Cluster 
Secretariat 
WHO Geneva (HQ) 
Nutrition UNICEF Global Nutrition Cluster 
Coordination Team 
UNICEF, New York (HQ) 
and Geneva 
Protection UNHCR Global Protection 
Cluster Support Cell 
UNHCR Geneva (HQ) 
WASH UNICEF Global WASH Cluster 
Support Team 







N/A WFP Rome (HQ) 
Logistics WFP Global Logistics Cluster 
Support Cell 
WFP Rome (HQ) 
* Formerly the Agriculture Cluster 






The work of the global clusters, however, is not totally contained within 
the GCAOs, even though these offices play a central role in coordinating and 
facilitating this work. A central task of the global clusters, after all, is not only to 
coordinate the “relevant” global humanitarian actors, but to draw together these 
actors for the carrying out of collaborative work (IASC 2006). As such, the work 
of the global clusters is also partly distributed throughout the cluster membership. 
Accordingly, a second important aspect of the answer to where the work of the 
global clusters gets done, then, is where all the global cluster members are located.  
Figures 4.3a and 4.3b show the locations of all cluster member agencies 
and organizations as of December 2010. At that time, there were a total of 119 
different agencies and organizations participating in the global clusters, holding a 
total of 258 cluster memberships between them.21 Figures 4.3a and b reveal that, 
far from being more or less evenly distributed around the globe, the global cluster 
members are overwhelmingly located in the global North. Only three cities 
outside of Europe, North America and Australia are home to global cluster 
members: Nairobi (UNEP and UN-HABITAT), Addis Ababa (African Action 
Network) and Amman (UNRWA). Moreover, Figure 4.3a also shows that global 
cluster members are not evenly distributed in the global North either, but instead 
are heavily concentrated in Geneva, with secondary concentrations in New York 
and London.  
                                              
21The total number of cluster memberships is more than the total number of cluster members because 
some agencies and organizations are members of more than one cluster. For example, CARE International 
is a member of five of the global clusters. As such, although CARE counts as just one global cluster 





Figure 4.3a: Map of Global Cluster Memberships 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
Figure 4.3b: Number of Global Cluster Members and Global Cluster Memberships by 
City, 2010 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
The De Facto Exclusions in the Location of the Global Clusters 
It is perhaps not surprising that the work of the global clusters is so heavily 





































































































































































































































































transnational humanitarianism, being both where the Red Cross movement and 
the League of Nations were founded and, of course, the location of the 
international negotiations that led to the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols, which delineate international humanitarian law. Today, Geneva remains 
at the center of the Red Cross movement, with the headquarters of both the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International 
Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent societies (IFRC) located therein. Geneva is 
also an important UN city, with the former League of Nations building (the Palais 
des Nations) acting as the UN’s European offices, and with several of the UN 
agencies and offices most involved in humanitarian work located there (e.g. 
UNHCR, WHO and OHCHR).  
In addition to its historical significance for the UN and the Red Cross 
movement, Geneva is now also home to a growing number of humanitarian 
platforms (e.g. the Global Humanitarian Platform), collaborations (e.g. SPHERE 
and ALNAP) and consortia (e.g. ICVA), as well as to a rapidly increasing number 
of new humanitarian NGOs. Increasingly, even humanitarian actors 
headquartered outside of Geneva are establishing important offices there. 
Indicative of this trend, while none of the six largest operational humanitarian 
NGOs originated in Geneva, all except Catholic Relief Services (the charitable 
arm of the US Catholic Church), have established a physical presence there since 
the 1990s (see Table 4.2). While the location of so many important humanitarian 
organizations in Geneva makes it the logical place for locating the GCAOs, the 





reinforcing, as illustrated by the decision-making process associated with locating 
the global clusters’ meetings. 
Table 4.2: Organizational Presence of the Six Largest Operational Humanitarian 
NGOs in Geneva, 2010 
Organization 
City and Year of 
Founding 
Organizational Presence in 
Geneva (as of 2010) 
CARE  Atlanta, GA, 1945 CARE International Secretariat 
Catholic Relief Services Baltimore, MD, 1943 None 
Médecins Sans 
Frontières 
Paris, France, 1971 Global Headquarters 
Oxfam Oxford, UK, 1942 Advocacy Office 
Save the Children London, UK, 1919 Geneva Office 
World Vision  Los Angeles, CA, 1950 International Liaison Office 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
The global clusters’ large annual, biannual or quarterly (depending on the 
cluster) meetings are events to reflect on and plan cluster activities, establish 
cluster priorities, and form cluster strategies. As one Cluster Coordinator put it, 
“cluster meetings in a lot of ways are the embodiment of the Cluster Approach” 
in that they are “all about cooperation, inclusion [and] involving people.” Yet, as 
another Global Cluster Coordinator explained to me in his office in Geneva,  
I mean, we have [the meetings] in Geneva all the time and these partners have to come at 
their own expenses. It’s not always easy to come to Geneva four times a year, it costs. 
Some partners who are in Europe are easier for them to move around ... But there are 
partners who have to come from Africa, [or] from Asia, and they cannot make it all the 
time; and there is the feeling that … that it’s only those agencies and partners who are 
actually around and able to participate will participate. … So we have to devise a way that 
will bring these meetings to different regions, which means if we take this meeting to 
Africa, that will increase participation in Africa, but then participation from Europe will 





This coordinator clearly recognized the problematic de facto exclusion of potential 
partners from the global South that resulted from always holding the global cluster 
meetings in Geneva. At the same time, the fact that so many existing cluster 
members were located there or in other European cities was preventing him from 
relocating the meetings. The centrality of Geneva for this Global Cluster, as with 
others, had become self-reinforcing: the more meetings, trainings, and other 
events held there, the more organizations in and near the city joined the cluster; 
and, the more cluster members located in and around Geneva the more there was 
a disincentive to move the meetings, trainings and events elsewhere.  
This coordinator’s recognition of the potential place-based exclusions that 
result from always holding events in Geneva is not universal. Speaking from her 
office in London, a staff member at one of the largest humanitarian NGOs was 
adamant that the location of Global Cluster events was inconsequential:  
the meetings invariably happen in either New York or Geneva [and sometimes] in 
London… I don’t know, I think there’s value in the face-to-face global meetings, but I 
think we’ve all got very used to working via teleconferences and video conferences and 
it’s such a global group and we’re all so conscious of using funds appropriately that I’m 
not sure that the face-to-face meetings and physical locations are important. Especially I 
think because … the global people, by this stage, we pretty much all know each other. 
Starting from the spatial imaginary of the global clusters as placeless, this NGO 
staff member dismisses the importance of place, even while noting that the 
meetings are always held in either her own city, London, or in New York and 
Geneva – places that are extensively connected to London via numerous and 
frequent air routes. The self-invisibility of her claim aside, the basis this staff 
member gives for the non-importance of meeting places is that the global cluster 
members “pretty much all know each other.” Attendance at various cluster and 





members to get to know one another. The familiarity gained from physical 
proximity at such events facilitates effective interaction at a distance in the case of 
later participation in cluster meetings via teleconference or video conference. 
However, for would-be participants who do not already know “everybody” 
because they have not had the opportunity to participate in the various sectoral 
events that larger organizations based in Europe and North America regularly 
attend, effective interactions are harder to achieve over the telephone. The global 
actors who all already know each other reinforce their own centrality through 
easily participating in the place of cluster meetings even when they are in other 
cities (usually London or New York instead of Geneva), while those who have not 
yet joined the group find in difficult to participate without travelling what is 
sometimes a restrictive distance.  
Despite the GCAOs being located in just three cities, it is possible that the 
global clusters could draw together the members who are more or less evenly 
dispersed around the globe. As Figures 4.3a and b show, however, this is not the 
case. Far from being located in either a placeless nowhere or more or less evenly 
distributed over the globe, it is clear that the work of coordinating, organizing, 
planning, and directing transnational humanitarian action carried out by the global 
clusters takes place overwhelmingly in Geneva and, secondarily, in New York and 
London. This locational bias is reinforced by the location of important sector 
events, including cluster meetings, in those cities where the most cluster members 
are present to the exclusion of would-be members from the global South. This 
underlines Calhoun’s (2004) argument that global humanitarianism’s “view from 





gaze from particular cities, almost exclusively in the global North and, in the case 
of the global clusters, heavily concentrated in Geneva.  
Locating the Country-level Clusters 
In contrast to the global clusters, one of the most notable features of the 
places of the country-level clusters is not where they are, but where they are not. 
The IASC Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach states that it is to be 
implemented in all “major new emergencies” (IASC 2006). And, according to 
IASC: 
For IASC operational purposes, a “major new emergency” is defined as any situation 
where humanitarian needs are of a sufficiently large scale and complexity that significant 
external assistance and resources are required, and where a multi-sectoral response is 
needed with the engagement of a wide range of international humanitarian actors. (IASC 
2007b: 1) 
Accordingly, one would expect that the country-level clusters would be found 
anywhere in the world where a humanitarian crisis has met this definition since the 
Cluster Approach was first implemented at the end of 2005. However, this is not 
the case. Since 2005 there have been a number of large-scale humanitarian crises 
where the Cluster Approach has not been implemented. For example, clusters 
were neither implemented in response to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, nor in 
response to the 2011 Japanese tsunami, despite both disasters easily fitting the 
IASC description of a “major new emergency.” The reason for this is that, in 
practice, the clusters are only activated in countries that have a UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator (HC) or UN Resident Coordinator (RC).22 In countries like Japan and 
China, where the UN does not have a significant humanitarian or development 
presence, there is no HC or RC in place and, accordingly, the national government 
                                              





maintains control over the authorization, organization and coordination of any 
transnational humanitarian action that takes place within its borders. This means 
that, in practice, the global humanitarian spaces being created by the Cluster 
Approach are only present in less developed countries – as a quick look at the 
map above (Figure 4.1) verifies. The distribution of country-level clusters is 
therefore not only a reminder of the fact that globalization doesn’t simple flow 
out from the West unfettered, but also reflects the obduracy of postcolonial 
spatialities and how these “earlier frontiers” (see Chapter Two) are implicated in 
channeling global humanitarian action into some places and not others.  
However, the map also obscures as much as it reveals. The locations of the 
country-level clusters in this map, as noted above, are represented as extending 
throughout the particular national territories in which each works. Yet almost 
none of them are actually active throughout the entire country where they 
operate.23 The Phase II Cluster Evaluation report refers to the restriction of 
cluster activities to only part of a country’s national territory as “partial 
implementation.” The reasons for this, it suggests, “can be due to the geographic 
concentration of an emergency or to political pressures not to classify certain 
situations as ‘humanitarian’” (Streets et al. 2010: 27). In addition, another 
significant driver of partial implementation, not mentioned in the Evaluation 
report, is restricted humanitarian access in certain areas due to violence and 
threats aimed directly at the staff and property of transnational humanitarian 
organizations. Perhaps the best example of this is Somalia, where the clusters are 
                                              
23 The exception to this is the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) clusters, where cluster operations are 
distributed more or less throughout the whole territory. This is, at least partly, due to the prominent role 





most active in the country’s northern provinces, despite the fact that the worst of 
that country’s humanitarian crisis is happening in the southern and central 
provinces (see Chapter Five for a longer examination of this case).  
In terms of where within their given countries cluster members are carrying 
out humanitarian operations, then, most are restricted to certain areas within a 
national territory. When one considers only the areas where the country-level 
clusters are administered – that is, where country-level cluster administration 
offices are located and where cluster meetings are held – their locations are 
revealed as even more restricted. The NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project 
review of the Cluster Approach found that most country-level cluster 
administrations and meetings were restricted to capital cities (2009: 26). In 
addition, in two cases, Somalia and Myanmar, the Country-level Cluster 
administrations have been located outside of the territory of their designated 
country.24 Instead of the full shading of national territories depicted in Figure 4.1, 
then, an alternative mapping of country-level cluster implementations might 
include just particular regions or cities where the clusters are active, both within 
and (in the cases of Myanmar and Somalia) outside of their respective countries.  
Although the country-level clusters do not extend fully throughout national 
territories, however, neither are they simply locally or regionally bounded. This is 
an important point, for it unsettles the emergency imaginary of disconnected, 
locally contained crises. The memberships of the country-level clusters are largely 
made up of transnational humanitarian agencies and organizations, often to the 
                                              
24 The Somalia Clusters are indefinitely managed from Nairobi in neighboring Kenya (see Chapter Five), 





exclusion of national and, especially, of local NGOs (see Chapter Six). Moreover, 
throughout implementation of crisis responses, the country-level clusters maintain 
close relationships with their corresponding global clusters, on whom they rely for 
guidance, surge capacity, and operational support. This relationship is dictated by 
the IASC Terms of Reference for Cluster Leads at the Country-level, which reads:  
Sector/cluster leads at the country level are responsible for ensuring adherence to norms, 
policies and standards agreed at the global level and should treat the global level clusters 
as a resource that can be called upon for advice on global standards, policies and ‘best 
practice’, as well as for operational support, general guidance and training programmes. 
(IASC 2007b: 96) 
In accordance with this guidance, the country-level clusters continuously engage 
with the global clusters during crisis responses, with the latter extending 
“universal” standards, policies and best practices into the places of crisis 
responses. Such articulations between the country-level clusters in the places of 
humanitarian crises and the global clusters in Geneva, New York and London, are 
explored in the remainder of this chapter, which traces the production of the 
global through two different territorial configurations.  
Articulating Places and Scales: Cyclone Nargis, Myanmar 2008 
Through their work of supporting operational responses, the GCAOs 
extend their version of global humanitarian action into the places of humanitarian 
crises. The global clusters offer initial coordination and ongoing support for the 
country-level cluster operations; they liaise between cluster members and national 
governments; they draw up appeals for funding from donors; and they ensure that 
global standards are being met and global guidelines and best practices are being 
followed. The articulations between global and country-level clusters, however, are 





the places of humanitarian crises, aspects of the places of humanitarian crises also 
extend themselves into the places of the global clusters. To illustrate this dynamic, 
the following example traces the processes of articulations between places and 
scales of action in the humanitarian response to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar.  
The worst natural disaster in Myanmar’s recorded history and the third 
deadliest storm ever recorded, Cyclone Nargis “severely” affected an estimated 2.4 
million people in the Yangon and Ayeyarwady Divisions of Myanmar and brought 
an official death toll of 84,537 with 53,836 recorded as still missing by the end of 
2008 (Turner et al. 2008). This major natural disaster occurred in a place where a 
number of complicating aspects already converged from a transnational 
humanitarian point of view. Ruled by a military junta since 1962, Myanmar 
severed diplomatic and economic relations with western nations in the 1990s. 
Though it remains one of the world’s poorest nations, economic sanctions in 
place since the 1990s mean that Myanmar receives only a fraction of the foreign 
aid given to other least developed countries.  
While the clusters are usually able to establish themselves quickly in-
country after a sudden onset disaster, in Myanmar government-imposed 
restrictions on both visas for foreign aid workers and on the import of foreign 
supplies obstructed both the inflow of personnel and aid supplies. This situation 
was compounded by the fact that, prior to Cyclone Nargis, there was only a 
limited humanitarian presence in Myanmar. When the acting HC activated the 
clusters, the IFRC – convener of the Emergency Shelter Cluster in natural 
disasters – had no international staff in-country and the Myanmar Red Cross felt it 





Barred by government restrictions from moving staff into Myanmar quickly, the 
IFRC in Geneva initially asked its cluster co-lead UNHCR – already in Myanmar 
working with IDPs in the north – to act as the lead agency for the Myanmar 
Shelter Cluster.25 Within a few days, however, IFRC headquarters in Geneva 
renegotiated with UNHCR headquarters, also in Geneva, for the latter to keep 
lead of the Myanmar Shelter Cluster only until the IFRC could get its own staff 
into Myanmar to take over.  
While waiting for visas for entry into Myanmar, IFRC started sending staff 
and supplies to Bangkok in neighboring Thailand, where both aid workers and 
essential humanitarian supplies – tents, medicines, sanitation equipment, food and 
potable water – were starting to accumulate awaiting visas and paperwork to be 
approved. With so many aid workers and supplies gathering in Bangkok waiting 
for the paper work to enter, a parallel cluster system was set up there. Clusters 
started meeting simultaneously in Bangkok and Yangon, connecting with one 
another via the global clusters in Geneva. Though this initial  back and forth over 
which agency was going to lead the cluster could have created ill-will or lasting 
confusion, an evaluation of the Shelter Cluster response in Myanmar found that  
The repercussions of this initial confusion were not severe as UNHCR already had a 
strong presence, and the two agencies worked closely to manage the lead. Cluster 
members from other agencies noted that operations were stalled briefly but that the 
cooperation between IFRC and UNHCR minimized delays, and the shelter cluster was 
able to quickly mobilize. (Alexander 2009: 11) 
Working together in Geneva, the two Global Shelter Cluster leads were able to 
quickly assess each other’s capacities, negotiate leadership roles and, jointly, 
                                              
25 Although UNHCR is the global co-lead for the Emergency Shelter Cluster, this was an unusual 
agreement as the IFRC is designated to lead the shelter cluster in natural disasters, such as cyclones, while 





organize other humanitarian actors in their sector in Geneva, Yangon and 
Bangkok.  
While waiting for its staff in Bangkok to have their visas approved, the 
IFRC Global Shelter Cluster Team learned through its connections with country-
level cluster members in different countries that some nations were able to secure 
visas comparatively quickly to enter Myanmar. Moreover, several Shelter Cluster 
members from these nations had already gone through training to be cluster 
coordinators. Upon this discovery, the IFRC in Geneva quickly arranged for the 
trained staff from those member organizations to lead the Myanmar Shelter 
Cluster, drawing up contracts and prioritizing their paperwork to get them in and 
on the ground as quickly as possible. The result was that the IFRC was able to 
take over from UNHCR much faster than originally anticipated and to move 
critical shelter materials from Bangkok into Myanmar through those national 
societies.  
Once the IFRC-led Shelter Cluster Team was up and operating in Yangon, 
however, restrictions on the movement of international personnel and supplies 
continued to hinder action. In addition to difficulty securing visas to enter 
Myanmar, foreign aid workers faced tight government restrictions on their 
movements within Myanmar once they entered. Government imposed restrictions 
in Myanmar were further compounded by the country’s very poor transportation 
and communications infrastructures, with the latter consisting only of “a 
government controlled and unreliable Internet connection and a telephone 
network that covers only urban zones” (Kauffman and Krüger 2010: 20). For 





communications infrastructures, coupled with tight government restrictions on 
the movement of foreign workers, significantly limited their access to affected 
populations and constricted what would usually be a continuous flow of 
communication with Geneva. 
With such severely limited access to the field, cluster members were largely 
unable to get out to the affected areas to gather data on the severity of damage 
and the level and type of needs. Unable to move forward under the existing 
conditions, the Shelter Cluster Team in Yangon, supported by the Global Shelter 
Cluster in Geneva, renegotiated the terms of humanitarian access for the whole 
shelter sector with the government of Myanmar, something individual 
humanitarian organizations and agencies – especially the smaller one – would have 
found difficult if not impossible to do independently. Once access was secured for 
the sector as a whole, individual agencies and organizations started to move 
personnel into affected regions via boat to assess the situation and deliver relief 
aid. With this access, the Shelter Cluster could start to produce and circulate the 
information necessary to plan a coordinated shelter response.26 
Recalling the experience as one of the Shelter Cluster’s great successes, a 
member of the Global Emergency Shelter Cluster Team said,  
for me these two things of UNHCR coming before IFRC and a number of national 
societies managing to get visas quicker to speed up the process, this is a clear example of 
how partnership can do something. And this, before the cluster system it would have 
been impossible to do it, because we would have been all working in isolation … So, 
how to share mandate and resources and things, this is what the cluster allows, no? You 
can have it so that the one [organization/agency] that is better placed to do something, 
that one is doing it, regardless of all the other constraints.  
                                              
26 Chapter Five explores the process of gathering and circulating information about humanitarian crises 





Without the Shelter Cluster’s centralized view of the crisis from Geneva, this 
comment indicates, the shelter response in Myanmar would have been a mess. No 
one agency or organization would have been able to gain enough information to 
produce a “big picture” of the crisis, let alone draw together the resources of other 
organizations in order to select the most useful capacities for the particular 
context from each. 
In this example, the Global Shelter Cluster Team, led by the IFRC in 
Geneva, was able to draw together various actors – the UNHCR in Geneva and 
Myanmar, cluster partners in Bangkok and Yangon, and various transnational 
cluster members in countries with particular visa capabilities – to facilitate and 
coordinate the humanitarian shelter response to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. 
However, as this example has also shown, the movements of the global clusters 
were not those of an unfettered global force flowing over and homogenizing local 
places. The government of Myanmar channeled global humanitarian action into 
particular routes, minimizing the inflow of foreign aid workers and materials and 
leading to the formation of parallel clusters in Bangkok. Even once established in-
country, the IFRC-led Myanmar Shelter Cluster was not able to simply go about 
carrying out the response it had been planning in Geneva and Bangkok, but 
instead was compelled to negotiate the terms of humanitarian access with the 
government of Myanmar and navigate a landscape with limited transportation 
infrastructure in place. 
Global policies, standards and capacities developed by the global clusters, 
then, do not simply extend over a passive surface of spaces, homogenizing places 





humanitarian crises. The places of crisis extend into and mobilize the places of the 
global clusters (Callon and Law 2004: 7). The example of Myanmar underscores 
Massey’s characterization of the comings and goings of the elements of a place as 
presenting an “unavoidable challenge of negotiating a here-and-now” (2005: 140). 
The negotiations that happen within places help determine the contents of those 
places. This includes, for example, negotiations centred on what is included and 
what is excluded, the positions of elements vis-à-vis one another, and the rate at 
which these different elements of place change.  
In Myanmar the clusters had to maneuver around government restrictions 
on visas and material supply lines as well as maneuvering the difficult terrain via 
boats due to a lack of passable roads or approved airspace. The production of a 
global humanitarian space in Myanmar was not a matter of transporting the 
conditions or contents of that space pre-formed from Geneva into the 
Ayeyarwady Delta, but rather a matter of negotiating the terms of that space in 
Geneva, Yangon and Bangkok and of making articulations between these places 
and between different scales – most clearly nationally scaled legal conditions, 
globally scaled humanitarian supply chains and personnel networks and locally 
scaled environmental conditions. As such, this has been an example of making 
global humanitarian space through the articulation of different territorialities and 
spatial scales. In the final section of this chapter I look at a second way in which 
global humanitarian spaces are made by the Cluster Approach: through 





Denationalization and the Global: the Kenya Clusters, est. 2008 
A new IASC Guidance Note on working with national authorities (still in 
draft as of writing) states that “Wherever possible, international humanitarian 
actors should organize themselves in such a way as to buttress and strengthen 
existing national structures and not create parallel structures that may undermine 
or weaken existing governmental ones” (IASC 2009: 1-2). The implication here is 
that, when global and national actors work together, it is the former that 
strengthens the latter. This section demonstrates another possibility: that the 
national actors can strengthen and forward the production of global humanitarian 
spaces within their own national territory.   
In some country-level clusters, national government ministries formally act 
as co-chairs in cluster meetings, sometimes even acting as cluster co-leads with the 
HC-appointed lead agency. The extent to which government ministries participate 
as true partners in the clusters, however, varies greatly from country to country 
and in many countries government involvement in the clusters is limited or non-
existent. This is sometimes due to capacity (as in DRC, Chad and Somalia), 
sometimes due to tensions between the national government and UN agencies (as 
in Myanmar, Uganda and, more recently, Pakistan), and sometimes because the 
government is party to, or even the cause of, the conflict causing the humanitarian 
crisis in question (as in Sudan). In addition to differing national capacities, variable 
involvement by national governments also results from variations in the ways that 
different country-level clusters relate to national governments. In cases where 
coordinators felt that government participation in the cluster was a hindrance, 





meeting with national officials separately from the wider cluster meetings or, as 
noted in one evaluation, holding Cluster meetings at the same time as important 
national meetings, such that government officials were unable to attend (Streets et 
al. 2010: 61).  
Given this variety of barriers to national government participation in the 
Cluster Approach, in many country-level cluster implementations limited 
interaction with national governments is the norm. As the Cluster Evaluation 
Phase I report found: “In the field, in most cases, governments were not closely 
consulted in advance of the decision to roll out the clusters” and once clusters 
were established they rarely consulted government authorities on important 
decisions, assessments or programming (Stoddard et al. 2007: 21). In countries 
where national governments have both the capacity and the will to participate in 
clusters, however, government authorities have played active roles in the country-
level clusters. In one of the earliest country-level cluster implementations, the 
2005 Pakistan earthquake, the government of Pakistan structured its new Federal 
Relief Commission in line with the Cluster Approach, creating what the first major 
Cluster Evaluation called a case “where national and international systems were 
truly aligned” (Stoddard et al. 2007: 21). Similarly, in Indonesia and the 
Philippines, government ministries have been active participants in the cluster-
based coordination of humanitarian responses to natural disasters within their 
territories.  
In contrast to clusters which seek to avoid the involvement of national 
government, for some country-level cluster members, the participation of the 





member, for example, was emphatic that governments should be included when 
and where the capacity and desire to participate exists, saying 
when you look at countries like, you know, the Philippines, like Kenya, you know, like 
Pakistan, for example, where the government does play a strong role, wants to play a 
leadership role, does put in resources, does contribute significant logistic capacity through 
the military or others, there kind of has to be a role for the government. (Emphasis 
original) 
She later added that, even in cases where the government had limited capacity, it 
“doesn’t mean that it actually isn’t or ought not be in the driver’s seat in terms of 
contributing to and taking greater accountability for humanitarian assistance” 
(emphasis original). This attitude stands in notable contrast to the second major 
Cluster Evaluation’s finding that a lack of capacity on the part of participating 
governments was “at times undermining cluster meetings” (Streets et al. 2010: 61).  
In Kenya, although it was not initially included in the decision to 
implement country-level clusters, the national government quickly became a 
central member of the clusters and, in several sectors, a cluster co-lead.27 This 
happened in part because government-led sectoral coordination mechanisms in 
most cluster areas were already in place prior to the implementation of the Cluster 
Approach in 2008. For example the Ministry of Water and Irrigation was already 
coordinating the WASH sector, and the Ministry of Health had established the 
Nutrition Technical Forum to coordinate the nutrition sector. After the Cluster 
Approach was declared, these existing mechanisms decided to transition 
themselves into clusters, rather than maintaining themselves as a parallel system. 
                                              
27 Part of the reason for this initial exclusion was that the Clusters were implemented in Kenya in response 
to post-election violence in 2008. Once this conflict, to which the government was party, was resolved, the 
Kenya Clusters remained in place to address various smaller humanitarian crises such as drought and 





The UNICEF Kenya point person on the Cluster Approach recalled this decision, 
explaining that, with non-cluster coordination mechanisms already in place,  
when you then declare the Cluster Approach there’s a little bit of confusion – are these 
the same, are these different? what do we mean? why are we duplicating things that are 
already there? And so then what we did in the end of 2008 was say, where there is an 
existing structure where government has already bought into leadership, let us just 
acknowledge that that is a cluster. (Emphasis original) 
Rather than continue to run their own competing coordination mechanisms, as 
has happened in some countries, the Government of Kenya, in agreement with its 
major non-government humanitarian partners, decided to embrace the Cluster 
Approach by transitioning existing sectoral groups into Clusters. Critically, 
however, this does not mean that the pre-existing sectoral groups were changed in 
name only.  
After declaring themselves clusters, the former government-led sectoral 
groups became responsible for maintaining standards and implementing policies 
and programming set by the Global Clusters. This, in turn, led to significant 
changes in the way individual organizations within each sector carried out their 
programming in Kenya. As a UNICEF Kenya staff member involved with the 
Kenya Nutrition Cluster explained, 
previously, you know, you could be in one district that it was one NGO supporting and 
you would get, you know, very targeted services on treatment of acute malnutrition. And 
then in the next district where there is another NGO working you would have services 
of treatment of acute malnutrition but with a very strong component of nutritional 
prevention or breastfeeding or something else. And so what the Cluster was able to do 
was to say, let us agree on the standard package of interventions.  
As has been a typical experience in many country-level cluster implementations, 
this move towards the standardization of programming was not always welcome 
by organizations that had been doing things “their way” for years or even decades 
(see Streets et al. 2010; Stoddard et al. 2007). In Kenya, NGOs faced with having 





UNICEF, complaining to donors that “UNICEF is forcing us to do this” (emphasis 
original).  
On its own, however, UNICEF does not have the power to “force” other 
humanitarian agencies and organizations to do anything. In general, if Cluster 
members don’t agree with the direction of the cluster or have an issue with the 
lead agency, they can simply choose not to take part in the cluster and go off and 
do their own thing. However, assuming they are not particularly weakened or 
incapacitated by crisis, national governments do have the authority to enforce 
standards and regulate practices within their territory. As such, with the national 
government acting as co-lead for the Kenya Nutrition Cluster, UNICEF was able 
to push back, telling cluster members that the new standards were not their call, 
but that of the national government. As the UNICEF Kenya cluster point person 
explained, “the fact that the government is a member of the Cluster and a co-lead 
really helps with [enforcing standards], because they can say, look, we’re the 
government of Kenya, statutorily this is part of our job is to set standards and 
monitor compliance.” With national authorities acting as Cluster co-leads, then, all 
actors within that sector have to comply with Cluster decisions, whether or not they 
even participate in the clusters. As such, the participation of the government in the 
Cluster not only avoids a global/national conflict, it can actively forwards the global. 
In addition to the active work that national authorities do to forward the 
global agenda of the Kenya Clusters, certain specific national capacities have been 
redirected towards the Clusters’ global aims. This is the case, for example, in the 
Kenyan Nutrition Cluster’s use of Government of Kenya nurses to carry out 





practices” set by the Global Nutrition Cluster. That is, the Kenya Nutrition 
Cluster has adopted a new practice of training Government of Kenya nurses, 
working in Government of Kenya hospitals and health centers to deliver 
nutritional services devised by the Global Nutrition Cluster. This contrasts with 
the traditional model of transnational humanitarian agencies and organizations 
setting up their own facilities and delivering programming with their own staff. As 
with the Government Ministries’ leadership role in various Clusters, the use of 
Kenyan government nurses to deliver global humanitarian programming is an 
example where national capacities are actively and voluntarily participating in the 
construction, and forwarding the advancement, of global humanitarian space 
within national territorial places.  
This example shows, once again, that the global as compiled in the GCAO 
does not simply extend into the national. In Kenya, national places participate in, 
help make, or become important to certain aspects of the global through a process 
of ongoing (explicit or implicit) negotiation between national and transnational 
actors on the contents of national and subnational places. This process has been 
described by Sassen as the denationalization of the national (2008a, 2010a), wherein 
national actors – such as national government agencies – participate in the 
development of certain aspects of globalization using national capacities in 
national territorializations. As Sassen notes, the fact of active national government 
participation in forwarding the global goes against “the common notion of the 
withdrawal of the state at the hands of the global system” (Sassen 2008b: 65).  
Sassen’s main concern in this work has been with the global economy, 





but is forwarded partly through conscious efforts and particular kinds of work by 
various national institutions (2010a). Just as national ministries of finance 
participate in the development and forwarding of the global economy, this 
example demonstrates how various national ministries can also participate in the 
production of global humanitarian spaces within their national borders. In 
addition, this example reminds us that places are rarely only national, only local, or 
only global, although some may contain more elements of one and less of another 
and actors within place may code or experience it as only one sort of scale.  
Conclusion 
In locating the situated places where the clusters – both global and 
country-level – are at work and exploring the articulations between places and 
scales that are productive of global humanitarian spaces, this chapter has served to 
destabilize the fixed, hierarchically scaled spatial imagination suggested by the 
architecture of the clusters system. The spatial imagination of universal, placeless 
global clusters existing at a pre-given global scale above that of the nationally 
territorialized country-level clusters does not coincide with the spatial relationships 
enacted in the practices of the Cluster Approach. The global clusters, in setting 
global standards, policies, and capacities, are themselves embedded in the located 
places of cities like Geneva, New York and London. Meanwhile, the articulations 
between the global and country-level clusters link the places where the country-
level clusters are at work to other places. Together these findings disrupt the 
closed spatial imagination that informs the emergency imagination of the place 





As well as locating the clusters and unsettling the spatial imagination of 
place and placelessness within nested hierarchical scales, this chapter has sought to 
build up a spatial imagination of place as open, overlapping and ever evolving. 
The places of humanitarian crises, like the Pakistan flood plains in 2010 or the 
Ayeyarwady Delta in 2008, highlight both the ongoing flux of the elements of 
place and the inevitable negotiations that occur between these elements. The 
juxtaposition between elements of different spatial extension and temporal 
duration within places, in turn, highlight the multiscalar and cross-territorial 
articulations through which global humanitarian spaces are made. In some places 
– like in the GCAOs in Geneva – the juxtaposition of locally sited objects at the 
center of globally spanned networks makes the production of global spaces clear, 
while in other places – like the denationalized humanitarian spaces being made in 
Kenya – the global may require some decoding (Sassen 2001; Amin 2004).  
This chapter does not conclude this dissertation’s engagement with place, 
but rather, in locating the places where the clusters are at work, provides the first 
step in tracing their reordering of transnational humanitarian space. In the 
chapters that follow I revisit the places of humanitarian crises and those of the 
GCAO in tracing the practices through which the Cluster Approach makes global 
humanitarian spaces. In the next chapter I start with an exploration of how the 
cluster connects sites and makes the places of humanitarian crises knowable at a 









“The attempt to build institutional memory of past disaster responses has always been a challenge 
within any implementing organisation. Building memory collectively has been an even greater 
challenge. Shelter programmes, both the strategy and adopted technical solutions, are at best 
captured in evaluations, final reports or annual reviews. Most often these sit on the shelves of 
agency headquarters, are buried inside field manager’s [sic] laptops or become anecdotal 
‘snapshots’ passed on by the people involved. If not properly documented, memories fade away, 
year after year, disaster after disaster.”  
– UN-Habitat and IFRC, Shelter Projects 2009 (2010: iii) 
 
 
In order to achieve a globally coherent approach to, and coordinated practice of, 
humanitarian action, the Cluster Approach seeks to make the spaces of humanitarian 
crises and responses to them knowable, both at a distance and over time. As the above 
passage from a shelter sector programming review suggests, when records of past 
humanitarian responses “sit on shelves” or get “buried inside” computer files, they lose 
their ability to inform other humanitarian responses – they cease to circulate. This problem 
is exacerbated by the fact that, without a mechanism for drawing these disparate pieces of 
information together, these records, when they did circulate, did so only among the 
members of one agency or organization. As such, gaps, ruptures and other discontinuities 
have proliferated in the flow of information about humanitarian crises and responses 
both between groups and over time, inhibiting the accumulation of collective knowledge. 
The Cluster Approach aims to ensure the continued circulation of information about the 




information from across different cluster members and different crisis responses and 
redistributing it in the readily usable form of guidelines, “best practices” and standardized 
technical solutions. In circulating this information widely between different crises and 
cluster members, moreover, the Cluster Approach articulates a global scale of 
humanitarian space. 
At the base of the process of making crises and responses knowable across space 
and over time, and thereby making a global scale of humanitarian space, is the work of 
cluster information managers, whose role is to collect, process, interpret and circulate 
information about humanitarian crises and responses. Describing the critical role played 
by information managers in the Cluster Approach, the IASC Operational Guidance Note 
for Information Management (IM) states,  
IM improves the capacity of stakeholders for analysis and decision making through strengthened 
collection, processing, interpretation and dissemination of information at the intra and inter-
cluster level. Information is in this sense the foundation on which decision-making for a 
coordinated and effective response is based. (IASC 2008: 1, emphasis original) 
The production and circulation of information about crises and responses, the IASC 
suggests, is a foundational component of decision-making within the Cluster Approach. 
At the same time, decision-making, as this chapter will show, is a constant component of 
information management, shaping what information gets circulated and in what form. 
Further still, the information circulated by information managers (selected and 
interpreted according to decisions made by information managers) shapes strategic 
decisions about crisis responses, ending in a looping effect that might be summed up, in 
the words of Annemarie Mol, as “Information, presenting some version of reality, does 
not come after practice. Neither does it precede it. Instead they are intertwined” (2002: 




2006). That is, IM practices within the Cluster Approach, I argue, both represent some 
part of the realities of global humanitarian spaces and also help shape these realities.  
With this in mind, this chapter traces on the practices that go into producing 
information and translating it into different forms so that it might circulate, thereby 
connecting sites, within the Cluster Approach. In the next section, I start by considering 
the interplay between material arrangements and what might be called, following Saskia 
Sassen (e.g. 2008a), “cultures of interpretation.” This is followed by an exploration of the 
practices involved in translating the diverse qualities of humanitarian crises and responses 
into standardized forms that can be easily transported across distances and over time. A 
third section moves into an examination of the calculations and professional judgments 
that shape how (and when) information managers gather, interpret, present and circulate 
information about ongoing crises. In the final section, I consider the specific case of 
Somalia in illustration of the conditions under which information about humanitarian 
crises resists conversion into knowledge about those crises.  
Material Arrangements and Cultures of Interpretation 
Before cluster Information Managers can start collecting, collating, and analyzing 
information and distributing it back out as “information products” (reports, maps, 
graphics and other material representations), they need a certain minimum material 
arrangement in place. This consists of certain basic objects like office space, a desk, a 
chair, a telephone, a computer loaded with the appropriate software and a printer with 
paper, as well as infrastructural elements like electricity, a phone line and an internet 
connection. These objects are all so common in almost modern office environments that 
their necessity often goes unrecognized. When any of these items is absent and not easily 




a sudden onset emergency, their necessity for compiling, analyzing, representing and 
distributing information is made painfully clear.  
Information managers with experience setting up IM operations in humanitarian 
crisis situations are very aware of how necessary certain material arrangements are for 
their work. In cluster IM training courses new information managers are warned that, 
before they can gather any information about a crisis, the very first thing they will have to 
do when they arrive in the field is to find office space with an electrical hook up and, if at 
all possible, an internet connection. They also need to acquire certain essential pieces of 
equipment like a computer with Windows Office software suite, a printer and paper and 
a telephone (preferably cellular or satellite). These items all seem basic enough, but in 
many humanitarian crisis situations they can be difficult if not impossible to procure 
locally as shops are often closed for business and/or supplies restricted in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis. Recognizing the essential nature of these materials for IM, some 
global clusters have preassembled hardware kits – pre-packaged collections of essential 
office equipment including a computer with Windows Office suite and a printer – that 
they dispatch to new country-level cluster offices when they are first set up.  
At the same time that material arrangements and technological infrastructures are 
essential for connecting sites and conveying knowledge about humanitarian crises and 
responses to them, however, they do not by themselves guide these connections or 
constitute this knowledge. That is, as Sassen (2008a: 341) points out, the ability of 
technological capabilities to shape outcomes is not simply a matter of the capabilities 
themselves, but also of the substantive rationalities guiding users of the technologies in 
question. The ability of material arrangements and technological capacities to direct 




interpret and interact with these materials and technologies. As one cluster information 
manager put it, “technology is not necessarily the answer, technology will always have to be 
managed” (emphasis added).  
One of the most apparent ways in which information managers manage 
information (and technologies and materials) is through the decisions and calculations28 
they make about what, when and how to collect, represent and circulate information. 
These decisions and calculations, in turn, are shaped by various organizational and 
professional rationalities, different contextual opportunities and constraints, and prior 
emotive or moral attachments, such as that expressed in the humanitarian imperative to 
save lives and end immediate suffering. Thus, although the information gathered and 
distributed by cluster information managers holds the status of objective representations 
of reality, it is thoroughly imbued with the professional judgments and moral 
commitments of specifically humanitarian information managers. To capture this 
broadened sense of calculation, Franck Cochoy (2002, 2008) uses the term “qualculation” 
to indicate the inseparability of calculation and judgment in decision making practices. In 
making calculations that are shaped by qualitatively informed rational judgments (where 
“rational” is understood to take diverse forms), information managers regularly make 
qualculative decisions that shape information about humanitarian crises and responses.  
Peter Redfield’s (2006) research on the production of what he calls “motivated 
truth” by the global NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), is illustrative of one 
common form of humanitarian qualculative practices (though he does not use this term). 
                                              
28 Calculation, as Michel Callon and John Law argue, need not necessarily connote mathematical operations or even 
quantification more generally, but can instead be understood as involving the widely variable ways by which things 
are “reworked, displayed, related, manipulated, transformed, and summed in a single space” (2005: 730). It is this 




Specifically, in their campaigns to mobilize support and funding for humanitarian 
responses, MSF couples overtly moral humanitarian value messages with what are 
presented as the “objective facts” of human suffering in the form of medical statistics 
and epidemiological models. While the latter “facts” of suffering lend a sense of objective 
certainty to MSF’s claims, their explicitly located position as witnesses to immediate 
human suffering instills these otherwise sterile sounding facts with moral weight and 
emotional urgency. MSF uses the resulting motivated truths to mobilize a rhetoric of 
global moral obligation that appears as an impassioned call to action and yet, 
simultaneously, as an impartial statement of fact. Critically, as Redfield argues, the 
subjective choices (or, qualculations) involved in the creation of statistics and 
epidemiological models to describe the facts of crisis and in the selection of particular 
narratives, photographs and testimonies to impart the moral urgency of crisis both 
disappear behind the self-invisible stance of their Western, mostly white, and most often 
male, creators (Redfield 2006; see also Haraway 1997).  
Whereas Redfield’s subject, MSF, is well known for its impassioned political 
approach to humanitarian action, however, the Cluster Approach does not speak to the 
moral passions that drive humanitarian action. Individual cluster members may engage in 
their own campaigns to mobilize overtly moral claims, but the Cluster Approach itself 
only presents a procedural model for organizing action, sharing innovation and 
enhancing technical capabilities. And yet, in the procedures and technical solutions put 
forward by the Cluster Approach there is always a prior attachment to the humanitarian 
ideal of saving lives and reducing suffering in the urgent present of the emergency 
temporality. Redfield argues that it would be a mistake to focus only on the contrast 




“not to consider the extent to which one affects the formation of the other when 
brought into continuing association” (2006: 16). In this chapter, I argue that the prior 
attachment of cluster information managers to the humanitarian imperative to save lives 
and end immediate suffering orients their decisions in line with an urgent present 
temporality of humanitarian action (see Chapter Two) and loosens the conditions under 
which information is judged as objective and accurate. At the same time, these decisions 
are also consistently shaped by a professional and practical attachment to standardized, 
often quantitative inscriptions of information, as explored in the following section.  
Translation for Travel: Quantifying the Qualities of Humanitarian Crises 
The first decision that gets made about how to know crises is what questions to 
ask in the first place – what does the cluster want to know about a crisis? Deciding what 
to ask is, of course, central to shaping what will ultimately be known about a crisis. This 
decision is usually made by the cluster coordinator, lead agency, or cluster working 
groups. However, while information managers do not usually decide what should be 
known about a crisis, they are the ones who decide how it will be known and, critically, 
what will constitute an answer. This means deciding, among other things, what will count 
as data, how to collect it, store it, clean it and analyze it, as well as how to present it. As 
stated in the course materials used in cluster IM training courses: 
The role of the information manager is not simply to be able to collect and manage data but to 
present it in a format that can be used by planners and decision-makers: words, numbers, pictures 
or, most often, a combination of all three.  Information managers are looked to for the 
development of creative and innovative approaches to analysis to guide planners and decision-
makers, providing the right information at the right time and in the right way. (IFRC 2010a) 
So while the clusters at large decide what they want to know about humanitarian crises, 




What type of information is the “right” information for the question? And what is the 
“right time” to start circulating it? What is the “right way” to present it?  
In answer to the first of these questions (the second two are addressed further 
along in this analysis), the answer for information managers is almost always quantitative 
information.  Sometimes the information that the clusters are interested in collecting is 
quantitative from the start, for example, how many people have been displaced or how 
many kilos of food have been distributed. Other types of information begin as qualitative 
judgments. For example, how extensive is the damage to housing in a particular 
humanitarian crisis? The only way to collect this is for humanitarian workers to go into 
the field, look at damaged houses and assess the amount of damage. As damage to homes 
cannot be measured exactly, this relies on the observer making a qualitative assessment. 
Qualitative assessments, however, are difficult to compile in concise form. Written 
descriptions or photographs might provide a sense of the scene on the ground, but they 
are difficult to synthesize into a concise statement about the crisis and even more difficult 
to compare across disasters. With regards to the latter point, for example, housing 
damage caused by an earthquake does not resemble housing damage from a cyclone: in 
the first case damaged homes will have partly or completely collapsed in place, in the 
second case parts of homes will have been blown or washed away, and mud and water 
may be inside what is left. In their pursuit of globally predictable humanitarian responses, 
however, the clusters want to be able to compare the level of damage caused by 
earthquakes in one crisis to that caused by cyclones in another. 
A common way by which information managers produce coherent knowledge 
about the diverse aspects of humanitarian crises, such as housing damage, is to make 




first step in making information similar is to set standards for measuring, collecting and 
interpreting information. Without agreed standards, the huge volume of information 
being gathered would be “like so many more or less meaningless pieces of paper” (Law 
and Mol 2001: 611) (or more or less meaningless computer files, as the case may be). 
Once agreed on, these standards are expressed in the format of standardized templates 
for translating the unique qualities of individual objects, such as damaged homes, into 
standardized, often quantitatively defined, categories. Information thus inscribed is able 
to hold its meaning, unchanged, as it moves around, acting as what Latour (1987) calls an 
“immutable mobile.”  As Latour characterizes it, an immutable mobile “succeeds in 
practicing the incredible feat of transporting a site into another one without deformation 
through massive transformations” (2005: 223). In other words, immutable mobiles 
connect sites and stabilize relationships between them across space and over time by 
maintaining their complex shape as they travel from one site to another. To see how this 
works in practice, the following section considers how the Emergency Shelter Cluster’s 
template for assessing housing damage connects diverse humanitarian crises through 
standardizing, and stabilizing, the meaning of housing damage wherever and whenever 
the shelter cluster coordinates humanitarian shelter responses. 
Measuring Housing Damage with the Rapid Shelter Assessment Template 
In coordinating humanitarian shelter responses, the shelter cluster asks its 
members to assess levels of housing damage using a standard template for translating 
qualitative assessments into quantitative data that can be easily added up and compared. 
More specifically, the rapid shelter assessment template prompts cluster members to 
classify houses into one of three categories: severely or totally destroyed (>70% damage), 




(Occasionally the last category is divided into two categories, one for minor damage and 
one for almost no damage; the reasons for this are discussed below.) To provide 
additional guidance for aid workers surveying damage in the field, the cluster provides 
illustrative images of what damage from the particular type of crisis might look like as 
part of the data collection template (see Figures 5.1a, 5.1b and 5.1c). In this way, 
qualitatively dissimilar damage to homes blown away by a cyclone in one disaster, 
flattened by an earthquake in another, and burned in the course of a violent conflict in 
yet another, is made into similar, and therefore comparable, quantitative data.  
 By turning the diverse qualities of differently damaged houses into simple and 
concise statistics, the rapid shelter assessment template allows information on the level of 
housing damage in Mynamar to travel successfully to Geneva, New York, Sumatra or 
Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, by removing the unique emotive aspects of viewing different 
forms of housing damage and providing only apparently dispassionate data on levels of 
damage, the rapid shelter assessment template standardizes the facts of crises around the 
world and over time. In doing so, it not only allows information to travel unchanged 
between sites, but it makes comparison between crises possible: a cyclone in Myanmar 
can be compared to an earthquake in Sumatra and to ethic violence in Kyrgyzstan. The 
rapid shelter assessment translates confusing three-dimensional objects – in this case 
damaged houses – into manageable two-dimensional inscriptions of those objects: 
numerical data on housing damage (see Latour 1986; Eisenstein 1979). This matters for 
the Cluster Approach because it allows them to make comparisons across crises and over 
time, which in turn allows them to build cumulative knowledge on what makes for a 
successful (or unsuccessful) crisis response, furthering their aim of making humanitarian 




Figure 5.1a: Illustration from Rapid Shelter Assessment Template, Myanmar 2008  
  
Source: (Myanmar Shelter Cluster 2008) 
 
Figure 5.1b: Illustration from Rapid Shelter Assessment Report, Sumatra Earthquake, 2010 
 
Source: (Hirano 2010) 
 




Source: (ACTED 2010) 
 
 Importantly, the dispassion associated with the numerical data created through the 
rapid shelter assessment template lends an air of universal authority to the information 
that information managers produce through its use. As a number of authors have shown, 




commensurability, they also represent the information they contain as objective, definite 
and transparent (e.g. Porter 1995; Power 1997, 2003; Poovey 1998). As Mary Poovey 
(1998) elaborates, numbers present information as non-interpretive facts. With its technical, 
procedural orientation to action, such non-interpretive, transparent facts about 
humanitarian crises are exactly what the Cluster Approach wants from its information 
managers. Accordingly, unlike MSF as described by Redfield (see above), cluster 
information managers do not couple these facts with any explicit moral claims. At the 
same time, however, the choices that cluster information managers make in producing 
numerical information about humanitarian crises are influenced by numerous subjective 
judgments, including some shaped by prior moral attachments. As a result, the 
information produced and circulated by cluster information managers, even though it is 
devoid of any explicit moral claims, conveys certain implicit values and moral judgments.  
 For example, as noted above, the third category in the rapid shelter assessment 
template – “minor to no damage” – is sometimes divided into two categories, one for 
counting homes with minor damage and one for counting homes with almost no damage. 
In natural disasters there is little use in counting homes with “almost no damage,” as they 
will require no intervention on the part of the humanitarian community. In conflict 
situations, however, while these homes will similarly not require humanitarian action to 
rebuild, there may be political or compensatory reasons for recognizing even those 
homes that have suffered the most minor damage. As Figure 5.1c shows, for example, 
such homes were counted in Kyrgyzstan following the eruption of conflict between 
ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities in June 2010, in which widespread arson caused 
extensive damage to housing in the Osh and Jalalabad Provinces. In this case recognizing 




under international humanitarian law. As such, the neutral and objective status of housing 
damage numbers carry with them an implicit moral claim about the human rights of 
people who, while their homes are still intact, have suffered ethnic persecution in 
violation of their human right to respect for the home – Principle 6 of Pinheiro 
Principles (Kyrgyzstan Shelter Cluster 2010: 10).  
Figure 5.2: Emergency Shelter Cluster Graphic Comparing the 2010 Pakistan Floods with the 
2010 Earthquake in Haiti 
 
Source: (Pakistan Floods Shelter Cluster: 2010) 
 
 In a second example, consider Figure 5.2, which shows a graphic compiled by the 
Shelter Cluster comparing the 2010 floods in Pakistan to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. In 
the Kyrgyzstan example an implicit moral claim was made through the addition of 
information (in the form of an additional housing category) about the particular crisis. In 
this example, the moral claim is expressed through the elimination of any quality of the 
two crises that cannot be expressed in purely numerical (and therefore what are assumed 
to be neutral and non-interpretive) terms. By removing the specific qualities of each 
crisis, the graphic allows human suffering in Haiti, measured in the percent of damaged or 
destroyed houses, to be concisely compared to human suffering, similarly measured, in 




suffering caused by the destruction of housing that resulted from the 2010 floods in 
Pakistan was dramatically greater than that caused by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Like 
the inclusion of an additional housing damage category in Kyrgyzstan, the graphic in 
Figure 5.2 makes no explicit moral claims. The only information it directly puts forward 
is the area affected in km2, the number of people in millions who lost their homes and 
the number of houses damaged or destroyed for each crisis. However, the comparison 
gains a moral weight through an additional piece of information that, while not present 
on the graphic itself, was well known by the humanitarian community at the time the 
graphic was put into circulation: that is, the huge disparity in international support and 
(critically) funding between the two crises.29 In 2010 the Haiti earthquake response 
received donations upwards of USD 3.5 billion while the Pakistan floods received around 
USD 2.5 billion (OCHA Financial Tracking Service 2011). In showing how many more 
people were affected by the Pakistan floods than by the Haiti earthquake, this graphic 
reminds the viewer that this billion dollar disparity, already great, is made immensely 
greater when measured on a per person basis. In this way, the graphic, by presenting only 
the plain numerical facts of the two crises, conveys an implicit yet urgent moral 
condemnation of the disparity in support and funding made available for each crisis 
response.   
The rapid shelter assessment template is just one example among many 
standardized templates for data collection used by the cluster information managers for 
measuring aspects of humanitarian crises relevant to their sectors. By creating templates 
for translating the dissimilar qualities of different humanitarian crises and responses into 
                                              
29  In this sense, the disparity in funding becomes a “present absence” on the graphic: though absent from the 
graphic, it is sharply present in the mind of the graphic’s viewers, thus shaping their interpretation of the 




similar numerical data, the cluster information managers are able to successfully mobilize 
globally standard, commensurable information about humanitarian crises. At the same 
time, numerical data projects the qualities of dispassionate objectivity and transparency. 
By therefore representing information about crises as non-interpretive facts about crises, 
templates lend the weight of objective certainty to any moral assertions that are implied 
in the information they convey.  
Adding Categories to Account for Difference 
To be clear, the argument here is not that cluster information managers are 
cynically hiding moral claims behind statistics. Rather, cluster information managers have 
a deep professional commitment to producing neutral and objective information about 
humanitarian crises and they believe that using quantitative data is the best way to achieve 
this aim. At a cluster IM training session, for example, it was explained that quantitative 
data is preferable because it most easily adheres to IASC guidelines on IM in the Clusters, 
which call for the inter-operability, objectivity, neutrality, verifiability of data and for its 
collection to be “based on sound methodologies” (IASC 2008: 4). For information 
managers, most of whom are trained in statistical analysis, it seems obvious that 
quantitative data is the best way to achieve the IASC standards. As the experienced 
cluster information managers leading an IM training session variously explained to the 
trainees, quantitative data is “objective and verifiable,” it is “the real evidence,” and it 
allows for “indisputable reporting.” To demonstrate how quantitative data conveys 
incontrovertible evidence, one presenter provided the following three step example: “We 
want to distribute 100,000 tarps; we have distributed 100,000 tarps; we have met our 




In the actual practices of cluster information managers, however, achieving such 
easy objectivity is revealed as far from straightforward. There are still decisions that have 
to be made about the data that shape how even seemingly simple assessments are made. 
For example, to remain with the case of tarpaulin distribution, not all cluster members 
distribute tarpaulins of equal size or quality, so a decision has to be made as to whether 
all will be counted equally or not. In addition, some organizations may distribute one 
tarpaulin per household while others distribute two per household and still others 
distribute one per a certain number of people to take account of widely varying 
household sizes. For information managers, this poses a problem: should information 
only be gathered on how many tarpaulins have been distributed (a measure of 
organizational activity), or should it also be gathered on how many households or 
individuals have received tarpaulins and how many each (a measure of beneficiaries 
reached)? The case of Myanmar provides an example of how information managers seek 
to respond to such questions in practice. There, the Shelter Cluster decided that two 
tarpaulins should be distributed per household. One of the largest cluster members, Save 
the Children, however, decided to distribute only one tarpaulin per household in order to 
spread limited resources over a greater number of people. An evaluation of the Myanmar 
shelter response noted that “this discrepancy caused problems in reporting and 
monitoring numbers of distributed items” (Alexander 2009: 16). Given that information 
managers are the ones tasked with “reporting and monitoring,” they are the ones who 
must resolve the discrepancy. In this case, a decision was made to count both the total 
number of tarpaulins distributed and, separately, the number of households served, 
thereby accounting for Save the Children’s decision to deviate from the agreed standard 




distributed by different cluster members, nor anything about the size of different 
households (how may tarpaulins distributed per person was not counted), nor any 
number of other details related to tarpaulin distribution. This is because, for every quality 
of a response accounted for through adding another category, there will always be others 
that are not counted or categorized (on the politics of categorization, see Bowker and 
Star 1999). An important part of cluster information managers’ job, then, is to decide 
what will get counted and what will not, and this decision is based on professional 
judgments. The more variation in the item being counted, the more decisions an 
information manager has to make about what to count and how to count it.  
At a cluster coordinators’ training session, the problem of deciding what to count 
was alluded to in a presentation on the Shelter Cluster response in Haiti in which the 
question “How should we count a Coleman tent?” was put to the group. For the cluster 
coordinators at this training, this question was posed rhetorically, a way of 
communicating the chaotic nature of the Haiti response and relating the inexperience of 
the multitude of small, sometimes newly formed organizations who imported and 
distributed huge numbers of inappropriate recreational tents to people left homeless by 
the earthquake. For the information managers tasked with actually counting tents 
distributed in Haiti, however, this had been a serious question.  Recreational tents had 
almost no value as a shelter response in Haiti, where they generally lasted less than a week 
under the environmental stress of the tropical climate. As such, more experienced Shelter 
Cluster members thought they should not be counted in official counts of emergency 
shelter tents distributed. At the same time, many of the smaller NGOs that had 
distributed these essentially worthless tents were also members of the Haiti Shelter 




end, the Shelter Cluster IM team30 decided to account for the huge range in quality and 
durability of tents distributed in Haiti by classifying them into five categories ranging 
from highest to lowest quality. Thus the question “How should we count a Coleman 
tent?” was answered by the Haiti IM team as: Coleman tents will be counted in the lowest 
quality category of tents, designated as “small hike tents” (Ashmore 2010). In this case, 
the cluster information managers found a way to include the contribution of smaller 
organizations, while simultaneously appeasing more experienced members of the cluster 
by indicating that this contribution was of little to no value in the shelter response.  
The decision of what to count and how it will be counted, therefore, inevitably 
involves making professional judgments that are (necessarily) subjective. In these 
examples of tarpaulin and tent distributions, cluster information managers’ decisions to 
account for difference by adding more (standardized) categories were guided by 
qualculations rooted in their professional commitments to producing objective and 
neutral information. The neutral, dispassionate status afforded to quantitative 
representations, again, obscures some of the non-neutral decision-making processes that 
go into choosing what information to collect, how to collect, analyze and present it, and 
when to put it into circulation. These examples have demonstrated how the qualculative 
decisions made by information managers shape what is known within the Cluster 
Approach about humanitarian responses, while the prior example of the rapid shelter 
assessment tool illustrated how the tools information managers design and use to collect 
data also shape what is known about humanitarian crises themselves. In the following 
                                              
30 In most responses the clusters have only one designated information manager. In Haiti, however, due to the 
complexity of the response and (critically) to the availability of funding, the Shelter Cluster was able to contract a 




section, conversely, I look at the at how humanitarian crises shape information managers’ 
decisions.  
Managing Information in the Emergency Temporality 
In the early days of a crisis, information managers experience a marked tension 
between the desire to produce accurate information based on complete, verified data and 
the perceived need to produce information products and get them circulating as fast as 
possible. Two of the main consumers of information about crisis, the clusters at large and 
donors who fund the cluster system and its members, both make decisions based on early 
data that critically shape the course of humanitarian responses. In the case of the clusters 
at large, they use early information about crises to make operational decisions about 
which coordinated response strategy to pursue. Cluster information managers assume 
that more accurate information will lead to better cluster strategies, but they also 
understand that delays in coming up with a coordinated strategy might result in cluster 
members going off in their own directions. Donors, meanwhile, use early information on 
crises to make decisions on funding levels and so information managers know that early 
information they circulate can have big consequences for operational budgets, again 
putting on the pressure to provide information that is as accurate as possible as fast as 
possible.  
In addition to the clusters and donors, information managers feel pressure from 
the media to provide information on new crises straight away. On the one hand, failure 
to attend early to media demands for information could cost valuable coverage. On the 
other hand, feeding inaccurate information to the media could result in the “wrong 
message” going into circulation. To return to the example of the recreational tents in 




its shelter needs assessment, waiting until they could get more complete information 
from the IM team. When finally released, the needs assessment called for the distribution 
of shelter kits31 and building materials rather than tents. In the time it took for this 
document to be released, however, the media picked up “a shortage of tents” as a major 
narrative, resulting in a flood of poor quality, inappropriate tents being sent in, including 
the aforementioned “Coleman tents” (Ashmore 2010). The influx of substandard tents 
was a set-back for the shelter response in Haiti, one that could have been lessened if the 
Shelter Cluster IM team had managed to get information on appropriate shelter materials 
circulating sooner. Reflecting on this costly delay, a presenter at an IM training session 
said, “you’ll never have a hundred percent information, if you wait for that level of 
specificity, we’re paralyzing ourselves.” Instead, information managers need to decide 
when enough information is enough to start circulating it. 
The decision of when to trade off accuracy for speed (or vice versa) highlights two 
competing rationalities driving the decisions made by information managers in the 
Cluster Approach. On the one hand, information managers’ decisions are informed by a 
scientific rationality, one which leads them to prefer quantitative over qualitative data and 
to strive to attain complete and accurate (e.g., verifiable) information before providing 
answers (see above). On the other hand, the actions of cluster information managers, like 
others in the humanitarian profession, are oriented by an urgency imparted in the 
humanitarian imperative to save lives and end immediate suffering. In an ideal world, 
attaining complete and accurate information would lead to maximizing a response’s 
effectiveness (measured in terms of saving more lives and ending suffering faster). That 
                                              
31 Shelter kits are standardized collections of tools, fixings (i.e. rope, nails) and plastic sheeting (tarpaulins). Their use 




is, information managers expect that humanitarian responses will be more effective if 
operational decisions are based on complete and accurate information on the crisis at 
hand. In reality, however, getting complete accuracy is time consuming and can therefore 
stall critical operational decision-making, risk lowering donor funding levels, and/or lead 
the media to run with unhelpful narratives, all of which decrease the effectiveness of 
humanitarian responses, potentially resulting in more lives lost.  
Because it is recognized as a significant tension in cluster IM, the cluster IM 
training course devotes a significant amount of attention to helping future cluster 
information managers decide between speed and accuracy. For example, Figure 5.3 
shows a graph presented at a training course visually depicting the tension between 
accuracy and the potential number of lives saved. Over time, the graph suggests, 
information in the form of assessments will become more accurate, however over time 
the potential number of lives saved will go down. The effectiveness of an intervention, 
according to this visual, is maximized at the point where the two lines cross. At this point 
the assessment is not yet very accurate, however increased accuracy will take time and 
therefore more lives will be lost waiting for it. Since the primary role of IM in the clusters 
is to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian responses – i.e. save more lives – the 
implication of this graph is clear: in order to maximize the effectiveness of the response, 
information should be put into circulation early on, even if it is not very accurate yet.  
 Notably, although it is presented in the standard format of a quantitative 
representation of change over time, the graph in Figure 5.4 contains no actual numbers. 
There is no specific time, number of lives saved, or percents of accuracy or effectiveness 
on the graph. As such, the graph is only meant to illustrate a general principle of 




language of quantitative assessments is significant: it both exemplifies and reinforces the 
cluster information managers’ professional commitment to what is understood as an 
objective and neutral form of information. Yet the graph’s lack of specific numbers 
betrays the qualitative judgments that necessarily inform the decisions cluster information 
managers must make in compiling quantitative data. The graph therefore embodies the 
tension between competing substantive rationalities that underlines the information 
managers’ decision-making processes during crises. 
Figure 5.3: A Graph Depicting the Tension Between “Speed versus Accuracy”, Presented at 








Source: (IFRC 2010d) 
Along similar lines, the course materials distributed as part of the cluster IM 
training course include a graphic aimed at teaching IM trainees how to prioritize 
information in emergencies (see Figure 5.4). In this visual the operational importance of 
information is plotted against the time and effort it will take to collect the necessary data. 
First priority, the graphic suggests, should be given to information that is of relatively 
high operational importance and which takes little time or effort to collect. Second 
priority should be given to information that is either of relatively high operational 




low operational importance but will take little time or effort to collect. Unsurprisingly, the 
lowest priority should be given to information which is both of relatively low operational 
importance and will take a lot of time and effort to collect. In this way, information 
managers are encouraged to make triage-like decisions about which information to 
prioritize. Some information may be of high operational importance, but if it takes too 
long or too much effort to collect, its ability to improve the operational response will be 
diminished and so – like the patient who is unlikely to live regardless of treatment – it 
should be deprioritized. Instead, information that is also important but is more easily 
attainable and therefore likely to improve the effectiveness of the operational response 
should be given first priority. Once again, there are no specific numbers on the graph: it 
is expressed in the language of quantitative assessment, but it illustrates only a qualitative 
decision-making process. 
Figure 5.4: A Graph on Prioritization of Data Collection in Emergencies, from Course 



















While they can give no precise instruction, the graphics shown in Figures 5.3 and 
5.4 suggest to information managers in training that the imperative to save lives – 
understood to require urgent action – ultimately trumps the desire for complete accuracy 
in the decision on when to start circulating information. If information takes too long to 
gather, it may hold up important decisions, making responses less effective and therefore 
going against its very purpose. In emphasis of this point, the following comments were 
made by the presenters at an IM information panel at a cluster coordinators’ training 
course: 
− “You’re forced to make assumptions, to say, ok, this is my best guess.”  
− “You will never have perfect information, just try to get as much data as you can, you’ll never 
get 100%.”  
− “Don’t be afraid of getting incomplete information out there, as long as it’s noted.” 
− “Follow the ‘80:20 rule’: 80% of the information will come from 20% of the organizations so 
concentrate your efforts on them.”  
Information managers are thus encouraged to release incomplete information and make 
assumptions and even educated guesses in order to get it circulating as fast as possible. 
This does not, however, mean that anything goes. Information managers are given 
guidance in how to prioritize information (see Figure 5.4 above), and strategies like the 
“80:20” rule noted above are used to maximize the amount of information that can be 
collected in a short time. In another “tip” shared with trainees, one presentation at the 
cluster IM training reminded trainees that “Half the whole world is better than the whole 
of half the picture” (IFRC 2010d). That is, if there is only time to get half of the 
information, it is better to get half the information on the entire area affected by the crisis 
than to get all of the information on just one area. In the case of the former (half the 




whereas in the case of the latter (the whole picture of half), they may miss major features 
of the crisis that are in the area they do not look at.  
At the same time that information managers are encouraged to release incomplete 
information and make assumptions in order to speed up the process of getting 
information to circulate, an emphasis is also placed on the importance of recording this 
process. Here, information managers’ professional commitment to providing neutral and 
objective information is reaffirmed by substituting accountability for the accuracy lost in 
the trade of with urgency. Accounting for partial or possibly inaccurate data also allows 
cluster information managers to conform to the Cluster Approach’s overall commitment 
to increasing the accountability of humanitarian responses and to the IASC guidance on 
cluster IM. The latter states that, in order to maintain the accountability of information, 
“Users must be able to evaluate the reliability and credibility of information by knowing 
its source and having access to methods of collection, transformation and analysis” 
(IASC 2008: 4). In the interests of accountability and transparency, then, information 
products always contain some record of the methods used and/or assumptions made.32 
Whether something requires a simple footnote or a longer explanation might determine 
whether information can be presented solely in a compact format or must also have a 
longer report accompanying it, thus shaping what type of information gets circulated in 
what form about a crisis. 
The question remains, however, as to whether such forms of accounting actually 
open information up to questioning and criticism, or whether instead they close off 
                                              
32 The exact form of this record varies widely, sometimes appearing in the form of footnotes, sometimes as a 
detailed methodology section in a longer report, and sometimes there is simply a URL appearing somewhere on a 
page of information which directs the viewer where to find a longer account of methods and assumptions if they 




further inquiry (Power 1997). To return briefly to the problem of counting tarpaulin 
distribution in Myanmar, consider the following small example. A color-coded map of 
Myanmar entitled “Shelter Tarp Kit Distribution” includes the following note, at the top 
of the page, in fine print: “Note that this map only shows presence of organisations in a broad 
sector; it does not portray detailed information such as the volume of assistance, the 
number of benefeciaries [sic], or the extent to which needs are met or unmet” (UN-
HABITAT and MIMU 2008, emphasis added). This note reveals that the map depicts 
something slightly less informative than what its viewer might initially expect from the 
title: the map only indicates the presence of organizations distributing tarpaulins in an 
area, but it does not tell the viewer anything about either the number of tarpaulins 
distributed or the percentage of households given tarpaulins by these organizations. By 
including this note, the map achieves a transparency that would be absent without it. But, 
whether this transparency is useful or not is a matter for debate: on the one hand the 
note indicates that the information shown on the map is different from what might be 
assumed from the title, opening it up to the critique that the information it contains is 
does not tell the viewer very much at all about tarpaulin distribution. On the other hand, 
the note is clear about what the map does depict, and in this sense one might simply say 
that it is what it is, thereby closing off further critique. 
This section has shown that information managers must make a series of decisions 
– or “qualculations” – in order to make crises knowable at a distance and over time. 
Among the most important of these are what kind of data to collect and when to trade 
accuracy for speed. The decisions they make are informed both by a numerical rationality 
that seeks complete, objective, verifiable information and by a humanitarian sensibility 




often in tension, they also inform one another. Ultimately, many of the practices of 
cluster information managers are oriented towards the urgent present of an emergency 
temporality, which implores immediate humanitarian action to save lives and end 
suffering. The understanding of humanitarian crises as states of exception, which self-
authorize urgent action, derives from a humanitarian imagination of an emergency 
temporality that requires speed and flexibility in its aim to save lives and end immediate 
suffering (see Chapter Two). In this mode of operating, inaccuracies in information are 
inevitable, but the technical rationality of information managers also suggests that the 
accounting for possible inaccuracies absolve them from such mistakes. The act of 
accounting for information frees information managers to include more assumptions or 
guesswork in service of increasing the speed at which information can be put into 
circulation.  
So far in this chapter, the focus has been on IM practices within the spaces of 
humanitarian crises. The success of the practices described, in fact, are largely contingent 
on information managers inhabiting these spaces. In the final section of this chapter, I 
consider how an inability to directly access the spaces of humanitarian crises constrains 
IM practices, turning to the case of Somalia to illustrate the limits of information 
management in situations where humanitarian space is limited or even shut off to the 
clusters altogether.  
The Limits of Information Management: External Constraints to Knowing Crises 
The need to make difficult qualculations about information is not limited to time-
pressured situations, such as in the immediate aftermath of a sudden onset crisis. In 
protracted crises, while information managers have more time to carefully plan and carry 




information on crises in areas with functioning governments can at least be checked 
against, and supported by, pre-crisis government statistics, in a place like Somalia pre-
crisis statistics, even if available, would be too old (at least twenty years at this point) to 
be of much use for informing the current state of crisis. Moreover, violence or threats of 
violence in protracted crises can create a boundary separating safe and unsafe 
humanitarian operating spaces, closing off transnational humanitarian access to certain 
areas. In Somalia – at least prior to the declaration of famine in July 2011 – time pressure 
was rarely a major factor in information management decisions. Transnational 
humanitarian access, on the other hand, presented a major barrier for information 
managers in their pursuit of accurate, accountable information. In Mogadishu, where 
most of the violence directly related to the ongoing civil war is concentrated, there has 
been virtually no international humanitarian presence for years. Speaking from Nairobi, a 
UN OCHA staff member told me that, although the humanitarian needs in Mogadishu 
were among the greatest in Somalia, due to security concerns the transnational 
humanitarian presence there was minimal, exclaiming “God knows we don’t travel there. 
We’re at the airport and we don’t leave the airport.”  
In addition to particular safety concerns about Mogadishu, the large areas in south 
and central Somalia controlled by Al Shabaab (an insurgent group with ties to Al Qaeda) 
are among the more dangerous humanitarian operating environments, with the most 
limited humanitarian access, in the world. Between 2008 and the start of 2011, at least 48 
aid workers were killed, and attacks on personnel, offices, and assets of aid agencies have 
been frequent occurrences (OCHA Somalia 2011a). Reviews of OCHA’s monthly 
analyses, The Somalia Humanitarian Overview and the “Humanitarian Access Update” 




suspended its operations in the south central region following escalating threats, attacks 
and diversions of relief aid by Al Shabaab; in August 2010 Al Shabaab publically banned 
three INGOs – including World Vision International – accusing them of propagating 
Christianity in Somalia; and in September three more INGOs were banned, this time 
accused of ties to the US government and of spreading Western ideology. Attacks on 
humanitarian operations continued into 2011, and in mid-April Al Shabaab entered and 
looted the OCHA offices in the UN Common Compound in Baidoa.  In addition to 
attacks on humanitarian personnel, offices, and assets, Al Shabaab has levied increasingly 
high “registration fees” for both national and international humanitarian organizations in 
recent years. Whereas Al Shabaab used to require a registration fee equivalent to a few 
thousand US dollars a year, in 2010 that fee was raised to USD 5,000 every six months. 
At that level, most NGOs could no longer justify the expense, nor could funders accept 
the possibility that their money was being given to a group they considered to be a 
terrorist organization,33 resulting in the shuttering of many humanitarian programs in the 
area.  
Due to the difficult and dangerous operating environment in southern and central 
Somalia, many humanitarian organizations have been steadily moving their operations 
north to more stable regions like Puntland. The northward movement of the 
humanitarian response in Somalia does not reflect shifting humanitarian needs, but a 
shifting boundary of humanitarian space. The shifting semantics around this closing off 
of humanitarian space are captured in the following comment made by the same UN 
OCHA official quoted above: “[Al Shaabob] have kicked us out. Or we’ve ‘suspended 
                                              
33 Five important donor nations – the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – have laws criminalizing the 
funding of terrorist organizations, whether knowingly or otherwise. As Al Shabaab has been officially classified as a 




operations’ – whatever the correct term is. We’ve ‘left voluntarily’ or ‘we’re kicked out.’ 
We're not allowed to be there” (emphasis original). As the official’s comments indicate, 
whether the northward movement of humanitarian organizations is voluntary or forced, 
the result is the same: transnational humanitarian organizations are increasingly leaving 
southern and central Somalia in line with the closing off of safe humanitarian operating 
spaces. Figure 5.5 illustrates the moving boundary of humanitarian access in Somalia in 
the form of three OCHA produced humanitarian access maps, where areas shaded in 
black represent areas where there is no humanitarian access. As is evident, the boundary 
of accessible places for humanitarian action in Somalia has been steadily contracting in 
recent years. 
Figure 5.5: Humanitarian Access Maps for Somalia, left to right: January 2009, January 2010, 







Note; The colors on these maps represent a continuum moving from black, which denotes “access extremely 
restricted/denied,” through maroon, red, orange, yellow and, finally to green, which denotes “unrestricted access.” 
Source: (OCHA Somalia 2010a, 2010b, 2011b) 
 
For cluster information managers, the result of this closing off of humanitarian 
space in Somalia means that their work is conducted at a distance. Severe restrictions to 
humanitarian access within Somalia has led to the Somalia Clusters being run remotely 
from Nairobi in neighboring Kenya. In addition, most transnational cluster members do 




with national and local NGO partners. Managing partnerships between transnational 
cluster members seated in Nairobi and local NGOs on the ground in Somalia creates an 
extra layer of bureaucracy for the clusters and extra work for cluster information 
managers. Notably, getting information to circulate between Somalia and Nairobi and 
beyond is not a problem. Despite essentially total state failure in Somalia, the country has 
relatively good communications infrastructures in place.34 Because of this, Somalia 
Cluster lead agencies and large transnational cluster members sitting in Nairobi are able 
to frequently and easily communicate with national partners in Somalia via Skype, email, 
and satellite telephone. Information managers, therefore, can quickly gather information 
from cluster partners in the field for compilation, analysis and distribution (both to 
country-level cluster members and the corresponding global clusters). But, with few (if 
any) actual visits to the field to see situations first hand or to build up relationships with 
local NGOs in person, the Somalia cluster information managers have no way of 
knowing whether the information they regularly receive is accurate or reliable.  
The problem with information coming into Nairobi from national and local 
NGOs in Somalia was described to me by an OCHA Somalia staff member as follows, 
For [the cluster coordinators] to really know what’s happening on the ground is so difficult … 
you lose that grasp if you’re not actually there and if you rely on everybody emailing and sending 
photos. And it’s such an industry now that really, and the NGOs, especially the local NGOs have 
made it such a—we’ve made them into such an industry, that we will—Again, if you want a 
drought, we will get reports within days and they will have pictures. They may not be from that 
particular year, but there’s a picture! And how the cluster chair can actually wade through all of 
that, all this information, it’s super difficult. And if you were sitting at least a few hundred 
kilometers away in the same country you definitely would have a stronger feel than you do sitting 
here [in Nairobi].  
                                              
34 As a staff member at UN OCHA Somalia put it, “Connection in Somalia is surprisingly excellent, so getting a 
hold of someone in Somalia is actually not that complicated. Now they have one of the better telecommunications 
system in Africa. Because of no regulations and no taxes, it works really well and it's really cheap” (interview, 




As this description indicates, information is easily translated into material or electronic 
forms and circulated quickly between sites, but it cannot be accounted for. As shown above, 
cluster information managers accept that assumptions must be made about information, 
but to make up for this they place a high value on accountability through transparency. A 
decided lack of trust in the information provided by local partners inside Somalia is 
expressed in the above commentators suggestion that the information sent by Somali 
NGOs is not only inaccurate, but that these groups are willfully deceiving their 
transnational partners by sending made up information using old photos as evidence. 
Contributing to this lack of trust, a fairly high staff turnover coupled with limited access 
to Somalia means that many cluster information managers in Nairobi have never been to 
the areas in Somalia they are receiving information on and have never met the local and 
national partners from whom they receive reports. Even those that have been to these 
areas have not been for years.  
A lack of trust and an inability to see the situation for themselves leaves the cluster 
information managers in Nairobi with a lot of information that may or may not 
accurately reflect the crisis in Somalia. In an attempt to sort through this information, the 
cluster information managers engage in various practices to try to make the 
unaccountable information they receive from Somali NGOs more accountable. 
Whenever possible, they cross-reference and triangulate information coming from local 
partners in Somalia. Better known partners, like Save the Children, which still operates 
directly in southern Somalia (though with entirely local staff), are seen as more reliable 
than poorly known or newly established local NGOs. Echoing the “80:20 rule” noted 
above, information managers in Nairobi focus proportionally more attention on getting 




Somalia directly. Information from smaller, less well know members can then be checked 
for consistency against these more trusted sources. Information managers also try to look 
for signs that information might be inaccurate – signs like photos that they have seen 
before or descriptions and numbers that conflict with previous accounts. Somalia Cluster 
information managers, then, do what their counterparts in sudden onset crises do: they 
make qualitatively informed rational decisions – qualculations – about information. As 
one cluster member said, when it comes to knowing what’s happening in Somalia, “It’s 
our best guess based on the systems we have in place.” 
In most situations, however, the cluster information managers have direct access 
to the field and can base any assumptions they make on their own professional 
judgments of the situation around them. As noted above, they are significantly less 
comfortable making assumptions without actually having a sense of what’s happening on 
the ground. Moreover, no matter how incomplete the information that is initially 
circulated in most crises is, the information managers can at least count on getting more 
and more complete and accurate information as time passes. In Somalia, conversely, over 
time the situation has continually deteriorated with fewer and fewer sources of reliable 
information available. This has raised serious concerns among the members of IASC and 
donor nations about the accountability and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance in 
Somalia. As a result, the IASC has proposed several schemes for carrying out an 
evaluation of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The Afgooye Corridor, however, which 
comprises both a large number of IDP camps and the main area of fighting around 
Mogadishu, is considered so inaccessible that the IASC commissioned an “Evaluability 




evaluating the accountability of humanitarian aid would be unfeasible in the Afgooye 
Cooridor, citing that: 
Numerous interviewees made it clear that, given the relative importance of aid flows for some 
powerful individuals, asking questions about the outcomes of specific interventions could be very 
dangerous. Four WFP monitors have been killed in Somalia, presumably because monitoring 
specific projects threatened the livelihoods of those living from manipulating aid. Interviewees in 
Somalia may also be at risk if powerful individuals perceive them as providing information that 
they would rather keep hidden from outsiders. (Cosgrave 2010: 9). 
Taking account of these serious safety concerns, plans to evaluate the accountability of 
aid were scrapped in favor of a watered down plan to survey what humanitarian aid is 
being delivered where and by which organizations, as well as which aid programs are 
considered most effective by those receiving aid. In other words, IASC decided that not 
all the information that the cluster information managers wanted to gather could be 
gathered, but that at least some relatively basic information might be gathered about the 
situation inside Somalia.  
Even with this reduced scope, however, some areas of Somalia will remain off-
limits for cluster evaluations. As IASC Somalia’s post-Evaluability Report evaluation plan 
states, citing the safety concerns noted above, the “primary location selection criterion is 
therefore based on access and security,” and the evaluation team “will only be able to 
travel in those areas where IASC members are able to provide security clearance and 
necessary security arrangements are taken, which includes armed escorts where necessary 
and appropriate insurance schemes” (DARA 2011: 15). Areas of Somalia where the 
security of evaluators cannot be ensured even with armed escorts or where “appropriate 
insurance schemes” cannot be secured (that is, where insurance companies will simply 





For the cluster information managers, then, parts of Somalia like the Afgooye 
Corridor have become what Callon and Law (2005) call a “nonqualculable space.” 
Nonqualculability in this case is created through the removal of the resources or relations 
needed for qualculation (Callon and Law 2005: 718).35 That is, Cluster information 
managers (and everyone else outside of Somalia) are unable to make qualculations about 
information from parts of Somalia because they lack both the necessary resources – 
safety, insurance – and relationships – trusting partnerships – to be able to do so. 
Although the material arrangements necessary for the circulation of information are in 
place, a lack of trust in local and national partners coupled with the inability to safely 
access the field remove the possibility of accounting for that information. This lack of 
accountable information, in turn, works “to refuse the provisional capacity to enumerate, 
list, display, relate, transform, rank, and sum”(ibid.: 731). Cluster information managers 
develop and use standard tools to translate the messy qualities of humanitarian spaces 
into clear and manageable information, but sometimes some of these messy qualities are 
simply too messy: they resist translation, despite information managers’ best efforts. 
Somalia is a case, then, where the technical capabilities of information management tools 
and technologies are most certainly not determinative of what is known about a crisis. 
Despite excellent ICT connections with partners in the field, parts of Somalia, and the 
humanitarian crisis therein, remain unknowable to the Cluster Approach.  
                                              
35 The authors call this process of removing the resources and relations needed for qualculation “rarefaction” and 
contrast it to a second type of nonqualculable space created through “proliferation,” which acts in the opposite 





 Cluster information managers are tasked with translating the diverse qualities of 
different humanitarian crises into similar information about crises and responses for use 
within the Cluster Approach. In carrying out this task they rely on certain material 
arrangements and technological infrastructures in order to produce and circulate 
inscriptions of this information across spaces and over time. As this chapter has shown, 
however, material arrangements do not by themselves solve the problem of what 
information to gather, how to collect, analyze and represent it and when to put it into 
circulation. The answers to all of these questions depend on the judgments and 
calculations – the qualculations – of information managers themselves as much as on 
material capabilities and constraints. Standardized assessment templates, for example, 
translate the dissimilar and unique qualities of different crises into similar quantitative 
data and can both travel between sites and over time without losing its meaning and 
which makes different crises commensurable. Information managers develop and use 
such templates in order to produce information that, because it is numerical, projects 
itself as non-interpretive facts. Yet decisions about what to include or exclude in 
numerical information often carry implicit moral statements about crises. Qualculations 
and material arrangements are intertwined in the process of producing information about 
humanitarian crises. Together they shape what is known how and when about 
humanitarian crises and contribute to the production of a global scale of humanitarian 
space. 
This chapter has also shown that the qualculative processes of cluster information 
managers are shaped by a tension between competing rationalities. On the one hand, 




neutral, accurate and verifiable information about humanitarian crises; a commitment that 
is understood to be best achieved through the use of quantitative assessments. On the 
other hand, they also share a prior commitment to the humanitarian imperative to save 
lives, which is understood to require speed. The tension requires a trade-off in which 
cluster information managers must decide when to release partial or possibly inaccurate 
information in order to get it circulating as soon as possible so it can fulfill its aim of 
supporting the humanitarian imperative to save lives. The sacrifice of complete accuracy 
is then made up for by accounting for incomplete or estimated information. The tensions 
shaping information managers’ decisions once again highlight the subjective judgments 
that necessarily go into producing “objective” information about humanitarian crises.  
 Finally, this chapter has shown that, despite cluster information managers’ best 
efforts, the diverse qualities of some of the humanitarian spaces they encounter resist 
translation into what they understand as accountable information. As a case in point, the 
messy realities of the protracted crisis in Somalia have progressively closed off 
humanitarian space to the clusters, removing the resources cluster information managers 
need to make qualculations about information. This again demonstrates the point that the 
global does not simply flow over space-as-a-surface, but rather that global spatial orders 
encounter diverse spatial orders as they move and that these encounters are productive of 
new spatial engagements as well as patterns of resistance. Despite the best efforts of 
cluster information managers, Somalia – at least prior to the declaration of famine in July 
2011 – remained largely outside the globally scaled humanitarian space being constituted 
through the circulation of information. In the next chapter, I explore how Somalia has 





From Saving Lives Today to Saving Lives Today  
with Tomorrow in Mind:  




This chapter looks at how humanitarian spaces are both defined through, and 
serve to reinforce, certain temporal orientations of humanitarian action within the Cluster 
Approach. Different temporal orientations to humanitarian action, I argue, are implicated 
both in the designation of different situations as specifically humanitarian, and in the 
production of a global scale of humanitarian action. How humanitarian space is defined, 
in turn, is implicated in how that space is enacted as it unfolds within and beyond the 
moment of humanitarian crisis. That is, the definitions used to mark out specifically 
humanitarian spaces shape what sort of humanitarian action is carried out and when it is 
carried out. Following from Lefebvre’s description of the production of social space 
more generally (1991 [1974]: 73), humanitarian space can be thought of as both the 
outcome of past actions and relationships (such as those through which it is defined) and 
simultaneously as directive of new actions and relationships, including scalar 
relationships.  
As noted in Chapter Three, the question of whether or not a particular situation 
constitutes a humanitarian crisis is, in general, determined by the humanitarian 
community itself. As Stockton observes:  
First, “humanitarian crises” are invariably designated as such by “humanitarian” institutions, and 
until the label is applied to a particular situation, it rarely has any currency as an “abnormal” state 
of affairs. After all, there is boundless human suffering and premature death to be found almost 




is not of concern to humanitarian organizations… Second, a major “humanitarian crisis”, once so 
described, then invokes a “humanitarian emergency”, an urgent organisational effort to move 
human, financial and material resources to the site of crisis. (2004: 16, emphasis added) 
The impetus to humanitarian action – through which humanitarian spaces are made – is a 
matter of humanitarian actors defining a situation as specifically humanitarian. As such, 
how humanitarian organizations define humanitarian crises is of no small consequence to 
the question of when and where humanitarian action is mobilized. In this chapter, I argue 
that how situations get designated as specifically humanitarian is also implicated in how 
global scales of humanitarian space are produced.  The temporal orientation of 
humanitarian action, meanwhile, both shapes the practices of designation and is itself 
shaped by these designations. 
In illustration of this dynamic, I consider two temporal orientations to 
humanitarian action through which the Cluster Approach designates spaces as specifically 
humanitarian: the common temporal orientation of humanitarian action towards saving 
lives today and an emergent temporal (re)orientation of humanitarian action towards 
saving lives today with the future in mind. The former orients humanitarian action towards 
the urgent present, or what Mariella Pandolfi (2003) calls the “emergency temporality.” 
As discussed in some detail in Chapter Two and revisited in the context of cluster 
information management in Chapter Five, the emergency temporality commands 
immediate action to save lives and reduce mortality after a humanitarian crisis, which is 
understood to be a “sudden rupture” of the normal functioning of things and, as such, an 
“emergency” (see Calhoun 2004). Alongside this first temporal orientation, I also detect 
an emergent temporal (re)orientation of humanitarian action that is starting to gain 
ground in some humanitarian sectors, particularly as organized through the Cluster 




focused on saving lives and providing relief in the urgent present; however, life-saving 
and relief efforts are carried out with specific attention to the minimization of future 
harm to those whose lives have been saved. Oriented to this temporality, humanitarian 
action enacts humanitarian space not as a rupture but as part of a larger, unfolding spatial 
trajectory that also includes spaces of recovery and development. I characterize this 
second, emergent orientation to humanitarian action as one of “saving lives today with 
tomorrow in mind.” While holding the potential consequences of humanitarian action in 
mind, I suggest that this orientation falls short of a fully consequentialist model of 
humanitarian action (see Chapter One) in its continued focus on saving lives in the 
immediate present rather than on more future oriented ends like peace-building.  
This chapter traces two specific cases in which humanitarian space is defined 
through, and reinforces, certain temporal orientations of humanitarian action. The first 
case looks at how the Food Security Cluster defines food security crises using a 
standardized classification system that represents slow progressions over time as sudden 
changes in type – as ruptures – with consequences for which types of food security 
situations get understood as specifically humanitarian, what sort of action this engenders 
on the part of the humanitarian community, and how a global scale of humanitarian 
space gets produced. The second case takes the example of how the Education Cluster is 
seeking to (re)define humanitarian spaces as requiring not only urgent action to save lives, 
but also urgent action to sustain those lives, consequently expanding the understanding of 
what might constitute specifically humanitarian action and producing a different sort of 
global scale for humanitarian spaces. Before examining these two cases, however, this 
chapter begins with a brief look at what the second major Cluster Evaluation identifies as 




predominant temporal orientation of humanitarian action within the Cluster Approach 
and outlines some of its potential consequences for the content of the humanitarian 
spaces and global scales enacted through the Cluster Approach.  
Setting the “Temporal Scene”: Humanitarian Action and the Myth of Speed 
Commenting on the common temporal orientation of humanitarian action 
towards the urgent present, a senior UNDP member of the Global Early Recovery 
Working Group said, 
You know, that you save lives is fine today, what about tomorrow? And how long are you going 
to keep these people dependent on humanitarian aid? On relief? And if you don’t do anything to 
move away from that, it’s going to be sustained as long as you’re here. And then when you leave 
you’re going to create another crisis and that’s going to be a silent crisis because CNN will not be 
there, you know, it disappeared from the screens and the humanitarians are not there to respond 
and the development actors are not there yet, and you have another humanitarian crisis with 
relief needs actually, that are not covered. 
On the one hand, this comment reflects what is, perhaps, the characteristic position of 
development actors vis-à-vis humanitarian action, oriented towards improving the future 
through longer term or forward looking projects. Humanitarian actors, meanwhile, are 
more typically oriented towards relieving immediate suffering through shorter term 
projects focused on the present (see Krause 2009). On the other hand, after the high 
profile humanitarian failures of the 1990s (see Chapter One), the possibility that 
humanitarian action carried out today could cause harm in the future is an issue that even 
the most traditional of humanitarian actors are starting to take seriously. Yet despite a 
growing recognition that humanitarian action may not take sufficient stock of future 
contingencies, many humanitarian actors continue to carry out business as usual, 
choosing action over inaction in the urgent present of immediate human suffering. 
The second major Cluster Evaluation report concludes that this impetus to 




myth of speed refers to a predominant perception among transnational humanitarian 
actors that the imperative to act fast and save lives in a humanitarian crisis prevents them 
from taking the time needed to assess local contexts and capacities or consider the future 
impacts of today’s life saving action. One of the most apparent consequences of 
humanitarian actors’ perceived need for speed is that local NGOs have been persistently 
excluded from the clusters, despite the fact that their inclusion is persistently cited as one 
of the most important goals of the Cluster Approach (e.g. Stoddard et al. 2007; Streets et 
al. 2010).  
Explaining how these groups ended up excluded from the clusters, a Save the 
Children staff member said,  
it’s a real balance between the need to, often, work really fast to effect a good quality emergency 
response but also needing to include people, but if you’re going to have to stop and explain 
things then you’re also going to slow the whole thing down. 
Slowing things down is assumed to cost lives, going against the primary aim of 
humanitarian action, and so the possibility that the steps needed to include local NGOs 
will take extra time is put forward as a reason for excluding these groups, especially in the 
early stages of a crisis.  
Describing the process of holding a Cluster meeting, for example, Save the 
Children’s point person for the Nutrition Cluster said, 
I mean, we [at Save the Children] sorta run in and it’s all really fast and there’s a lot of jargon and 
we’ve had a lot of exposure to clusters and we know the language and we’ve had training and all 
the rest of it and we know what to expect. Whereas smaller organizations, if they’re not included 
at a global level, um, don’t know how to navigate it.   
Successful navigation of a terrain – here the Cluster meetings – involves possessing 
particular knowledge and skill, what Ingold has called the ability to “know as we go” 
(Ingold 2000). Save the Children, like other transnational humanitarian NGOs, has 




“run in” and keep up with the cluster meetings in new crisis situations. When 
humanitarian action is oriented toward saving lives today, the capacity to hit the ground 
running, so to speak, is essential for participation in coordinated responses. Smaller 
organizations that do not already possess these navigational skills, that is, that do not 
know the jargon-heavy language used or “what to expect,” however, will struggle to keep 
up and, as a result, are often left behind.36 That is, if they are included at all. The first 
major Cluster Evaluation, for example, found that: 
In sudden-onset crises, cluster coordinators do not appear to have engaged sufficiently with local 
capacities, particularly local NGOs, nor did it appear that this was a priority in the process, with 
local NGOs hearing about meetings through word of mouth rather than official invitation, 
despite the presence of active and capable local NGO communities in a number of settings. 
(Stoddard et al. 2007: 16) 
The effort required to include local NGOs – identifying them so they can be invited, 
taking the time to explain the Cluster Approach and to de-jargonize meetings, let alone 
finding interpreters for local languages, is often considered too time consuming in the 
early stages of an emergency response, when transnational cluster members are oriented 
to the urgent task of saving lives today. 
Just as the information managers trade accuracy for speed (see Chapter Five), 
then, the clusters at large often trade inclusiveness for speed. Yet, as the second Cluster 
Evaluation suggests, this trade-off may underestimate the degree to which excluding local 
and national NGOs will lead to a poorer humanitarian response. An example might be 
when a lack of local expertise leads to aspects of humanitarian responses not being 
appropriate to the local context, meaning it is therefore less effective at saving lives. 
Moreover, the failure to include local capacities in the planning and programming process 
                                              
36 See also Chapter Four on how larger organizations like Save the Children gain the skills needed for successful 
navigation of the clusters through frequent participation in cluster events like meetings and trainings, which are 
often held in Geneva, New York or London. Smaller NGOs, particularly those from the global South or which 




creates the possibility – as described in the scenario given by the UNDP officer above – 
that a second crisis will occur when transnational humanitarian actors leave the scene and 
there is no one in place to take over the provision of essential services. In short, when 
clusters fail to include local NGOs in the name of ensuring the speed of humanitarian 
action, they do so at the risk of acting in ways that are at best wasteful and at worst 
detrimental to the populations they are trying to assist. 
 Providing a simple example of how a humanitarian response might be less 
effective without local input, one NGO cluster member pointed to the setting up of 
mother-infant privacy tents to support breastfeeding during the response to the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti. Privacy tents are one of the Global Nutrition Cluster’s “best 
practices” for supporting breastfeeding in emergencies, a practice supported by Save the 
Children’s guidance at the global level. In Haiti, however, these privacy tents were an 
example, according to this NGO member, “of people coming in from outside with a 
preformed idea of what’s the right thing [to do] in a response without considering the 
local knowledge, the local practices.” In Haiti, she went on, breastfeeding in public is 
common, so setting up special mother-baby privacy tents was “a total waste of funds” 
that might have been used towards more essential programming. Echoing the conclusion 
of the cluster evaluation report above, the NGO cluster member who related this 
example was adamant that deprioritizing the inclusion of local NGOs in the name of 
increasing the speed of humanitarian action simply does not give enough weight to the 
possibility that a response without local NGO participation, though fast, will be worse 
than one with local NGO participation.  
The future utility of having included local NGOs from the start of humanitarian 




humanitarian action foreshortens the temporal horizon of humanitarian space. Space, as 
it is encountered in the immediate present of human suffering and lives at risk, is urgently 
populated with what is perceived as life saving action, without consideration of how that 
space might unfold in the future. Humanitarian action oriented by the emergency 
temporality aims to create spaces where lives are saved today. This orientation to 
humanitarian action engenders humanitarian responses intensely focused on saving as 
many lives as possible in as short a time as possible, with the almost inevitable 
consequence that the lives saved are reduced to bare life (Agamben 1998, see Chapter Two 
for a discussion of this distinction). Moreover, a global scale of humanitarian space 
effected through humanitarian action carried out within this temporal orientation is one 
that relies extensively on the practices of “global” humanitarian actors to the exclusion of 
local actors.  
At the same time that the emergency temporality continues to dominate 
humanitarian action, however, it is also possible to detect a growing re-orientation of 
humanitarian action if not towards the future, then at least towards saving lives today with 
tomorrow in mind. This phrase aims to capture a temporal orientation for humanitarian 
action that, while remaining intensely focused on action in the present, is conscious (to 
varying degrees) of the potential impact of these present actions on future outcomes. 
Saving lives, in this orientation to action, becomes not just about physically preserving 
bare life, but about making a conscious attempt to ensure that action that saves lives 
today does not put them in danger in the future. This often (though not always) leads to 
humanitarian action that, along with seeking to save physical (bare) lives, attempts, at 





 The temporal orientation of humanitarian action, then, can either contract or 
expand the temporal horizon of humanitarian space, with critical consequences for the 
question of whether or not a humanitarian response will take stock of the future 
consequences of action in the present. It also contributes to the creation of a global scale 
of humanitarian space that involves the extension of global humanitarian standards and 
practices into the local places of humanitarian crises with minimal input from local actors 
within those places. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to tracing two cases of the 
Cluster Approach defining specifically humanitarian space for action, the first oriented by 
the emergency temporality of saving lives today and the second oriented by the 
emergency (re)orientation of saving lives today with tomorrow in mind.  
Defining Specifically Humanitarian Space, 1: Measuring the Food Security Crisis 
in Somalia  
In Chapter Five, I looked at how information managers use assessment tools to 
translate the unique qualities of different humanitarian crises into standard, 
commensurable information that can be easily circulated, added up and compared. Here, 
I take a second look at cluster tools, however this time my focus is not on how these 
tools shape what is known about humanitarian crises, but rather, how certain types of 
tools are used to determine whether a situation constitutes a humanitarian emergency or 
not. I illustrate this with the case of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 
(IPC) tool (pictured in Figure 6.1), which was used in July 2011 to (re)classify the food 
security situation in parts of southern Somalia as famine.  
The Cluster Approach, in its aim to make humanitarian responses more 
predictable, has sought, where possible, to set clear guidelines for determining when a 




standardized classification systems to make this determination “predictable” across space 
and over time. The Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) of the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO, co-lead agency for the Food Security Cluster) originally 
began developing just such a standardized classification tool for defining food security 
crises in Somalia in 2004. This original, context-specific, classification tool has been 
progressively refined and standardized for global use, and by 2006 it was being used to 
assess food security situations across three continents, including for various countries in 
Africa, Asia and South America (IPC Global Partners 2008). The IPC tool defines five 
color-coded categories for classifying food security phases based on thresholds for a 
range of indicators, from (critically) malnutrition and crude mortality rates, to food and 
water access and availability, to rates of destitution and displacement, to livelihood assets 
and civil security. As Figure 6.1 shows, the pre-set categories progress from green 
“generally food secure,” through to yellow and orange “warning” categories of 
“moderately/borderline food insecure” followed by “acute food and livelihood crisis,” 
and then on to red “humanitarian emergency” and, finally, dark red for 
“famine/humanitarian catastrophe.” By establishing seemingly transparent, globally 
standardized categories for classifying food security situations, the IPC tool is designed to 
remove politics from the otherwise contentious question of when acute malnutrition 
becomes famine (see, for example, De Waal 1997). Using the IPC tool, the Food Security 
Cluster can present only “the facts” of a particular food security situation to its members, 
the members of other clusters, to donors and to governments. According to the 
designers of this classification tool, its global standardization will enable stakeholders to 
make unbiased decisions on appropriate allocation of resources and program 




Prior to the development of the IPC tool, most food security classifications were 
based on assessments particular to the situation at hand. The developers of the IPC tool 
criticise this previous ad hoc method of determining food insecurity for being “relative” 
and therefore lacking in objectivity writing,  
While striving to capture the overall essence of a crisis, this type of classification system is based 
on relative terms whose meaning is open to interpretation (even if the analysts themselves are 
clear about their meanings)... thus opening their use to bias and leading to ambiguous or 
subjective categorizations. As such, systems based on relative terms typically do not enable 
technical consensus and are not comparable over space and time. (IPC Global Partners 2008: 8) 
In disparaging relative measures, this passage from the IPC Technical Manual illustrates 
the linking of standardized, quantitative assessments with transparency and accountability 
as well as the emphasis placed on achieving commensurability over time and across space 
(discussed for the Cluster Approach in general in Chapter Five). It also points more 
generally to the desire of the global IPC partners in the Food Security Cluster to set 
standard categories classifying food security situations (for example as humanitarian 
crises or not) and thereby mark out clear spaces for different types of action. As the IPC 
Technical Manual also states: 
there is a lack of clarity and common definitions for classifying various situations in terms of 
varying severity and implications for action. This lack of clarity is operationally problematic 
because the way in which a situation is classified determines not only the form of response, but 
the source of funding and its scale, the planning timeframe and the organizational roles of 
different stakeholders. There is an urgent practical and operational need for a broadly accepted 
food security classification system. (IPC Global Partners 2008: 7) 
As this passage makes clear, in developing the IPC tool, the global IPC partners in the 
Food Security Cluster hope to make food security situations commensurable in order to 
direct standardized action in response to these situations, including the setting of globally 





Figure 6.1: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Tool 
 
Source: (IPC Global Partners 2008) 
 
By using clear, quantitative measures to define different categories of food 
security, the IPC tool largely succeeds in making food security situations comparable 




demarcated categories serve to obscure the continuity of human suffering experienced by 
those living with food insecurity by representing progressively increasing degrees of food 
insecurity as changes in the type of food in/security (see Mol 2002). In this way the IPC 
tool represents the move from yellow/orange classifications to red/dark red 
classifications not as more of the same thing, but as a different mode of crisis. As such, 
the move from orange/food and livelihood crisis to red/humanitarian emergency appears 
as a rupture and therefore in need of urgent action. However suffering measured at just 
below the “red” threshold becomes outside the purview of humanitarian action.  
The case of Somalia offers particularly revealing insights into these processes. For 
here the IPC tool’s ability to immediately communicate crisis and rupture confronts the 
slow moving temporality of the food security situation. This suggests that is not simply 
the IPC tool categories that matter, but the movement from one category to another. 
Food Security as Protracted Crisis versus Emergency in Somalia 
During the time I was conducting interviews for this dissertation (April 2010 
through March 2011), the food security situation in the southern part of Somalia was 
classified according to the IPC tool as one of acute malnutrition, “humanitarian 
emergency” – the fourth/red food security classification on the IPC tool. Yet, although it 
was classified as an emergency by the IPC tool, the overall situation in Somalia was one 
of protracted crisis, unfolding slowly but persistently, far from the attentions of the 
global media, and low among the priorities of donors. As such, it was no longer 
considered a priority for specifically humanitarian action. Consider, for example, the 
following comments made to me by a UN OCHA Somalia official in February 2011: 
Somalia is unique in the sense that it’s a twenty year humanitarian crisis, and I’m personally sick 
of calling it a humanitarian emergency because I think it’s nonsense. You can’t possibly—most of 




to within the week of when it happens and yet every year we seem shocked and surprised and 
everything gears up and it’s an emergency, it’s the worst. Ultimately, it’s actually not an 
emergency.  (Emphasis in original) 
For this official, the situation in Somalia in February 2011 did not constitute a 
humanitarian emergency because, although it involved enormous levels of human 
suffering, this suffering was slow moving and predictable. At that time, the food security 
situation had settled uneasily into fourth/red category on the IPC tool as the normal state 
of affairs for Somalia. As such, the OCHA official reasoned that “it’s more a 
development, early recovery, development issue rather than a humanitarian issue.” This 
understanding expresses the reservation of humanitarian action for “emergency” 
situations that are unpredictable, onset rapidly and are therefore outside the normal state 
of affairs (Calhoun 2004), while relegating situations that are predictable, slow moving 
and normal to the domains of recovery and development action. Providing more 
evidence of its low priority status within the humanitarian system, for years Somalia had 
been included among MSF’s list of “forgotten” humanitarian crises around the world.  
Of course, the change in Somalia’s food security situation was just as slow moving 
and predictable as the droughts and floods the OCHA Somalia official refers to – not to 
mention that these cyclical droughts and floods were partly implicated in the region’s 
growing food insecurity. Moreover, non-environmental factors that contributed to the 
deterioration of food security in Somalia, such as protracted conflict and its associated 
population displacements and government restrictions on the mobility of pastoralists 
(Levine 2011), are even more slow moving and predictable than droughts and floods.37 
                                              
37 Notice, again, how humanitarian crises highlight the entanglement of, and negotiations required between, the 
heterogeneous elements that constitute place (see Chapter Four): in the place of Somalia’s current famine, cyclical 
flooding and regional drought (both extensions of global climate change) are entangled with restrictive government 
land use policies, economic marginalization and violent conflict tied up in various current (e.g. Islamic extremism) 
and historical (e.g. colonial and post-colonial) geographic extensions, as well as with transnational humanitarian 




Yet on the 20th of July 2011, just four months after my interview with the OCHA 
Somalia official, the transnational humanitarian system, organized through the Cluster 
Approach, kicked into full gear after the UN officially declared a famine in the Bakool 
and Lower Shabelle regions of Somalia, marking the situation as a specifically humanitarian 
emergency once again.  
The UN declaration was a result of certain IPC indicators of Somalia’s food 
security situation reaching the thresholds required to meet a classification as the fifth, 
dark red/famine category of food insecurity. More specifically, it has been assessed that 
at least 20% of the population in Bakool and Lower Shabelle were getting fewer than 
2,100 calories of food per day; more than 30% of children were suffering from acute 
malnutrition; and there were at least two adult deaths per 10,000 people or four child 
deaths per 10,000 children daily. The declaration of famine was also accompanied by the 
grave assessment that 3.7 million Somalis (nearly half of the country’s population) were 
now “in crisis” with 2.8 million of those residing in the southern regions (United Nations 
2011). With this reclassification, the formerly “forgotten” humanitarian crisis in Somalia 
became headline news and a top priority on donor agendas. 
Although Somalia’s slow progression into famine was inevitably a matter of degree 
– the grim indicators marking famine were simply more of the same grim indicators that had 
previously marked acute malnutrition – the Food Security Cluster partners, in using the 
IPC tool, represented the inevitably gradual progression into famine as a dramatic change 
in the type of food insecurity situation. Perhaps even more to the point, the shift from one 
category into a higher category on the tool – from red to dark red – frames this 
progression as a rupture: the shift from one category to a higher one itself triggered an 




on affective responses to this sort of color coding). As such, the IPC tool reinforces an 
imaginary of humanitarian crises as involving sudden and unpredictable ruptures in the 
normal flow of things (Calhoun 2004). This, in turn, has consequences for how 
humanitarian action is practiced. The reclassification of Somalia’s food security situation 
moved from a type of situation that the OCHA official quoted above considered a matter 
for development actors, to a humanitarian catastrophe understood as requiring – and 
therefore receiving – urgent humanitarian action.  
This is not to suggest that the crisis in Somalia did not deserve the surge in 
humanitarian action triggered by the reclassification of its food security situation; clearly 
millions of people in the region were and, at the time of writing, still are in dire need of 
assistance. Rather, the point here is that, had the food security situation in Somalia been 
addressed sooner, famine (both as a classification and as a very real, lived experience for 
many people) may have been averted. Underlining this point, the Consolidated Appeal 
for humanitarian funding for Somalia launched in December 2010 was met with a 50 
percent shortfall in committed funds, forcing the WFP to reduce rations in Somalia by 
about 65 percent in April/May 2011 and around 79 percent in June 2011(Tran 2011; 
WFP 2011). Humanitarian inaction in the early part of 2011, then, not only failed to 
prevent the progression into famine, it contributed to this progression.  
There are, of course, many complex factors involved in transnational humanitarian 
inaction in Somalia prior to the declaration of famine. These include the limited 
humanitarian access described in Chapter Five as well as tight restrictions on funding 




will end up in the hands of Al Shabaab.38 Yet, after the declaration of famine, 
transnational humanitarian aid surged in the region, despite these serious constraints 
remaining in place. As such, it seems clear that one reason for humanitarian inaction 
before the declaration of famine in July 2011 is that the situation in Somalia was simply 
not considered a priority area for specifically humanitarian action at that time. By 
contrast, once famine was declared, Somalia became a top humanitarian priority.  
Within four months of the declaration of famine the food security situation had 
already been downgraded from phase five/dark red back to phase four/red on the IPC 
tool, with this downgrading attributed to the surge in humanitarian action having 
“mitigated the most extreme food deficits and reduced mortality levels” (FSNAU Somalia 
2011).  
In marking out spaces for humanitarian action based on globally standardized 
thresholds, the IPC tool, like other assessment tools of its kind – for example MSF’s 
“bracelet of life,” a color-coded strip for measuring the circumference of children’s arms, 
described by Redfield (2006) – measures human suffering only in terms of bare life. That 
is to say, it tells the humanitarian community how many lives are at risk (or already being 
lost), the number of calories being taken in by the average person, and numerous other 
rates and percentages measured for populations as a whole. But it tells nothing of the 
elaborated qualities of the lives of people living in food insecure situations. It leaves no 
room for an accounting of socially, politically, or emotionally elaborated lives of 
individual sufferers as they progress in aggregate from one category on the IPC tool to 
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terrorist organizations, among which they count Al Shabaab. As Al Shabaab is the de facto government for much of 
southern Somalia, it is practically impossible for most humanitarian organizations to meet the bureaucratic 




the next. In fact, as the IPC Technical Manual itself makes clear, the use of the tool 
actively seeks to eliminate the subjective qualities of individual crises (see above). In so 
doing, the IPC tool provides a globally predictable means for defining a humanitarian 
food security crisis, but the “overall essence of a crisis” provided by relative assessments 
formerly in use is lost, and with it the situated, subjective humanity of those suffering 
from crisis. For humanitarian action oriented towards saving lives in the urgent present, 
however, the aim of saving lives is achieved in the saving of bare life (see Chapter Two). 
The reversion of Somalia’s food security situation to “pre-famine levels” is marked as a 
success, as fewer lives are now at imminent risk of being lost. Sustaining those lives in 
this temporal orientation, however, is a matter to be addressed after the emergency phase 
is over, during the next steps in what is conceived as a sequence of action following crisis. 
They are steps to be carried out by recovery and development actors, not by 
humanitarian actors. 
Moreover, the IPC tool accomplishes a global scale of humanitarian space by first 
– like the assessment tools discussed in Chapter Five – making different humanitarian 
spaces (in this case food security spaces) commensurable with one another. Relative 
measures of crisis are disparaged by the makers of the IPC tool as being “ambiguous” 
and “subjective” such that they do not enable consensus – in other worse, they fail to 
stabilize relationships between crises. In translating the diverse qualities of different food 
security crises into standardized quantities, on the other hand, the IPC tool makes 
different crises commensurable, thereby stabilizing relationships between them as well as 
between various parts of the global humanitarian system (notably donors and cluster 




that relies on the partial homogenization of global humanitarian spaces through the 
extension of global standards into the places of crises. 
 This example demonstrates how a tool for standardizing humanitarian crises can 
reify understandings of humanitarian crises as sudden and unpredictable, thereby enacting 
a humanitarian space with a constricted temporal horizon and a global scale of 
humanitarian space that is at least partly homogenized through standardization and the 
stabilization of relationships. Before the famine was declared the situation in Somalia – 
because it had become protracted to the point of seeming mundane – was a low priority 
for humanitarian actors and donors alike. After famine was declared the weight of the 
global humanitarian apparatus was thrown into the scene, ready to perform urgent action 
and suddenly finding ways to overcome the barriers that had led to previous inaction. 
This example also demonstrates the degree to which humanitarian action oriented 
towards an emergency temporality is one that orients itself in terms of saving (bare) lives 
in the urgent present of crisis (understood as rupture). In the following section I explore 
how one cluster – Education – is seeking to redefine the object of humanitarian action to 
include not only saving (bare) life, but also sustaining (elaborated) lives and, in the 
process, is attempting to reorient humanitarian action away from saving lives today and 
towards saving lives today with tomorrow in mind.  
Defining Specifically Humanitarian Space, 2: “Education can’t wait” 
Education was not included among the “gap” areas of humanitarian responses 
identified in the Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) and was, consequently, not among 
the original IASC clusters established in 2005. This exclusion is partly attributable to the 
HRR’s assessment that education in humanitarian crises was under the clear leadership 




under WFP – did not require the establishment of a cluster (Adinolfi et al. 2005; IASC 
2007a). As those I spoke with in the Education Cluster see it, however, an even more 
important factor in the decision not to include education among the original clusters was 
an attitude among other humanitarian actors that education does not save lives and is 
therefore not a priority in humanitarian responses (see also A. Anderson and Hodgkin 
2010). As a point person for the Education Cluster at Save the Children put it, the 
humanitarian community is “obsessed with the language of saving lives and people don’t 
understand how education saves lives.” In contrast to this “obsession” with saving lives, 
she said, “we should be thinking about a ‘comprehensive humanitarian response’ more, 
but this language isn’t really in use, it’s still about ‘saving lives’.” 
After being left out of the initial cluster roll-out, organizations involved in working 
on education in humanitarian crises, organized by the Inter-agency Network for 
Education in Emergencies (INEE), almost immediately started to advocate for a Global 
Education Cluster. To this end, INEE approached UNICEF about leading a global 
education cluster and at the 63rd IASC working group meeting in November 2005 
UNICEF put in a proposal to establish and lead such a cluster. Despite these initial 
efforts, however, the IASC declined to support the proposal, both citing the HRR’s 
conclusion that it was not a gap sector and expressing concern that the timing was not 
right given the huge undertaking involved in getting the first nine clusters off the ground 
(A. Anderson and Hodgkin 2010).  
However, despite the initial set-back, advocacy for an education cluster continued. 
In October 2006 the INEE circulated a letter of petition to its member organizations as 
well as members of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and IASC 




letter offered the following justification for including education in humanitarian 
responses: 
Quality education in emergency situations accomplishes several life-saving and life-sustaining 
objectives: 1) it is an effective means through which to disseminate survival messages, such as 
information about the emergency, landmine safety or HIV/AIDS prevention; 2) it serves as a key 
psychosocial intervention by restoring a sense of normalcy, dignity and hope by offering 
structured and supportive activities and providing social support through peer interaction; 3) it 
builds life skills that strengthen coping strategies, support conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
and facilitate future employment; and 4) it has a preventive effect on recruitment by fighting 
forces, abduction, and gender-based violence. 
Notably, this letter uses the established language of “saving lives” to justify why 
education should be included in humanitarian responses, suggesting it can serve a key 
communication function for disseminating life saving safety messages. However, it does 
not stop with life-saving, but goes on to suggest a “life-sustaining” role for education in 
emergencies, suggesting that it can also serve various protective and capacity building 
functions during crises.  
The INEE’s campaign for a Global Education Cluster was further bolstered by 
the 2006 launch of Save the Children’s massive “Re-Write the Future” campaign for 
education in emergencies. In addition, advocates for a Global Education Cluster were 
able to point to the fact that, almost from the very beginning of the cluster roll-out 
process, education clusters were being established at the country-level at the behest of 
national government and/or national humanitarian actors (A. Anderson et al. 2006). In 
light of this, alongside increasing evidence that the beneficiaries of humanitarian relief aid 
consistently identify education among their top priorities when asked what they want 
from a humanitarian response (e.g. Save the Children 2008), the IASC established a 
Global Education Cluster in late 2006, to be co-led by UNICEF and Save the Children.39   
                                              
39 The appointment of Save the Children also marks the first and, to date, only NGO co-leadership position in a 




A report written for the Global Education Cluster proudly notes that the 
establishment of a Global Education Cluster “mandated that education must be on the 
agenda when there is a humanitarian disaster” (A. Anderson and Hodgkin 2010: 14). 
However, despite its cluster status, the Education Cluster continues to struggle to have 
education recognized as a critical part of humanitarian action. In a number of countries 
with clusters in place, an education cluster is only set up after the initial emergency phase 
of crisis has past, once the “recovery” phase of a humanitarian crisis is underway. 
Moreover, in the initial phase of humanitarian responses education is sometimes even 
seen as a hindrance to other “survival” sectors. This issue is most often raised in cases 
where the priorities of the Education Cluster (i.e. using schools for education) contend 
with those of the Emergency Shelter Cluster (i.e. using schools for collective shelters). As 
an example of this, in Haiti the ESC had started to use school buildings as collective 
shelters (as well as for its own operational offices, as safe built spaces after the earthquake 
were in short supply). However, this use conflicted with the aim of the Haiti Education 
Cluster to reopen Haiti’s schools as soon as possible. Among the participants of an 
Emergency Shelter Cluster coordinators’ training course I attended there was a palpable 
sentiment that the Education Cluster was a nuisance and that their aim of resuming 
schooling was interfering with the more urgent concern of providing life saving shelter. 
Education, for many humanitarian workers, is a development issue to be resumed 
sometime in the future, after the “real” humanitarian work of saving lives and reducing 
suffering in the immediate “emergency” phase of a crisis has finished.  
Perhaps the most telling indicator of education’s continuing struggle for priority in 
humanitarian responses, however, is its chronically low funding levels in relation to other 




among the clusters in terms of the proportion of requested funding received (A. 
Anderson and Hodgkin 2010). In a report published as part of their “Re-Write the 
Future” campaign, Save the Children (co-lead for the Global Education Cluster) offered 
the following explanation for this comparatively low level of donor support for education 
in emergencies: 
Humanitarian donors often do not see the lifesaving aspects of quality education. They question 
whether it is possible to invest in education given the destructive impact that a conflict or natural 
disaster can have on the affected societies, the educational infrastructure and the quality of the 
teaching corps. And most donor governments tend to categorize education as a development 
activity rather than as a continuous process that should not be interrupted even when disaster 
strikes. (Save the Children 2008: 2) 
Whereas this report rather diplomatically notes that donors question the possibility of 
effective education in emergencies, in an interview a staff member from Save the 
Children insisted this “questioning” is tied up with deeper prejudices. Referring to 
conversations she has had with staff members from major donors and even from other 
Humanitarian groups, she said “you wouldn’t believe what people say, I have heard 
things like ‘what good will education do Haitians?’ and ‘the elites will always rise to the 
top anyway,’ basically saying that education will be wasted on beneficiary populations.” 
She concluded, “it’s not a very humanitarian attitude.” In either case, education remains 
lower among donor priorities than other “life saving” sectors of humanitarian responses.  
In its efforts to change the entrenched attitudes of what Education Cluster 
members refer to as “old school humanitarianism,” the Global Education Cluster 
continues the work of advocating for education in emergencies. On the one hand, the 
Education Cluster continues to insist that there are cases where education physically save 
lives, such as when children have a safe place to go during the day which keeps them 
from getting pressed into armed groups or trafficked, or when education is used to 




Education Cluster Unit (ECU) is adamant that humanitarian responses need to go 
beyond an obsessive focus on saving lives, and move towards a model of 
“comprehensive humanitarian responses.” 
To indicate what such a comprehensive response might entail, the point person 
for the Education Cluster at Save the Children directed me to the following passage from 
a Save the Children policy brief on education in emergencies: 
In the middle of a crisis and in the aftermath, children’s lives are severely disrupted as they try to 
cope with the ongoing dangers and rapidly changing situations the emergency creates. They can 
be exposed to extreme suffering – physical injury, bereavement, separation from their families, 
displacement and fear. They need protection, a sense of security, people they can trust, and a 
familiar routine to help them overcome the distress and instability they have experienced. Many 
of these needs can be addressed through providing safe spaces and opportunities to play, and 
learn. Parents also need to know their children are safe in schools, so that they can find missing 
relatives, bury their dead, queue for food or household equipment, enrol in cash-for-work 
schemes and rebuild their lives. (Save the Children 2008: 1) 
As this passage suggests, what the Global Education Cluster means by a comprehensive 
humanitarian response is a response that seeks to do more than preserve bare life, aiming 
instead to protect a more elaborated social and psychological existence for the victims of 
crisis. Although they continue to draw on the language of “saving lives,” the members of 
the Global ECU increasingly reference the need for a more comprehensive humanitarian 
response that meets the psycho-social needs of victims as well as their physical needs.  
As part of its advocacy effort, the Global ECU has created a short (just over ten 
minute) video entitled “Education Can’t Wait” (Global Education Cluster 2010). In the 
video members of the Global Education Cluster in Geneva explain why education 
matters in emergencies, citing both reasons very similar to those noted in the 2006 INEE 
petition letter (see above) as well as those expressed in the Save the Children policy brief 
noted above. Critically, these voices of humanitarian policy experts and practitioners are 
interspersed with footage of children in the midst of different humanitarian crises (see 




going to take my exams. But the earthquake came and four months later I still haven’t 
gone back to school. It would be good if the school opens,” says a girl in Haiti – or 
showing them in different classroom settings during emergencies, both learning safety 
lessons and enjoying “safe spaces” in the midst of different crises. The effect is both to 
associate images of education (more normally associated with development) with the 
visual cues of disaster (for example in the image of a child pulling a workbook out of the 
rubble shown in Figure 6.2) and to link the global line on education in emergencies 
coming from the Global ECU and the Global Education Cluster member organizations 
to the particular needs of children in unique crisis situations around the world. The 
version of global scale making promoted in this video, then, involves not simply an 
extension of global standards into the places of crisis, but an articulation between global 
standards for practice with many different, situated local actors. The specific qualities of 
crises are not translated into standardized categories, but instead are recognized and 
included through the practice of adapting global standards to local situations.  
In addition, the video stresses the urgency of education in emergencies, starting 
with its very title, “Education Can’t Wait”(emphasis added). The main messages of the 
video are summed up in the following text appearing on the screen at the end: 
Education should be part of every humanitarian response. 
Children should be back in school immediately after a crisis – the longer they are out, the less 
likely they are to ever return. 
Schools can be protective – providing a safe place for children. 
Schools can offer other vital services – health, hygiene, food, nutrition and water. 
Children and their families prioritize education – they ask to be back in school as soon as possible. 
(Global Education Cluster 2010, emphasis added) 
By stressing the urgency of education in emergencies, the Global Education Cluster seeks 
to position education alongside other, more traditional, humanitarian sectors like health 
and shelter. Like other humanitarian sectors, education is positioned as saving (physical) 




through “providing a safe space.” In addition, however, the Global Education Cluster 
positions education as something that is vital to preserve in the present because of its 
effect on future outcomes – if education is not resumed today, children will be less likely 
to ever return. In this way, the Global Education Cluster’s advocacy maintains that 
humanitarian action should be oriented to an urgent present, but it tempers this with the 
claim that it should do so with the future in mind. 
Figure 6.2: Still Frame from the Education Cluster Unit’s Video Entitled “Education Can’t 
Wait” 
 
Source: (Global Education Cluster 2010) 
 
Although education continues to struggle to have its role as part of a 
“comprehensive humanitarian response” fully recognized, many working within the 
Global Education Cluster detect a growing willingness on the part of the wider 
“humanitarian community” to recognize an expanded definition of humanitarian 





the establishment of an Education Cluster signalled a shift in priority in acute emergencies, away 
from work focused solely on survival and reducing mortality, towards an emphasis on human 
dignity and human rights and an understanding and articulation of the relief to development 
continuum. (A. Anderson and Hodgkin 2010: 6) 
For these interviewees, therefore, the involvement of the Education Cluster signals a shift 
in the temporal orientation of humanitarian action.  
While such a change in attitudes is far from universal among humanitarian actors 
(as the continuing need to advocate for including education in humanitarian responses 
attests to), some humanitarian actors are starting to look for ways to (re)orient their 
action to an urgent present that keeps the future in mind. By expanding the temporal 
orientation of humanitarian action from one focused intensely on saving lives today to 
one that focuses on saving lives today with tomorrow in mind, humanitarian space is 
opened up to action aimed not only at saving physical (bare) life, but also at sustaining 
psycho-social (elaborated) lives. Moreover, a global scale of humanitarian space in 
enacted through articulations between global humanitarian actors and many different 
local actors in different humanitarian crises. Instead of seeking to standardize and 
stabilize relationships, this model of scale making seeks to make connections hold 
through adapting to global practices to better fit with local particularities. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explored how the temporal orientation of humanitarian 
action is both shaped by, and implicated in, the definition of what constitutes a 
specifically humanitarian space. Humanitarian action oriented toward saving lives today 
was shown to be aimed at saving lives and reducing suffering in the immediate, urgent 
present, to the extent that the preservation of bare life became the grounds for deferring 




(re)oriented toward saving lives in the immediate present but with the future in mind, on 
the other hand, was shown to be concerned with saving bare lives today as well as with 
sustaining the possibility of a more fully elaborated life for the future.  
Taking the time to include local actors, consider relative measures or to adapt 
practices to fit specific local contexts runs counter to humanitarian action oriented 
toward an urgent present where time is felt to be of the essence. As such, an orientation 
to saving lives today engenders humanitarian action that enacts a global scale of 
humanitarian space that partly homogenizes that space through extension of global 
standards and practices into local places with minimal input from local actors. 
Conversely, humanitarian action oriented to saving lives today with tomorrow in mind, 
envisions the possibility that a failure to include local actors, consider relative measures or 
adapt practices to local contexts may result in a less effective response – putting more 
lives at risk in both the immediate term and in the future. As a result, the global scale of 
humanitarian space enacted by humanitarian action oriented this way effects scale 
through making articulations between global and local actors and adapting practices to fit 
specific contexts.  
  Finally, this chapter has also shown how the definition of what constitutes a 
specifically humanitarian (versus recovery or development) space for action changes 
depending on which temporal orientation guides humanitarian action. As the example of 
the IPC tool illustrates, a temporal orientation to the urgent present foreshortens the 
temporal horizon of humanitarian space, fostering an understanding of humanitarian 
action as the first, urgent, step in a sequence of action moving from the emergency phase, 
to early recovery, then recovery, and then development. In the first, emergency, phase of 




this process – recovery and then development – may concern themselves with sustaining 
lives, however these actions are marked outside of the domain of specifically 
humanitarian space. Alternatively, the example of the Education Cluster shows how a 
temporal orientation to the urgent present with the future in mind attempts to extend the 
temporal horizon of humanitarian space, situating humanitarian action within an 
unfolding process of response such that it may be both focused on saving lives in the 
urgent present and cognizant of conducting action in such a way as to minimize harm in 
the future. In the next chapter I focus on the contrast between humanitarian space 
enacted as a step in a sequence versus that enacted as part of a process through an 
examination of the deployment of two different emergency shelter response objects: the 






“Shelter is a Process”:  
Spatial Relationships and Timelines  




In this final empirical chapter, I look at how the mobilization of different material 
objects for effecting humanitarian responses is implicated in both the enactment of 
different global humanitarian spatial relationships and in the enactment of different 
timelines of humanitarian action. Following particularly from the “post-ANT” work of 
John Law and Annemarie Mol (e.g. Mol and Law 1994; Law and Mol 2001, 2010), I argue 
that the deployment of different humanitarian response objects is not simply a matter of 
different solutions to the same problem, but rather a matter of enacting the problem in 
different ways. I explore this possibility through a comparison of two different material 
objects mobilized by the Emergency Shelter Cluster for effecting humanitarian shelter 
responses: the family tent and the shelter kit. The mobilizations of these two different 
shelter items do not simply represent different forms of emergency shelter in the sites of 
humanitarian crises, but both result from and reinforce different understandings of 
humanitarian response, each with its own distinctive set of spatial and temporal relations.  
In particular, I argue that by enacting an ideally identical shelter response as it 
moves from one humanitarian crisis to the next, the family tent acts as an “immutable 
mobile,” connecting different places of humanitarian crises with each other and with the 
Global Emergency Shelter Cluster through stabilizing relationships between them. By 




through stabilizing meanings and relations but through adapting to a wide variety of local 
contexts and conditions. The mobility of the family tent is associated with the enactment 
of global humanitarian space as network space, characterized by the fixing of associations 
between sites. Like the assessment tools discussed in Chapter Five and the IPC tool 
discussed in Chapter Six, this stabilization of relationships between sites through 
standardization enacts a global scale of humanitarian space that is at least partially 
homogenous. The mobility of the shelter kit, by contrast, is associated with the 
enactment of global humanitarian space as fluid space, characterized by a malleability of 
associations across space and over time. Like the Education Cluster’s vision for education 
in crises discussed in Chapter Six, this connecting of sites through flexible associations 
and the adapting of global practices to local situations builds a global scale of 
humanitarian space that is capable of including the heterogeneity of diverse places of 
crisis. 
In addition to the different spatial relationships enacted through different shelter 
objects, this chapter revisits the two temporal orientations of humanitarian action 
introduced in Chapter Six – the orientation of action towards saving lives today versus 
that towards saving lives today with tomorrow in mind. Whereas Chapter Six was concerned 
with the question of how the temporal orientation of humanitarian action is implicated in 
how and when spaces become marked out for specifically humanitarian action, this 
chapter explores how these temporal orientations are implicated in, and reinforced by, 
the deployment of different socio-material objects for effecting humanitarian responses. 
The temporal orientation towards saving lives today, associated with the deployment of 
family tents, positions humanitarian action as the first, immediate step in a sequence of 




and then development action. In this orientation, shelter is realized as a thing appropriate 
to the step in the sequence, for example as a tent during the humanitarian relief step, 
followed by a temporary shelter during the recovery step and then by a permanent shelter 
in the development step. By contrast, a temporal orientation towards saving lives today 
with tomorrow in mind, associated with the deployment of shelter kits, positions 
humanitarian action as part of a process that includes simultaneous elements of 
humanitarianism, recovery and development. In this orientation shelter is realized as a 
process of sheltering that ideally unfolds uninterrupted over time through continual 
adaptation of shelter spaces and the larger humanitarian space of emergency shelter. . 
Effecting Emergency Shelter Responses with the Family Tent 
The emergency tent has been used in humanitarian relief efforts, as the UNHCR 
Global Emergency Shelter Cluster (ESC) Coordinator put it, “since one can remember.” 
When homes have been destroyed by disaster or when people have had to flee, leaving 
their homes behind, tents present a simple, self-contained form of immediate shelter. 
Highly mobile relative to other forms of shelter, tents can be moved rapidly into the sites 
of natural disaster for distribution to households or set up en masse to form a camp for 
refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs). Flat packed in a single package for 
shipping, tents (ideally) require no additional materials and only a minimal amount of 
time to assemble into a complete shelter.  
While the tent has long been used to effect humanitarian shelter responses, its 
design has changed over the years in response to technical innovations and experiences 
using tents in the field. Reflecting on the innovations the emergency tent had undergone 




we remember having tents fifteen, twenty years ago which were carried by five people to load on 
a truck with bamboo poles which were three metres long and then you have to—because you 
cannot transport it by air—so [you have to] just send the tarpaulin out and there’s nothing to 
support it, [so] people would chop trees, you have environmental damage and all the rest. 
Such negative experiences using tents in past humanitarian operations have driven 
innovation in tent designs. However, different levels of field experience coupled with 
different capacities for research and technical design, have led to wide variation in the 
type and quality of tents being used by different agencies/organizations. For example, a 
technical comparison of tent specifications across major humanitarian actors carried out 
in 2002 for Shelter Project (now a Global ESC member) found wide variation in the 
design and quality of tents, leading the authors to warn that 
There is a danger that variation in tent specifications will lead to  
1) distributing markedly different tents to people with the same needs  
2) distributing inappropriate tents leading to higher costs and human suffering 
3) distributing tents when local solutions are more appropriate, leading to unsustainable solutions 
and higher costs. (Ashmore and Corsellis 2002) 
The wide variation in quality between tents distributed by different agencies in Haiti after 
the 2010 earthquake (as discussed in Chapter Five) provides an example of a response 
where all three of these identified “dangers” were realized. Seeking to reduce such 
undesirable outcomes, as well as the drag on response time caused by ad hoc tent 
procurement processes, the Global Emergency Shelter Cluster (ESC) made the 
standardization of tent specification a research priority.  
To this end, the co-leads for the Global ESC, UNHCR and IFRC,40 along with the 
ICRC (an important “observer” member41 of the ESC), recently agreed (following two 
                                              
40 Per its Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with IASC, the IFRC is the “convenor” for the ESC in natural 
disaster situations, rather than the “lead agency” in order to distinguish its role from that of UN agencies and signal 
its independence. Practically this MoU with IASC relieves the IFRC from accountability to any part of the UN 
system, however, in terms of its role in coordinating other cluster members, the IFRC practically serves the same 
role the same as any other lead agency.  
41 In keeping with its principle of independence, the ICRC maintains an official observer status in all of the clusters 




years of research and negotiation between the three agencies) to a set of joint-
specifications for a new family tent. By bringing together different experiences and 
expertise from the three agencies, the Global ESC collective research process made 
discrepancies between experiential knowledge about tents (literally) visible (see Eisenstein 
1979; Latour 1986), allowing for a reassessment of individual specifications and a joint 
redesign that is more technically advanced than any previous family tents. Each of these 
three agencies now stockpiles and uses exactly the same family tent for all of their 
operations (with the only exception of which agency logo, if any, gets printed on the roof 
and side). In addition, these new specifications are openly available and other ESC 
members are encouraged to draw on them in their own emergency tent procurement.  
The new joint UNHCR/IFRC/ICRC specifications for the family tent draw 
together the lessons learned from each of these agencies in their respectively extensive 
experiences using tents in shelter responses. Describing the research process behind the 
design of the new family tent, the UNHCR Global ESC Coordinator said that the design 
addresses 
issues like fire retardence, because we have had camps which burned down in a sort of very quick 
way and having loss of lives as well. So there’s research on what type of retardant goes into 
[developing new tent specifications]; there’s research on the fabric, whether it’s raining so it 
doesn’t seep through, that it’s the right type of material, that it’s not cotton that becomes too 
damp when it is raining, that it’s not only plastic which becomes too hot or melts when it’s too 
hot; to the total weight of the tent, that should not be more the 50 kilograms [so it] can be put on 
the planes and helicopters that can go in, so the packaging should be small; that we do not have 
timber to support the tent that it’s to be different poles, but those poles should be strong enough 
to withstand the wind and the dust and snow. 
As this description indicates, the family tent embodies a variety of lessons learned in past 
shelter responses carried out by these three agencies. Experience of a fast-burning fire in 
a refugee camp years ago is carried, in the material form of the new family tent’s fire 
retardence, to refugee camps being erected now in Pakistan, Ethiopia and Libya. The 




ago is carried, in the material form of the new family tent’s compact, lightweight design, 
forward into the recent airlift of family tents to the Dabaab refugee camp in Kenya to 
accommodate Somali refugees and so on.  
Accordingly, by embodying the organizational experiences of different agencies’ 
past humanitarian shelter responses, the family tent not only connects these agencies, but 
it also connects crises over time and across space.42 However, in order to carry these 
lessons faithfully across space and over time, the family tent must be manufactured by 
contractors at various locations around the world and then assembled in the places of 
humanitarian shelter crises as intended by its designers in Geneva. That is, the tent must 
be more or less identical from one place and time to the next.  
 To ensure that all agencies’ subcontractors are actually producing the same tent, 
the specifications for the family tent use exacting, standardized language. Detailed in a 22 
page document, these specifications contain precise information on materials, metric 
measurements, required minimum testing values (for example for the tensile strength of 
the canvas) and even standard typeface for logos: for UNHCR, for example, the logo 
must use Helvetica Bold typeface, printed in Pantone Blue 300 or quadrichrome CMYK 
(C=100%, M=45%, Y=0%, K=0%) (UNHCR 2010: 2). This standard, precise language 
allows a highly mobile written document to be translated into an actual tent at different 
factories in different places around the world (which must compete for contracts to 
manufacture the tents). As the IFRC procurement website reads, “The generic design 
specifications ensure that the product can be manufactured in numerous countries by 
                                              
42 In his research on MSF’s biomedical kits, Peter Redfield makes a similar observation, writing that, “Developed 
and refined through practice, [MSF’s biomedical kits] connect one outbreak and crisis to another. In this sense the 




suppliers with standard technical know-how and standard tent-industry equipment” 
(IFRC 2011).43  
 Standardization is not limited to the tent manufacturing process. Beyond needing 
to be manufactured as the same tent, in order for the family tent to remain the same 
wherever it is implemented, it must be assembled in situ as its designers intended. To this 
end, a six page illustrated instruction sheet for tent assembly is distributed alongside the 
flat-packed tents. These instructions include 26 illustrated steps for correctly assembling 
the tent, as well as instructions for how to lay out a group of tents (as in a camp), and 
other tips and instructions addressing additional considerations and possible 
contingencies. The latter include installation tips for specific difficult climate conditions 
(such as high winds or torrential rain), advice for ensuring fire safety within and between 
tents, and instructions on how to extend the life of the tent, which is expected to last a 
minimum of one year once in use. To give an idea of the specificity of these 
recommendations, consider the following bullet point from the instruction sheet 
distributed with the family tent on “How to do a proper layout”:  
The layout should take into account Sphere[44] indicators on firebreaks, minimum distance 
between tents, total open space per person, minimum covered space per person, and minimum 
distance and facilities per person for water points, latrines, washing facilities and refuse bins. 
Sphere guidelines suggests providing at least 45m2 per person for the whole site including 
facilities such as water taps and roads, as well as 3.5m2 of covered space per person in hot and 
temperate climates, or 4.5m2 per person in cold climates. By these standards (16m2 main floor 
area plus two 3.5m2 vestibules for a total area of 23m2), the family tent should only hold five 
people in hot and temperate climates and incorporate additional space for cold climates. Approx 
67m2 of usable space in required to erect the tent. This includes space to encore for guy ropes. 
(IFRC 2010b: 1) 
This level of detail in the tent assembly instructions allows the context in which the 
family tent works to travel alongside the tent itself. By defining how the space of both the 
                                              
43 Of course, these standardized specifications themselves rely on the “black boxed” standardization of various 
measurement units in order for the measurement to be the same from one site to another.  




tent and the site should be ordered and what the relationship between this space and its 
inhabitants should be, the tent functions as more or less the same emergency shelter 
response from place to place.  
The family tent specifications, printed on paper or circulated electronically as a 
PDF, faithfully transport the precise calculations, design elements, and standards devised 
by the joint UNHCR-IFRC-ICRC research team in Geneva to the factories producing 
the tent. Moreover, when the family tent arrives at the site of a humanitarian crisis, the 
accompanying instruction sheet faithfully convey the directions for correct assembly of 
individual tents as well as the expected configuration for groups of tents. Thus, together 
with its instructions, the tent moves as a “constellation” of object and context (Redfield 
2008: 161), (ideally) enacting the same humanitarian shelter response wherever it is 
deployed. In this way, it is not only that the tent erected in the field is essentially identical 
to the one designed by the Global ESC in Geneva, it is the shelter response, as embodied in 
the tent/instructions constellation, that is essentially identical to that devised by the 
Global ESC in Geneva. In this way, the tent/instructions constellation may be said to act 
as an “immutable mobile” (Latour 1987). 
The Family Tent as an Immutable Mobile 
As elaborated in Chapter Five, an immutable mobile connects sites and stabilizes 
relationships between them by staying the same as it travels. Staying the same, notably, 
does not require the tent stay in the same material form as it travels. Rather, as Latour 
explains, the term immutable mobile is meant “to describe not displacement without 
transformation, but displacement through transformations” (2005: 223n emphasis 
original). In other words, various material transformations along the way are often what 




tent/instructions constellation, for its part, is able to remain the same as it travels 
between ESC sites because it undergoes various material transformations along the way: 
from design ideal in Geneva, to the written inscription of exact specifications in a PDF or 
paper document, to the material form of a flat-packed tent with paper tent-assembly 
instructions, to a correctly assembled tent or group of tents at the site of humanitarian 
crises. These transformations of material form allow the tent to remain ideally identical as 
it moves from the Global ESC Team meeting rooms in Geneva to the factories and 
warehouses where tents are produced and stockpiled to the places of humanitarian crises 
where tents are assembled in realization of an emergency shelter response.  
By staying the same in this way, the family tent stabilizes relationships between 
places, enacting spatial relations between global (place of the ESC) and local (places of 
crisis) similarly wherever it goes. Describing a similarly standardized, mobile device for 
effecting humanitarian responses (in this case medical responses), Peter Redfield argues 
that the biomedical kits used by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) effect “a mobile, 
transitional variety of limited intervention, modifying and partially reconstructing a local 
environment around specific artifacts and a set script”(2008: 161). This characterization is 
an equally apt description of the family tent in the context of humanitarian shelter 
responses, with the tent acting as “specific artifact” and the instructions with which it 
travels acting as the “set script.” As with the biomedical kit, the local environments of 
humanitarian crises are partly reconstructed around the tent as assembled alongside other 
tents in a specified configuration. Moreover, because the tent/instructions constellation 
does not change according to the specificities of each crisis, its deployment effects a 




Figure 7.1 visually illustrates this homogenizing tendency in the images of several 
recent ESC responses where the family tent was deployed. Dotted across different 
landscapes of disaster, the tents shown in Figure 7.1 recall Debrix’s description of global 
humanitarian action as dissolving the specificities between different humanitarian crises 
into “a succession of similar, interchangeable catastrophic visual sites” (1998: 843). On 
the one hand, Debrix’s characterization is overly totalizing (see Chapter Two); after all, 
the elements of place in the sites of humanitarian crises interact with, collaborate with 
and resist the extension of the global humanitarian apparatus in the production of global 
humanitarian spaces (see Chapter Four). On the other hand, the family tent resists being 
changed by the specificities of local contexts, instead partially changing these contexts 
around its own standard form. In the images collected in Figure 7.1 each landscape of 
disaster is different, yet the tents provide the visual cues of repetition across sites, 
signaling a similarity between them. The tent, in holding its complex shape as it moves 
between sites, enacts humanitarian spaces created in the response to flooding in one 
place in a similar way to the response to an earthquake in another and to conflict in yet 
another. It does not change in accordance with the unique qualities of each crisis, but 
instead partly re-orders these qualities according to its own standard form and script. 
That is to say, it enacts global humanitarian space as a network space. A network space, as 
described by Law and Mol (2001), is characterized by holding associations stable such to 
effect invariance across space and over time. In this case, what is being held stable are the 
spatial and material relationships constituting a humanitarian shelter responses. Within 





Figure 7.1: Various Photographs of Standardized Family Tents in Use 
 
Photo credits, clockwise from top left: P.Fichard/©ICRC 2009; D.A. Khan/©UNHCR 2010; S. 
Phelps/©UNHCR 2011; A. Syedzada/©UNHCR 2010 
 
By staying the same wherever it travels, the shelter response effected through use 
of the family tent also effects predictability. However, like the forms of standardization 
enacted by the IPC tool discussed previously, the family tent achieves this predictability at 
the price of obscuring difference between crises and victims. The Global ESC research 
and development team that designed the family tent decided which characteristics of 
emergency shelter would be most important for beneficiaries of shelter aid and 
standardized the family tent to address these characteristics. At best, this relegates the 
recipients of tents to passive victims of crisis waiting for a globally standard solution to 
their homelessness to be delivered. At worst, this negation can threaten the very lives it 
intends to save. In the Puntland region of Somalia, for example, tents were distributed 
for use in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps because they are much cooler during 




However, a recent review of shelter solutions in Somalia found that those IDPs who 
lived in shelters – including tents – with canvas walls that could be easily cut through 
were at constant risk of robbery and, especially for women and girls, of rape (Somalia 
Shelter/NFI Cluster 2011).  
Shelter as a Thing in a Sequential Timeline  
 In designing the standardized family tent, of course, the intent of the Global ESC 
was not to essentialize the victims of humanitarian crises as homogenous “victims of 
crisis.” Rather, the standardization of the tent is intended to make humanitarian 
responses faster thereby saving more lives. In the rush to respond to new humanitarian 
crises, a lack of sufficient stockpiles of appropriate materials has been found to lead to 
rushed procurement, which in turn often leads to the production of substandard 
materials.45 Family tents are premade and prepositioned in stockpiles located around the 
globe so that they can be deployed almost immediately in the case of a new humanitarian 
crisis. Once they arrive at the site of crisis they can be assembled within a matter of 
hours, rather than in the days or weeks it might take to build a new or repair an old 
structure. In this way, the family tent is understood as an efficient means of saving lives 
today. 
However, like the humanitarian action aimed primarily at saving lives today, the 
temporality of the tent itself is bounded. Although they provide extremely rapid shelter 
for people left homeless by crisis, the tents are temporary: their life expectancy is 
estimated to be one year, after which time they are expected to be uninhabitable and to 
have little to no market value. The result of the tent’s limited life span is that those given 
                                              
45 This was found to be the case, for example, in the ESC review of the shelter response to the 2010 earthquake in 




tents to ameliorate the loss of a home will experience a second rupture after one year 
when they again lose their dwelling. For humanitarian action temporally oriented to 
saving lives today, however, the future rupture that will be caused when a tent ceases to 
work as a shelter solution after one year is of little concern. As long as lives are saved 
today – in the immediate aftermath of a crisis – humanitarian actors will have done their 
part in what is enacted as a linear sequence of action after crisis. In one year’s time, the 
emergency (humanitarian) phase will have passed and problem of providing shelter will 
have transitioned into the early recovery or development phase.  
The temporal orientation to saving lives today remains common among 
humanitarian actors (see Chapter Six). Humanitarian action oriented by it enacts the 
timeline of humanitarian crises sequentially, with the humanitarian phase taking place 
first, followed by an early recovery/recovery phase and finally moving into a 
development phase. Within each phase of this sequence, action moves linearly from a 
beginning to a definite closure. Within this sequential time, shelter is conceived as an 
object, or series of objects, to be deployed according to the stage of the sequence, such 
that humanitarian  recovery  development corresponds to tent  temporary shelter 
 permanent shelter. Because the family tent is expected to last at least as long as the 
humanitarian phase of action, it serves its purpose of saving lives in the immediate term.  
Commenting on the persistence of humanitarian action ordered according to such 
a linear sequential timeline, a UNDP staff member at the Global Early Recovery Cluster 
said, “we still see too much the response, early recovery, recovery and then development, 
but it doesn’t work that way. First, it is not an inert process, it’s not sequential in a sense.” 
This assessment of the situation is more common among development actors than 




humanitarian consciousness (see, for example, the discussion of the Education Cluster in 
Chapter Six). Within the ESC, while tents remain a major part of a sequentially ordered 
shelter response, there is therefore a growing attempt at moving away from a sequential 
model of “shelter as a thing” towards a model of “shelter as a process.” In the next 
section, I explore how the ESC is attempting to enact shelter as a process by deploying a 
very difference response object from the family tent: the shelter kit. 
Effecting Emergency Shelter Responses with the Shelter Kit 
Though the mobilization of tents remains the go-to shelter response for many 
ESC members, in many of the crisis responses the ESC coordinates, it advocates for the 
distribution of tools, plastic sheeting, and building materials instead of tents. In a 
presentation delivered at an ESC coordinators’ training course, a member of the Global 
ESC Team equated the use of tents with the idea that “shelter is a thing.” This is a 
conceptual model for thinking about shelter responses that the Global ESC Team has 
been keen to move beyond: as the presenter repeatedly emphasized “shelter is not a 
thing, shelter is a process.” In this section I explore how seeing shelter as a process rather 
than a thing is implicated in the enactment of different global humanitarian spaces and 
different temporal orientations of humanitarian action. 
Like the tent, the distribution of tools, tarpaulins and building materials has a long 
history in humanitarian shelter responses. Also like the tent, these materials have recently 
been standardized in the form of a “shelter kit,” developed by ESC co-lead agency, the 
IFRC. Like the family tent, the shelter kit connects the sites of humanitarian crises to 
each other and to the Global ESC in Geneva. As it moves, also like the tent, the shelter 
kit is transformed from a design ideal, to a specifications document, to the materialized 




in the places of humanitarian crises. In its use in diverse shelter responses the shelter kit 
effects the same humanitarian shelter response originally envisioned in Geneva. Yet, what 
it means for the shelter kit to be the same shelter response from place to place differs 
critically from what it means for the tent to be the same shelter response. Before 
elaborating on this point further, it is useful to explain in more detail what the shelter kit 
is and what kind of humanitarian shelter response it effects. 
Pictured in Figure 7.2, the IFRC/ESC shelter kit is a standardized collection of 
tools, fixings (i.e. rope, nails), and two tarpaulins. Unlike the tent which is self-contained 
and cannot be easily adapted or combined with other materials, the shelter kit is designed 
to be used in combination with locally salvaged or procured building materials (e.g. 
bamboo, corrugated metal, concrete, etc.) and can be used either to repair damaged 
housing or build new emergency shelters. Shelters built or repaired using the shelter kit 
can be easily added to and adapted over time to eventually become permanent housing. 
In addition, the items provided in the shelter kit can be used for auxiliary shelter tasks 
such as clearing rubble and digging drainage ditches, as well as for building essential non- 
shelter structures such as latrines and water collection points. Moreover, whereas tents 
are expected to last one year, after which they will have little or no value as either shelter 
or parts, the tools in the shelter kit are expected to last into the recovery phase of crises, 
when they can be used for things like gardening and boat building, thereby supporting 
the restoration of livelihoods after disaster. If and when tools are no longer needed, they 
are expected to retain some market value such that households can sell them for cash, 
again marking a crucial difference from the tent which rapidly loses its market value. In 




the immediate present of a humanitarian crisis – also signals a consideration of for the 
future well-being of the lives it saves in the present. 
Figure 7.2: Shelter Kit Contents, as Illustrated in “Shelter Kit” Promotional Pamphlet  
 
Source: (IFRC 2009a: 4) 
 
Put forward with the slogan ‘build back better’, the IFRC promotes the shelter kit 




emergency shelter needs. As noted above, when tents are used in shelter responses their 
inadaptability coupled with their limited life span means that they interrupt the shelter 
process: after one year in a tent there is a second rupture and a new shelter solution must 
be found. This is particularly disruptive in situations where the crisis is still ongoing after 
one year (as with many conflicts and famines) or where the crisis phase is over but 
recovery remains a long way off (as with many large scale natural disasters, especially in 
less developed countries). Compounding the disruption caused by having to move into a 
new temporary shelter is the fact that, after a year the global media (with its notoriously 
short attention span) is usually long gone from the scene, taking the attention and, 
critically, the funding it brings with it.  
Conversely, shelter kits, as noted above, are used to make shelters that can be 
adapted and built up over time so that the same structure can gradually be built up and 
transformed from an emergency shelter, to temporary or transitional shelter to a 
permanent shelter.46 That is to say, they are designed to enact shelter as a process that will 
unfold over time: like tents the kits effect emergency shelter in the urgent present of a 
humanitarian crisis, unlike the tent they are expected to also evolve into temporary and 
later permanent shelters in the future. In an attempt to ensure some continuity in this 
process, the shelter kit is distributed either directly to affected families, or to community 
building committees depending on local capabilities, available supplies, and local practices 
around building. Thus, whereas the tent arrives at the site of crisis complete, needing only 
                                              
46 Of course, a condition for becoming a permanent home is right to the land on which the shelter is built. While 
this is often not a problem in natural disaster situations where households seek to rebuild on the same site of their 
destroyed home, often even using salvaged materials and existing foundations to this end, in situations of forced 
migration,  emergency shelter sites – such as camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees – are usually 
built on government or private land, ruling out permanent tenure. To address this issue, the latest guidelines on 
emergency and transitional shelter recommend that these structures be built in such a fashion that they can be 




proper assembly (a task generally undertaken by the staff of humanitarian agencies and 
NGOs), the shelter kit involves affected populations in their own shelter solutions. In 
this way, the shelter kit not only enacts shelter as a process, but it enacts this process as a 
collaborative one between aid workers and the beneficiaries of aid in the hope of 
preventing a “second crisis” when aid workers leave the scene after the immediate crisis 
has subsided.  
In addition, the shelter kit has another major characteristic that sets it apart from 
the tent: it is standardized to be changeable. That is, the contents of the shelter kit, although 
standardized, are designed to be easily modified to fit the local context. Just as the tent is 
accompanied in its travels by a “script” in the form of precise instructions for its use, the 
shelter kit travels with a script in the form of an 88 page guidance booklet. However, 
rather than giving exact instructions for correct use, the shelter kit guidance booklet is a 
script that encourages and gives instruction for varying how the kit is to be used in 
practice. For example, the guidance booklet provides a quick reference chart advising 
when and in what way the shelter kit might be modified. This chart suggests many 
scenarios in which it is not only possible, but recommended, that the contents of the shelter 
kit be modified to accommodate local contexts. Many of these recommendations are 
aimed at minimizing future harm, such as excluding the machete in situations where it 
could be used in ongoing violent conflict or including construction materials where 
households will have difficulty procuring them locally. It should also be noted that, 
because the IFRC has developed specifications not only for the items in the standard 
shelter kit, but for many, if not most of the items which might be substituted, modified 
kits can be easily assembled by combining existing elements of the kit with new items 




incorporate flexibility without sacrificing more than a minimum of speed, keeping one 
eye toward maximizing the number of lives saved in the urgent present and another 
towards minimizing harm in the future by adjusting the contents of kits to fit into local 
contexts. 
Figure 7.3: Adapted Shelter Kit Distributed in Myanmar for Cyclone Nargis Response 
 





Exemplifying this process of adaptation, in the areas of Myanmar affected by 
Cyclone Nargis, the shelter kit was adapted for use in bamboo construction. This 
decision was made by the ESC based on the fact that bamboo was the building material 
most typically used in local construction techniques and that it could be procured locally 
without causing extensive environmental damage (as might be the case, for example, with 
hardwood construction). Figure 7.3 shows the contents of the toolkit that was distributed 
in Myanmar along with the standard two tarpaulins to comprise an adapted shelter kit. 
Basic items in the modified toolkit match those from the standard kit: machete, handsaw, 
claw hammer, nails and rope. Items for working with metal, such as tin snips and roofing 
nails, however, have been left out. And, finally, some items particularly useful for building 
with bamboo have been added: a chisel set for joinery and a sharpener for the machete, 
which was expected to be used continuously (again, signaling a consideration for the 
future through action oriented to the present). This sort of adjustment is not only 
possible, but actively encouraged: the example of the adjusted Myanmar kit was 
presented at the ESC training as a model example of how to use the shelter kit to effect 
shelter responses. 
The Shelter Kit as a Mutable Mobile 
Thus, although both the family tent and the shelter kit may be said to connect 
sites across space and over time by staying “the same” as they move, what it means for 
each to be “the same” is different. In the case of the family tent, “staying the same” 
meant that the material form of shelter realized in the places of humanitarian crises is the 
same material form of shelter conceived in Geneva and remains the same material form 
of shelter across space and over time. Conceived as a thing, shelter stays the same from 




shelter kit, on the other hand, “staying the same” does not translate into shelter being the 
same thing from place to place: the forms of shelters built with it vary widely – yet it still 
makes sense to see shelter kits as effecting the same humanitarian shelter response. 
Conceived as a process, sheltering – effected through the use of shelter kits – remains the 
same from place to place, even though the material form of shelters built vary both 
across space and over time. In other words, what is being transported is not the 
standardized spatio-material arrangement of shelter, but rather a  particular spatial and 
temporal relationship to emergency shelter responses.  
Unlike an immutable mobile, which faithfully transports form between sites 
(despite – or because of – the transformations it undergoes along the way), the shelter kit 
connects sites across space and over time by acting as a mutable mobile. A mutable mobile 
exhibits configurational variance as it moves between sites (Law and Mol 2001). To 
illustrate how this works, it is useful to take a moment to consider a comparative 
example: the Zimbabwe Bush Pump. The Zimbabwe Bush Pump, as described by 
Marianne de Laet and Annemarie Mol (and for which the term “mutable mobile” was 
first proposed) (2000), has three notable characteristics: first, the material composition of 
the Bush Pump is slightly different from place to place – parts sometimes fall off or 
break down and are replaced with different ones and new components are added that are 
not part of its original design. Second, as it moves from place to place, the Bush Pump 
takes on various meanings and uses: it is, of course, a mechanical devise for supplying 
water, but it is also in some places a tool for promoting health and in others one for 
building community. Finally, with its multiple uses and materialities, the Bush Pump 
extends the meaning of what is means for it to work beyond a binary yes or no, such that 




Laet and Mol 2000: 225). Critically, however, despite these characteristic variances or, 
more precisely, because these variances are part of the intended design of the Zimbabwe 
Bush Pump, it makes sense to say it is the same pump from one site to the next (Law and 
Mol 2001). 
As with the Bush Pump, the material composition of the kit is designed to be 
changeable: the components are similar but not necessarily the same from place to place 
where it is deployed (compare Figures 7.2 and 7.3 above). There is, indeed, no single part 
of the kit which must stay constant for it to hold its shape as an ESC shelter kit. Yet, if all 
the components of the kit were switched at once, it would indeed cease to be the same 
kit. The components of the shelter kit may change from crisis to crisis, but this change is 
always just partial, maintaining enough similarity to the original kit – kits always include 
tarpaulins, rope and some combination of building tools – to be recognizable as a shelter 
kit.  
Second, the shelter kit holds different meanings. It is a shelter response object, 
distributed to aid in the construction and repair of emergency shelters after disaster or 
displacement. It is also an affirmation of the idea that shelter is a process, designed to 
effect emergency shelter and thus immediately save lives, but also to allow shelters built 
with it to evolve over time into different forms, thereby also sustaining lives through 
preventing future shelter ruptures. And still further, it is a recognition of local capacities 
and a means of involving affected households in their own relief and recovery process. 
As the instructional booklet on using the shelter kit reads: 
Rather than waiting for the provision of tents or other such temporary shelter solutions, many 
people whose homes are affected by natural disasters begin the sheltering process themselves, 
using materials they are able to salvage from their damaged homes or sourced from their 
surroundings and with whatever tools they are able to access. Relief items, such as plastic 




households to rapidly provide their own shelter solutions or to make damaged houses habitable. 
(IFRC 2009b: i) 
This meaning also extends into a currently fashionable approach to the provision of 
humanitarian aid, which stresses the importance of “people helping themselves to 
provide appropriate shelter” (ibid.). So the shelter kit is a set of material objects for 
repairing and building shelters after displacement, but also a means of recognizing local 
differences and involving people in their own relief and recovery process. Moreover, it is 
an affirmation of the (re)conceptualization of shelter as a process and not an object. By 
holding these multiple meanings, the kit, at least partly, blurs the boundaries between the 
givers and receivers of aid and between humanitarian relief, recovery and development.  
 Finally, whether or not the shelter kit ‘works’ as a shelter response cannot be 
easily answered with a yes or no. The family tent, by contrast, presents a binary 
emergency shelter solution: if it is made to specification and set up properly it is working, 
if it is not made to specification or set up incorrectly it is not working. What constitutes 
“working” in the case of the shelter kit, conversely, is specifically intended to depend on 
the context and on which meaning one is asking about. The shelter kit results in different 
material structures of differing quality depending on the available building materials, local 
building styles and capacities at the scene. As such, whether or not the shelter kit is 
working is often a question of degree. Within a single affected community the shelter kit 
might work for some households, for example for those with several skilled and able-
bodied members, but not for others who lack these capacities. In addition, in cases where 
ESC members take on extensive roles in helping families design and construct shelters 
using the kit, it could work in the provision of emergency shelter but fail to work as a 




In acting as a mutable mobile – in varying in response to the different contexts it 
encounters, the shelter kit could be described as enacting a globally fluid space (de Laet and 
Mol 2000; see also Mol and Law 1994; Law and Mol 2001). In their joint work on spatial 
forms, Law and Mol (Mol and Law 1994; Law and Mol 2001) suggest the notion of ‘fluid’ 
space to indicate that articulations between places, people and things are not fixed, but 
rather positions and meanings can be open and overlapping. Instead of stabilizing 
relationships through making associations as in a network space, the notion of fluid space 
suggests that connections might be less solid, opening relationships to subtle changes and 
variance from place to place (Law and Mol 2001; see also Callon and Law 2004). Such 
fluidity, Law and Mol suggest, may be necessary to maintain relational connections in “a 
world in which invariance is likely to lead to rupture, difference, and distance. In which 
the attempt to hold relations constant is likely to erode continuity” (Law and Mol 2001: 
614). The shelter kit moves and maintains relationships across boundaries around the 
world precisely because it is capable of changing shape, not despite of this characteristic. In 
so doing, the shelter kit self-consciously enacts – together with its recipients – globally 
heterogeneous humanitarian spaces. 
Shelter as a Process in a Simultaneous Timeline 
In addition to enacting different spatial relationships from the family tent, the 
shelter kit is also associated with a different temporal orientation to humanitarian action. 
On the one hand, the shelter kit shares the family tent’s purpose of  saving lives today, as 
the following extract from the IFRC guidance booklet on the shelter kit describes:  
Although distribution of construction materials and tools has been a component of shelter relief 
programmes in many emergencies, until recently such assistance packages have only been 
developed after the disasters, a process that takes time and leads to inconsistencies in 
specifications and quality. By creating a standardised shelter kit, pre-positioned regionally in 
significant quantities using defined and tested specifications, IFRC has significantly improved the 




Like the family tent, then, the standardization embodied in the shelter kit is envisioned as 
increasing the speed at which shelter responses can be effected, thereby saving lives in 
the immediate term. On the other hand, the shelter kit is designed to also sustain the lives 
that it saves today: the kit widely adaptable and capable of producing emergency shelters 
that are expected evolve over time into temporary and then permanent structures, thus 
providing life saving shelter in the present while minimizing the potential of a second 
shelter disruption in the future.  
Finally, by being built specifically to interact with, and be at least partly shaped by, 
local knowledge and practices of affected populations, it seeks not only to save bare life, 
but to sustain the elaborated lives of individuals with particular knowledge, skills and 
cultural practices. As such, when used as intended, the shelter kit is expected to enact 
emergency shelter as a collaborative, interactive process that unfolds over time. Unlike 
the linear, sequential phase-time enacted with the family tent, the shelter kit enacts a 
timeline of crisis characterized by overlapping and even simultaneous concerns all of 
which are subject to ongoing adaptation and “tinkering” (Law and Mol 2010). Recovery 
and development are not separated from humanitarian time in this timeline, but all are 
happening at once as part of the same ongoing process. Similarly, this timeline 
incorporates not only the immediate present, but also the past in the particular skills and 
community contexts that inform how the shelter kit is used and what sort of shelters are 
produced with it, and the future in the shelter kit’s promise of retaining value and 
supporting livelihoods.  
Conclusion  
 This chapter has shown that the ESC enacts different global humanitarian spaces 




family tents provides a rapid, predictable shelter solution that enacts global humanitarian 
spaces as (partially) homogenous through the tent’s ability to remain the same shelter 
form from place to place. Deployment of shelter kits, meanwhile, enact global 
humanitarian spaces as globally heterogeneous, adapting to local contexts as they move. 
While the network space of the family tent is (ideally) invariable from place to place, the 
fluid space of the shelter kits adapts and unfolds differently from place to place.  
Deployment of the family tent signals a humanitarian action oriented towards 
saving lives today: tents are an extremely fast form of shelter to erect and once erected 
are self-contained and ready for immediate habitation. The timeline of crisis enacted 
through the deployment of the tents is one characterized by a linear sequence in which 
shelter is an object that corresponds to the step in the sequence. Deployment of shelter 
kits, alternatively, signal a humanitarian action in oriented towards saving lives in the 
urgent present but also mindful of reducing harm to those lives in the future. The 
timeline of crisis enacted through the deployment of shelter kits is one characterized by 
simultaneous forms of action in which shelter is a process of sheltering that involves 
ongoing adaptations.  
The division of this analysis into shelter responses enacted as steps in a sequence 
versus those enacted as process is, admittedly, somewhat of an artificial one, as almost 
every humanitarian response coordinated by the ESC contains a mix of both approaches. 
Some members of the ESC stay on through the recovery phases of humanitarian crises, 
while others – notably the cluster lead IFRC – never stay beyond the emergency phase. 
Yet, while groups like IFRC may maintain a strong focus on saving lives today, the use of 
the shelter kits signals their emergent consideration of the future. However, in opposing 




ongoing tension in global humanitarian responses between action oriented toward saving 
lives today and that oriented toward saving lives today with tomorrow in mind. I have 
also shown how these two orientations to action can be associated with different 
enactments of space and scale as either, on the one hand, stable and more or less 













This dissertation has looked at how emergent global humanitarian spaces are 
being made and enacted through the socio-material practices and arrangements 
associated with the IASC-led Cluster Approach. Through the empirical investigation, it 
has shown that the Cluster Approach makes and does global humanitarian spaces varies 
from cluster to cluster and from one humanitarian response to the next. That is, different 
types of socio-material practices, stemming from formal and informal relationships 
within each cluster, as well as from the contingencies of heterogeneous (human and non-
human) associations, enact different global humanitarian spaces in difference crisis 
responses. In what follows, I draw together some of the key analytic findings of my 
empirical chapters that speak to this enacting of different global humanitarian spaces and 
consider the implications of these findings for humanitarian action. 
Unfolding Global (Humanitarian) Spaces 
In Chapter Two, I introduced the problem of how space in the phrase 
“humanitarian space” is often conceptualized – or, more precisely, not conceptualized – in 
such a way as to relegate the space in the phrase “humanitarian space” to a static, pre-
given container for humanitarian action as variously and richly defined. By contrast, I 
have argued, following Lefebvre and Massey, for seeing (humanitarian) space as dynamic 
and open. Throughout this dissertation my analysis has relied on Lefebvre’s insight, 




permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others” (1991 
[1974]: 73). From this foundational insight – that social space is both the result of social 
action and productive of it – it follows that different actions will create different sorts of 
social space, and these different spaces will constrain or enable different actions in an 
ongoing interactional process unfolding over time.  
I have argued that global humanitarian space cannot be adequately understood as 
a homogenizing force spreading out from the West over the surface of the world, nor as 
somehow existing in a deterritorialized global “space of flows.” This is because, first and 
foremost, the world does not consist of a passive surface of space, but is already fully 
populated by diverse, overlapping and unfolding spaces and places. The local places of 
humanitarian crises each participate in the making of global humanitarian spaces and are 
not (cannot be) simply “acted on” by global forces. Moreover, such “global forces” as 
exist in the Cluster Approach – namely the global clusters – are themselves particular to 
certain located practices and actors. Chapter Four establishes that the global clusters do 
not represent a displaced “view from nowhere” nor a view from some universal 
everywhere, but, in actuality, represent a view from particular cities in the global North, 
especially concentrated in Geneva, New York and London. In their aim to effect 
coordination and collaboration between humanitarian actors, the global clusters have 
centered on these cities as they are home to the headquarters of important offices of 
many of the largest humanitarian agencies and organizations. The locational bias this 
creates is furthered by the convening of important cluster events in these three cities such 
that would-be partners from the global South experience a de facto exclusion from the 
global clusters as far as they are unable to travel to these cities to participate and thereby 




of increased coordination and collaboration between the largest humanitarian agencies 
and organizations, the global clusters have concentrated the locational view of “global 
humanitarianism,” thereby effectively foregoing the alternative possibility of a global 
humanitarianism that draws together a diversity of humanitarian actors from around the 
world.  
Despite the specific and concentrated locatedness of the global clusters, however, 
the global humanitarian spaces they enact are nonetheless necessarily enacted together 
with more dispersed and sometimes localized actors, material arrangements and 
processes. Chapter Four also establishes how new humanitarian spaces are created 
through the encounters between different spatial orders as “global” humanitarian actors, 
practices and material arrangements extend into the national and local spaces of 
humanitarian crises. These spaces, meanwhile, extend back into global places in varying 
ways and to various extents. The emergent global humanitarian spaces associated with the 
Cluster Approach involve different  articulations between varying places and scales.  
One version of global humanitarian space enacted through the Cluster Approach 
is the sort created in the humanitarian response to cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, reviewed 
in Chapter Four. In this humanitarian response translocal articulations between global 
and local actors effected a global humanitarian space in which the places of the global 
clusters in Geneva were extended into the Ayeyarwady Delta in Myanmar, as well as to 
cluster offices in neighbouring Bangkok from where the country-level clusters were 
temporarily run. At the same time the specificities of the place of the crisis – the strict 
regulations enforced by the national government and the difficult physical terrain – 
extended back into the places of global humanitarian command, constraining some 




humanitarian space was enacted as an extensive translocal network of actors, material 
arrangements and processes.  
A second version of global humanitarian space enacted through the Cluster 
Approach involves the denationalization of certain national processes and actors which, 
while remaining encased within national territorial and institutional framings, are 
reoriented towards global dynamics (Sassen 2008a, 2010a). In the case of the Kenyan 
Nutrition Cluster, also reviewed in Chapter Four, national actors and territorializations, 
including government ministries, nurses and hospitals, participate in and actively forward 
the global humanitarian aims established by the Global Nutrition Cluster through 
enforcing global standards for nutrition set by the global cluster and by moreover 
deploying national capabilities in their pursuit. Here, rather than creating a global 
humanitarian space through the forging of a translocal network of actors, materials and 
processes, a global humanitarian space in enacted through the enrolment of national and 
local actors, institutions and capacities in pursuit of global aims.   
Entangled with the creation of global humanitarian spaces is the achievement of a 
global scale of humanitarian action. As with space more generally, I have argued in this 
dissertation for seeing scales not as pre-given sizes or levels, but as subject to making and 
remaking through diverse and changing socio-material practices and arrangements. As 
such, the global scale of humanitarian space enacted through the Cluster Approach has 
been shown to take on different relational qualities depending on the different global 
humanitarian spatial practices through which it is enacted. As with – or because of – its 
effecting of different global humanitarian spaces, then, the Cluster Approach makes and 
enacts different versions of globally scaled humanitarian action. In one version of a 




material arrangements are aimed at stabilizing spatial relationships across space and over 
time. This is done by the Cluster Approach, as examined in Chapter Five, when it 
translates the diverse qualities of particular humanitarian crises into similar and 
commensurable data that may easily travel in different material forms – spreadsheets, 
reports, maps, etcetera – between sites. Through such translations, standardized 
information about crises and the standardized understandings it conveys are able to 
circulate extensively across space and over time without deformation, thereby stabilizing 
a set of standardized relationships between sites. Similarly, standardized relief materials 
used by the clusters, such as the standardized family tent discussed in Chapter Seven, 
effect a global scale of humanitarian space by stabilizing a standard relationship between 
humanitarian workers, the receivers of humanitarian assistance and the material form of 
relief provided across space and over time.  
A second version of a global scale of humanitarian action effected by the Cluster 
Approach aims to link humanitarian spaces through a set of socio-material practices that 
are capable of adapting to the particularities of different contexts. Rather than connecting 
sites through stabilizing spatial relationships, this form of global scale-making involves 
connecting sites through being fluid enough to include difference. Some clusters attempt 
to achieve this version of global scale through emphasizing the importance of tailoring 
each humanitarian response to the particular context of the crisis at hand. The Education 
Cluster, as discussed in Chapter Six, aims to “standardize” adaptability in its goal of 
working together with different national and local educational institutions and actors to 
effect flexible and diverse versions of education during crisis. The deployment of the 
shelter kit by the Shelter Cluster, discussed in Chapter Seven, also enacts a globally scaled 




of crisis to effect different spatial relationships and material arrangements of emergency 
shelter across space and over time.  
The first version of global scale-making depends on rendering humanitarian 
spaces similar, whether through making the qualitative specificities of each crisis and 
response quantitatively commensurable or through deploying standard response objects 
that (re)enact spatial relationships similarly across different sites of crisis response. This 
way of making a global scale of humanitarian action attempts to hold differences outside 
of the humanitarian spaces it creates and to thereby stabilize extensive relationships 
between sites by enacting the same social and material relationships between them. 
Conversely, the second version of global scale-making does not rely on or seek to exclude 
differences, but instead embraces difference, connecting places through adapting to 
different contexts and thus creating different spatial and material relationships within 
them. 
In addition to more explicitly spatial categories such as territorialisations and scale, 
I have also considered, in Chapters Six and Seven, how the temporal orientation of 
humanitarian action within the Cluster Approach directs practices in particular ways and 
thus shapes global humanitarian spaces in different ways. A temporal orientation to 
action in the urgent present – that is, towards saving lives today – remains common within 
the Cluster Approach. At the same time, I have also indentified a (re)orientation of 
humanitarian action within parts of the Cluster Approach towards saving lives today, with 
tomorrow in mind. These different temporal orientations were shown in Chapter Six to be 
associated with different practices within the Clusters for  designating situations as 
specifically humanitarian or not. The IPC tool for classifying food security situations was 




humanitarian spaces in terms of emergency and rupture, and reduces lives saved to mere 
physical existence, to “bare life.” A temporal orientation to saving lives today with 
tomorrow in mind, on the other hand, was shown, in the case of the Global Education 
Cluster’s attempt to have education accepted as an integral part of humanitarian 
responses, to frame humanitarian spaces in terms of a “comprehensive response,” 
marked by saving (bare) lives, but critically also marked by the effort to sustain socially 
and psychologically elaborated lives.  
Using two different shelter response items – the family tent and the shelter kit – 
Chapter Seven illustrated how different socio-material practices employed by the clusters 
in effecting humanitarian responses are associated both with different temporal 
orientations of humanitarian action and the enactment of different spatial relationships, 
both of which are deeply entwined with one another. On the one hand, deployment of 
the family tent by the emergency shelter cluster is associated with enacting a sequential 
timeline of crisis, in which humanitarian space is discretely bounded in time as the first 
step in a sequence, to be followed by the space of recovery and then the space of 
development. In this sequential understanding of crisis response, the tent represents an 
appropriate form of shelter for the first, emergency step as it is fast to deploy and set up 
and – because it is the same wherever it goes – reliably acts as the same emergency shelter 
response in different places of crisis. In this instance, the emergency shelter cluster 
urgently populates humanitarian space with the life saving tent, without consideration of 
how that space might unfold in the future, for example when the tent stops working as a 
shelter after one year (its life expectancy once in use). 
On the other hand, deployment of the shelter kit by the emergency shelter cluster 




coexists and unfolds together with recovery and development spaces and in which the 
edges between these spaces may be blurred. Acting within this temporal orientation, the 
emergency shelter cluster designed the shelter to create shelters that evolve over time, 
from emergency shelter to temporary shelter to permanent shelter and may be used for 
building other structures like latrines and water collection points as well as to support 
livelihoods such as boat building or small-holding farming. As such, in this instance, 
while the emergency shelter cluster is populating humanitarian space with life saving 
shelter, it is also populating that space with a form of life-saving shelter that aims to 
sustain lives through recovery and development by building in the possibility of  adapting 
to the unfolding of humanitarian space over time.  
Thus, rather than achieving one universal version of global humanitarian space, 
the Cluster Approach achieves different versions of global humanitarian spaces. This 
speaks in part to the diversity of organizational missions, practices, and capabilities 
represented between clusters as well as within each cluster. Although I have sometimes 
written of the clusters as singular actors for the purpose of expediency, it is important to 
keep in mind that, as noted in the Introduction, each cluster is in fact a coming together 
of many different humanitarian agencies and organizations with widely varying missions, 
organizational cultures, levels of experience, and budgets. Effecting coordination and 
collaboration between such a multiplicity of actors requires an ongoing negotiation, the 
outcome of which will be different in different situations. Among other factors, who 
takes part or not in each cluster and cluster response has a big impact on how the cluster 
will pursue its goal of making a global humanitarian space. In Pakistan and Kenya, for 
example, government actors hold central position in the clusters and redirect national 




adversary to the clusters. In some cluster organized responses – particularly those 
associated with natural disasters – MSF and ICRC have played central roles despite their 
official status as observers rather than members, while in other responses – particularly 
those associated with politically charged violent conflicts – they have largely pursued their 
own courses of action. The possibilities for combination and recombination between 
different potential cluster members are endless and who is present or not in each place 
and time that a cluster acts matters for what type of global humanitarian space gets 
enacted. 
The creation of different humanitarian spaces by the clusters also speaks, 
however, to the nature of global spaces. As I have argued from the outset, space is 
dynamic, constantly unfolding, and both shapes and is shaped by social interactions. 
Global humanitarian spaces, then, will necessarily be different as they unfold in different 
places and at different times. It is not only the different arrangement of cluster members 
that effects how the global is achieved, but also the specificities of each particular 
humanitarian crisis and the spatial orders with which those created by the clusters must 
interact. That is to say, the clusters seek to shape global humanitarian spaces through 
their socio-material practices, but these practices are also shaped by the spaces the 
clusters encounter as they go. In this way the global, as variously practiced by the Cluster 
Approach, is not universal or singular, but multiple. In the final section of this 
dissertation I consider the implications of the global as multiple in the case of 
humanitarian space as created through the Cluster Approach, but first I take a moment to 





The Implicit Politics of the Cluster Approach 
In reviewing Michael Barnett’s recent history of the humanitarian system, David 
Rieff chides that “to see humanitarianism everywhere is not to see it at all” (Rieff 2011: 
27). Where Barnett’s history expands the humanitarian net, so to speak, to include a wide 
range of projects aimed at improving the human condition, Rieff’s argument is for a 
humanitarianism that is limited in its ambitions and therefore realistic it what it can and 
cannot accomplish in the world. Speaking of Michael Ignatieff as a stand in for all those 
who see in contemporary humanitarian action a “revolution of moral concern,” Rieff 
argues that “He preaches against disillusionment, but the truth is, anyone who is not 
disillusioned has not heard the bad news” (Rieff 2002: 12). For Rieff humanitarianism of 
the sort advocated by Ignatieff and triumphed by Barnett’s history has overstepped its 
bounds, creating more ills through its attempt to order the world in accordance with a 
particular moral vision. Instead, Rieff suggests that humanitarian action forgo any such 
lofty goals and focus on the more modest tasks of patching up the wounded, feeding the 
starving and providing a “bed for the night.”  
 The Cluster Approach, with its resolutely managerial, technical and procedural 
approach to humanitarian action might seem to stand outside of these debates on the 
appropriate moral scope and ambitions of humanitarian action – and indeed, avoiding 
such politics, is central to its self-understanding. Yet, as I have shown in this dissertation, 
the Cluster Approach does not remove the ambitions, politics or ambiguities from global 
humanitarian spaces, but multiplies them through the diversity of socio-material practices 
and arrangements through which it enacts such spaces. Often these ambitions, politics 
and ambiguities are hidden from view, as with the “facts” of crises that are assembled and 




objective language of numbers, these inscriptions were nonetheless shown to convey 
implicit rationalities, normativities and sometimes even urgent moral claims, underlining 
Donna Haraway’s classic argument that all knowledge is always situated (e.g. Haraway 
1991). 
Beyond the implicit (and varied) claims of cluster information manager’s data 
products, there are some instances where more particular politics are expressed through 
the humanitarian spaces enacted by the Cluster Approach. This is the case, for example, 
with the Education Cluster’s struggle to have education understood an important sector 
of specifically humanitarian action. The demand to make education part of a so-called 
comprehensive humanitarian response is a claim for a humanitarianism that aims for a 
better future for the lives it saves – it is a version of Ignatieff’s consequentialist 
humanitarianism, albeit a quieter one. Similarly the deployment of shelter kits carries a 
quiet consequentialist politics in its promise of extending its use beyond saving lives and 
into community participation in relief, recovery and development. Conversely, the tent in 
its limited function and lifespan might be seen as making an implicit claim for a 
humanitarianism in the spirit of Rieff – it is not about building community or improving 
futures, but only an emergency shelter for immediate relief from homelessness brought 
on by disaster.  
Towards a politics of Global Humanitarian Spaces? 
What sort of global humanitarian space is being made or enacted through the 
Cluster Approach – stable or malleable, homogeneous or heterogeneous – and what sort 
of implicit politics of humanitarianism this space might convey, depends on the 
contingencies of different socio-material practices in different places and times as 




material practices of the Cluster Approach, oriented toward different temporalities of 
action, differ from one instance to another such that more or less different global 
humanitarian spaces are being done by the clusters from one place and time to another. 
From this general point, it follows that the configuration and content of global 
humanitarian spaces are not given in the order of things but, since more or less different 
global humanitarian spaces are being enacted simultaneously through different socio-
material practices and arrangements, we might choose to encourage some forms of global 
humanitarian space and discourage others. In this way some forms of global 
humanitarian space may become more common, others may fade away (see Mol 2002). 
And, if this is the case, then it opens the door to the possibility of a politics of global 
humanitarian spaces. This is not a question of politics in the sense of aligning 
humanitarian action with political causes or lofty goals for improving the world, but 
rather a question of politics with a small p. In the case of the spaces enacted by the 
Cluster Approach, we might start to think about how to encourage practices that enact 
more inclusive and participatory spaces, for example the practices that would encourage 
participation from humanitarian actors in the global South or those associated with  
doing humanitarian responses together with the beneficiaries of those responses.  
Conversely we could discouraging those practices that effect exclusionary humanitarian 
spaces, for example by ending the exclusive holding of global cluster events in the global 
North or foregoing humanitarian responses that exclude local voices and preferences.  
The Cluster Approach is just one among many contemporary systems aimed at 
improving the effectiveness of humanitarian responses, but in its global reach and goal of 
non-Political (with a large P) inclusiveness, it is well positioned to embark on forging a 




alongside its efforts to improve technical capacities and preparedness, the Cluster 
Approach would do well to expand its efforts to include local NGOs and CBOs and, 
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